Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Insurer issued an insurance policy to Insured covering his truck. When Insured did not pay the premium amount to renew his policy by the deadline of May 1, Insurer sent Insured a notice of expiration and cancellation summary but offered to reinstate Insured’s coverage without interruption if he would pay the premium by May 18. Insurer wrote a check that was not received by Insured until May 24. On May 14, After Insurer sent the notice of expiration and before Insured’s payment had arrived, Insured was involved in an automobile accident resulting in the total loss of his truck. Insurer denied coverage for the accident, and Insured filed a complaint alleging breach of contract and requesting declaratory relief. The district court determined that there was no automobile insurance policy in effect at the time of Insured’s accident, and therefore, Insurer had no contractual duty to indemnify Insured for his losses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by concluding that Insurer properly cancelled the insurance policy for nonpayment of the renewal premium. View "Finn v. Dakota Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Bridgett Noland suffered severe injuries in an accident in Utah when the bicycle she was riding collided with a truck. Bridgett’s parents, the Nolands, owned Flathead Janitorial & Rug Services, Inc. Flathead Janitorial was the named insured under a corporate policy issued by American States Insurance for the time period in which the accident occurred. Bridgett was listed as a driver in a piece of correspondence from American States. The Nolands sought underinsured motorist (UIM) and medical payment (MP) benefits under the American States commercial automobile policy issued to Flathead Janitorial. American States denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment that Bridgett was not covered under the UIM or MP sections of the policy. The district court ruled in favor of American States, concluding that because Bridgett was not occupying a vehicle owned by Flathead Janitorial and covered by the policy when she was injured, she did not qualify for coverage under the policy as a matter of law. The Supree Court affirmed, holding that Bridgett was not entitled to coverage because the policy was a corporate policy clearly identifying the named insured as Flathead Janitorial and because, at the time of the accident, Bridgett was not occupying a covered auto. View "Am. States Ins. Co. v. Flathead Janitorial & Rug Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009, Carol McClue was involved in a serious car accident. At the time of the accident, Carol had underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance coverage through Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois. In 2011, Carol was diagnosed with bulbar ALS. In 2013, Carol died from the illness. After the diagnosis, Dan McClue, Carol’s husband, submitted claims to Safeco for UIM benefits for damages associated with Carol’s ALS. Safeco denied the claims. Dan subsequently filed suit against Safeco, asserting that Safeco breached the insurance contract by failing to provide UIM benefits for Carol’s ALS. Before trial, the district court granted Safeco’s motions in limine to exclude expert testimony from two doctors - Dr. John Sabow and Dr. Decontee Jimmeh-Fletcher. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment to Safeco on the grounds that, without the expert testimony, Dan did not have admissible evidence to establish that the car accident caused Carol’s ALS. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling barring Dan from using Dr. Jimmeh-Fletcher’s testimony to establish causation in this case; but (2) reversed the district court’s ruling that Dr. Sabow was not qualified to present expert testimony during trial. View "McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill." on Justia Law

While in the course and scope of his employment with Employer, Plaintiff suffered serious injuries. Plaintiff recovered workers’ compensation insurance benefits in the amount of $207,147. Plaintiff subsequently brought this action against Employer, alleging that Employer was an uninsured employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act at the time of the accident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, concluding that Employer was an insured employer under the Act and was therefore entitled to tort immunity pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-411. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Employer was an insured employer under the Act and therefore was entitled to tort immunity. View "Stokes v. Golden Triangle, Inc." on Justia Law

F.H. Stoltze Land & Lumber Company and Maxum Specialty Insurance Group (collectively, “Stoltze”) and Les Schlegel Enterprises (“Schlegel”) contracted for Schlegel to log Stoltze’s property. Schlegel obtained liability insurance from American States Insurance Company (ASI). Whitney Shanks, a worker for Schlegel, injured himself during logging operations on Stoltze’s property. Shanks filed a personal injury lawsuit against both Schlegel and Stoltze. Stoltze tendered defense and indemnity of Shanks’s suit to ASI. After ASI accepted the tender, the district court dismissed the case against Schlegel on the grounds that Schlegel was immune to suit under the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision. ASI subsequently withdrew its defense of Stoltze, asserting that the policy covered Stoltze only to the extent that Schlegel was liable. Stoltze then filed a complaint against ASI, seeking declaratory judgment that ASI was required to defend and indemnify Stoltze against Shanks’s suit. The district court entered summary judgment for ASI, concluding that because the court in the underlying action determined that Schlegel was immune and not liable, ASI had no duty to defend or indemnify Stoltze. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that ASI’s insurance policy with Schlegel did not require ASI to defend and indemnify Stoltze in an action in which Schlegel could not be held liable. View "F.H. Stoltze Land & Lumber Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co." on Justia Law

GTL, Inc. filed suit against John Greytak and Tanglewood Investors Limited Partnership (collectively, Greytak) for non-payment of an obligation arising from a construction project. GTL was insured by Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company under a commercial general liability policy. Greytak filed counterclaims against GTL in the state court action. Atlantic sued GTL and Greytak in federal district court seeking a declaration that it was not required to defend GTL from Greytak’s counterclaims or to pay judgment because GTL had not provided timely notice as required by the policy language. GTL later defaulted. The federal district court granted Atlantic’s motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Montana Supreme Court, which answered in the affirmative, holding that an insurer who does not receive timely notice according to the terms of an insurance policy must demonstrate prejudice from the lack of notice to avoid defense and indemnification of the insured. View "Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v. Greytak" on Justia Law

Marian Davis lost control of her vehicle and struck a vehicle driven by Amy Locke. At the time of the accident, Davis was insured by Safeco Insurance Company under a policy with a $100,000 per person coverage. Davis died from her injuries. Locke, who also sustained injuries, filed a claim for damages against Davis’s estate. Prior to trial, Safeco paid Locke $16,306 for her past medical expenses. After a trial, the jury awarded Locke $400,000 in compensation for her injuries. The Estate appealed, and Safeco intervened. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in denying the Estate’s motion to alter or amend the judgment because Locke was precluded from recovering against the Estate more than the $100,000 insurance limitation; and (2) did not abuse its discretion when it made findings and conclusions that effectively bound Safeco to a judgment in a case in which Safeco was not a named party, was not represented by counsel, and did not appear. View "Locke v. Estate of Davis" on Justia Law

Central United Life Insurance Co. (CULI) purchased Judith Gleason’s cancer benefit insurance policy prior to Gleason’s death from breast cancer. Gleason’s Estate submitted notice of potential claims under the policy to CULI. CULI paid certain claims but denied payment for claims submitted outside the policy limit. The Estate contested the denial of the untimely-filed claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment for the Estate, ruling that CULI owed payment for the untimely-filed claims, provided it was not prejudiced by the late notice. After a trial, the jury found that CULI had violated the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) but did not award damages and therefore did not consider whether CULI acted with malice. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly applied the notice-prejudice rule; and (2) when an insurer is found to have violated the UTPA, a jury is not required to find compensatory damages beyond those for breach of the insurance contract before considering malice and punitive damages under the UTPA, and therefore, a new trial must be held on the issue of malice and punitive damages. View "Estate of Gleason v. Cent. United Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Montana corporation, sells workers’ compensation insurance to employers without the use of insurance agencies. Defendant Montana State Fund sells workers’ compensation insurance through in-house and out-of-house agents. The remaining defendants also sell workers’ compensation insurance, including State Fund policies. In 2011, Plaintiff brought this of action against Defendants, alleging violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA) and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. The district court (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s UTPA claim on the grounds that the UTPA does not create a private right of action by one insurance company against another; and (2) granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment with respect to interference with prospective economic advantage. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s inability to establish damages was fatal to its intentional interference claim and would be fatal as well to any UTPA-related claim. View "Victory Ins. Co. v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

This action involved a dispute arising from the construction of a large house. Interstate Mechanical, Inc. initiated an arbitration action to recover payments it claimed as a result of its work on the house project. Abbey/Land LLC and Glacier Construction Partners LLC (collectively, Plaintiffs) then filed suit against Interstate in Montana District Court in Flathead County. Thereafter, Glacier asserted counterclaims in the Interstate arbitration proceeding and obtained a positive arbitration award against Interstate. Abbey/Land subsequently filed an amended complaint dismissing Glacier as a plaintiff and naming it as a defendant. Glacier tendered the Abbey/Land claims to its insurer, James River Insurance Company. James River refused to provide defense or indemnity. Glacier and Abbey/Land settled the Flathead County action as between themselves. James River moved to intervene in the Flathead County action to challenge the reasonableness of the confessed judgment against Glacier. Meanwhile, Abbey/Land and Glacier entered settlements with all other parties. The district court never ruled on James River’s motion to intervene and entered final judgment against Glacier. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in entering judgment without considering either its motion to intervene or the reasonableness of the confessed judgment. View "Abbey/Land LLC v. Interstate Mechanical, Inc." on Justia Law