Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Real Estate & Property Law
by
This dispute arose from the use of easements on subdivided property in Yellowstone County, Montana. After a series of conveyances, Patti and Steve Schubert owned Tract 7B-2, which benefited from a 30-foot-wide access easement across neighboring Tract 7B-1, owned by Jeremy and Tynagh Toepp. The Schuberts installed a large electric gate, keypad, and package box within the easement, and engaged in activities such as removing vegetation and using heavy equipment, which the Toepps claimed damaged their property and overburdened the easement. The Schuberts also challenged the Toepps’ rights to use a shared well. The parties attempted to resolve their disputes through mediation, resulting in a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), but disagreements persisted over the interpretation and scope of the settlement, particularly regarding the gate and the use of the easement.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, heard cross-motions to enforce the MOU. Sitting without a jury, the District Court found the MOU to be a binding agreement that implied the Schuberts’ encroaching gate could remain in place. The court limited the Schuberts’ use of the access easement to ingress and egress only, prohibited unnecessary removal of vegetation, and awarded attorney fees to the Toepps, finding the Schuberts had unreasonably multiplied the proceedings by insisting on additional terms not included in the MOU.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court’s conclusion that the MOU allowed the encroaching gate to remain, holding that the MOU did not contemplate a gate easement and that the gate constituted an unlawful encroachment requiring removal. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s limitation of the easement to ingress and egress and its award of attorney fees to the Toepps, finding no abuse of discretion. The case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with these holdings. View "Schubert v. Toepp" on Justia Law

by
Frank and Shirlynne Apecella purchased property in Hamilton, Montana, in 2020, which historically received irrigation water from the Decker Ditch, originating at Roaring Lion Creek and running through their neighbor Lillian Overman’s property. After moving in, the Apecellas discovered they were not receiving water through the ditch and, upon investigation, learned that Overman’s husband had filled in the ditch and posted a “no trespassing” sign. The Apecellas own a water right in Roaring Lion Creek, and the disputed ditch segment runs from a bifurcation point on Overman’s property to the boundary with the Apecella property. The Apecellas sought a declaratory judgment affirming their ditch easement and alleged Overman interfered with their easement rights.The Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court held a bench trial and found that the Apecellas had established both an implied and a prescriptive easement for the ditch in question, and that Overman had interfered with their easement by filling in the ditch. The court rejected Overman’s defenses of abandonment and reverse adverse possession, finding insufficient evidence that the Apecellas or their predecessors had abandoned the easement or that Overman had extinguished it through adverse use. The court permanently enjoined Overman from further interference and awarded the Apecellas attorney fees as the prevailing party under Montana law.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. It held that Overman failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence either abandonment or reverse adverse possession of the Apecellas’ irrigation ditch easement. The Court also held that the Apecellas were the prevailing party under § 70-17-112(5), MCA, and were entitled to reasonable costs and attorney fees. The District Court’s orders were affirmed in all respects. View "Apecella v. Overman" on Justia Law

by
In May 2022, Garry Douglas Seaman shot and killed James Preston Freeman and seriously wounded Heidi Gabert, following the end of his romantic relationship with Gabert, with whom he shares a minor child. Seaman was criminally charged, and Gabert and Dawn Freeman, James’s spouse, filed a civil suit for damages. To prevent Seaman from transferring or selling assets during the litigation, Gabert and Freeman successfully sought a receivership over all of Seaman’s property. After negotiations, the parties reached a settlement memorialized in a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which included $10 million judgments for Gabert and Freeman, liquidation of Seaman’s assets, and a homestead exemption for Seaman.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, approved the creation of a designated settlement fund (DSF) to facilitate asset liquidation. Initially, the court’s DSF Order required the Liquidation Receiver to reserve funds from asset sales to pay Seaman’s capital gains taxes, interpreting the MOU’s tax payment provision as unambiguous. Gabert and Freeman moved to amend this order under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing the court erred in its interpretation and that the parties did not intend to reserve funds for Seaman’s capital gains taxes. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court agreed, finding the MOU ambiguous and, based on extrinsic evidence, concluded the parties did not intend to reserve such funds. The court amended its order, striking the provision requiring reservation for capital gains taxes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in amending the DSF Order. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, correctly found the MOU ambiguous, and its factual finding regarding the parties’ intent was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s amended order. View "Gabert v. Seaman" on Justia Law

by
A primary contractor entered into a subcontract with a heating and cooling company to install HVAC systems in an apartment complex. The subcontract included an arbitration clause allowing the contractor, at its sole option, to require arbitration of disputes. Over several years, the relationship between the parties deteriorated, leading the heating and cooling company to file suit for breach of contract and related claims. The contractor failed to respond timely to an amended complaint due to a breakdown in communication with its registered agent, resulting in a default being entered against it. After being properly served, the contractor and the heating and cooling company stipulated to set aside the default, and the contractor then filed an answer and counterclaims. Only after several months did the contractor move to stay proceedings and compel arbitration under the subcontract.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied the contractor’s motion to compel arbitration. The court found that the contractor had acted inconsistently with its right to arbitrate by failing to assert the arbitration right when reentering the litigation and by not including the arbitration defense in its initial answer. The court also determined that the delay prejudiced the heating and cooling company, which had incurred additional costs and surrendered its default judgment without knowing the contractor would later seek arbitration.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the contractor had waived its right to compel arbitration by acting inconsistently with that right and by causing prejudice to the opposing party. The court found no error in the District Court’s application of the waiver standard and declined to address arguments regarding federal arbitration law, as the waiver was established under Montana law. View "Monarch v. Petra" on Justia Law

by
Jeannette F. Tasey failed to pay property taxes starting in 2017. In 2018, she applied for an elderly/disabled tax credit program, believing she did not need to pay taxes until her application was decided. On August 1, 2018, the Yellowstone County Treasurer issued a tax lien on her property, which was later assigned to Guardian Tax MT, LLC. Tasey mailed a check for the full amount on July 30, 2021, with an expected delivery date of July 31. However, the Treasurer received and processed the check on August 3, one day after the redemption period expired. The Treasurer rejected the payment and issued a tax deed to Guardian Tax, which then sued to quiet title and declare Tasey a trespasser.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, granted summary judgment in favor of Guardian Tax, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court found Tasey's assertion that the check was received on July 31 to be speculative and unsupported by evidence. Tasey appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Tasey substantially complied with the redemption statute by mailing the payment in good faith, believing it would arrive before the deadline. The court emphasized that redemption statutes should be liberally construed to allow property owners to pay their debts and save their property. The court found that Tasey's actions met the substantial compliance standard and that there was no prejudice to Guardian Tax or the Treasurer’s Office. The court reversed the District Court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Guardian Tax v. Tasey" on Justia Law

by
David Wolfe owned property in Columbia Falls, Montana. In 2000, he executed a will leaving the property to his daughter, Wendy Rae Wolfe. In 2018, David signed a beneficiary deed transferring the property to his brother, Philip M. Wolfe. David passed away in 2023, and Wendy began residing on the property, believing it was hers per the will. Philip, however, claimed ownership based on the 2018 deed and issued a notice for Wendy to vacate.Wendy filed a pro se quiet title action in December 2023, alleging that the will conveyed the property to her and that Philip obtained the deed fraudulently, either by forging David’s signature or through undue influence. Philip counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, granted summary judgment in favor of Philip, concluding that Wendy failed to produce a legally meaningful challenge to the deed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court found that Wendy presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding undue influence and the validity of David’s signature on the deed. The court noted that Wendy’s evidence, including affidavits and personal knowledge of David’s intentions, was enough to warrant a jury’s consideration. The court concluded that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Philip and reversed the decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of David Wolfe" on Justia Law

by
Robert Sayers filed a complaint in 2021 seeking a declaration that Lippard Road is a public road and damages from Chouteau County for loss of access to his land. Chouteau County argued that the disputed portion of Lippard Road was abandoned in 1916. The disputed portion runs along the head of the Missouri River Breaks. The parties have a history of disputes over Lippard Road, but prior decisions do not impact the current case.The Twelfth Judicial District Court reviewed the case and concluded that the proper legal avenue was a writ of review, not a declaratory judgment. The court found that the Board of County Commissioners had abandoned the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. The court noted that although the record did not show the appointment of viewers or a viewers' report, the curative statute in effect at the time addressed any procedural deficiencies. The court concluded that the Board's decision to abandon the road was supported by substantial evidence and did not materially affect the interests of the county or prejudice the substantial rights of property owners.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's ruling. The court held that the Board of County Commissioners had jurisdiction to consider the abandonment and that the record showed compliance with the statutory requirements for abandonment. The court also held that the curative statute applied, and any procedural deficiencies did not invalidate the abandonment. The court concluded that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or fail to regularly pursue its authority in abandoning the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

by
Kevin and Jeannine Extreme appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Mineral County's order enjoining them from violating restrictive covenants applicable to their property in the Sloway Flats Minor Subdivision. The District Court also ordered them to remedy their violations and awarded attorney fees to Sloway Cabin, LLC (Sloway).The District Court found that the covenants were enforceable and that the Extremes had violated them by operating a commercial towing company, diesel repair shop, and impound lot on their property, among other activities. The court enjoined the Extremes from further violations and ordered them to remedy their current violations. The court also awarded attorney fees to Sloway.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the Subdivision’s covenants were clear and unambiguous, and therefore enforceable. The court rejected the Extremes' arguments that the covenants were never meant to be enforced and that their enforcement was barred by the doctrines of waiver and laches. The court found that the Extremes had been repeatedly informed about the covenants and that Sloway had promptly acted to enforce them upon noticing violations. The court also found that the Extremes' arguments regarding the use of surrounding properties were irrelevant as those properties were not subject to the Subdivision’s covenants.The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by enjoining the Extremes from violating the covenants and that the award of attorney fees to Sloway was proper under the circumstances. The court found that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the tangible parameters test was met. View "Sloway Cabin v. Extreme" on Justia Law

by
R&R Mountain Escapes, LLC ("R&R") purchased a property in a subdivision near Whitefish, Montana, and began using it for short-term rentals through a vacation rental company. The neighbors, Rodney and Heather Brandt, Marshall and Neva Fladager, and Larry and Rena Lautaret, filed a lawsuit claiming that R&R's short-term rentals violated the subdivision's restrictive covenants, which were designed to maintain the area for "country residential living" and prohibited commercial use. The neighbors sought to enjoin R&R's short-term rentals and requested attorney fees.The Eleventh Judicial District Court in Flathead County granted summary judgment in favor of the neighbors, holding that the restrictive covenants prohibited R&R's short-term rentals. However, the court denied the neighbors' request for attorney fees, reasoning that the covenants were ambiguous and it would not be just to penalize R&R with an award of fees. R&R appealed the decision barring short-term rentals, and the neighbors cross-appealed the denial of attorney fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court held that the restrictive covenants, when considered as a whole, unambiguously prohibited short-term rentals. The covenants were intended to promote "country residential living" and explicitly prohibited any commercial use, including short-term rentals that created nuisances for other homeowners. The court also affirmed the District Court's denial of attorney fees, concluding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it would be unfair to penalize a party for litigating potentially ambiguous covenants. View "Brandt v. R&R Mountain Escapes, LLC" on Justia Law

by
Steven Corry Stephenson, as trustee of the Steven Corry Stephenson Trust, owns Lot 11, and Lone Peak Preserve, LLC owns Lot 13, both near Big Sky, Montana. The properties were created by the same certificate of survey (COS 1754) and have a road (Skywood Road) with a 60-foot easement depicted. A 1993 affidavit of dedication granted this easement for ingress, egress, and utilities for all owners within COS 1754. In 2004, Phillip Smith conveyed Lot 13 to Lone Peak with a 30-foot easement for access and utilities across Lot 11. In 2010, Smith conveyed Lot 11 to Stephenson, referencing prior conveyances and easements. In 2013, Stephenson executed an access and utility easement agreement, incorporating the 30-foot easement described in the Smith-Lone Peak Deed.In December 2021, Stephenson sued Lone Peak for trespass and declaratory judgment, alleging that Lone Peak's utilities and proposed driveway were outside the easement area. Lone Peak counterclaimed for interference with easements, trespass, and declaratory judgment. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Between 2022 and 2023, Stephenson placed landscape boulders, a log, and a speed bump near Lone Peak's access, leading Lone Peak to file for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in July 2023.The District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, Gallatin County, granted Lone Peak's request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the 30-foot easement and cul-de-sac easement were valid and that Stephenson's actions unreasonably interfered with these easements. The court ordered Stephenson to remove the obstructions and refrain from further interference.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's order, finding no manifest abuse of discretion. The court held that Lone Peak demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, that the balance of equities tipped in its favor, and that the injunction was in the public interest. View "Stephenson v. Lone Peak" on Justia Law