Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group called Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts (MNC) submitted a proposed constitutional initiative, CI-132, which would add a section to the Montana Constitution stating that judicial elections shall remain nonpartisan. MNC also submitted a proposed ballot statement: “CI-132 amends the Montana Constitution to require that judicial elections remain nonpartisan.” After the initiative and statement were submitted to the Secretary of State and reviewed by the Legislative Services Division, the Montana Attorney General conducted a legal sufficiency review. The Attorney General found the initiative legally sufficient but rejected MNC’s proposed statement, arguing it did not accurately reflect the current constitutional text and failed to define “nonpartisan.” The Attorney General then issued a revised statement, which MNC challenged as misleading and prejudicial.MNC filed an original proceeding in the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Attorney General’s revised statement violated statutory requirements and asking the Court to certify its own proposed statement. The Attorney General responded, defending his revised statement and criticizing MNC’s version for not reflecting the constitutional status quo and lacking a definition of “nonpartisan.”The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the Attorney General’s revised statement was misleading because it implied CI-132 would change the status quo, when in fact judicial elections in Montana are already nonpartisan by statute. The Court also found that a definition of “nonpartisan” was unnecessary, given voters’ familiarity with the term and the absence of a statutory definition. The Court concluded that MNC’s proposed statement was a true and impartial explanation of the initiative in plain language, meeting statutory requirements. The Court certified MNC’s statement to the Secretary of State and granted the petition for declaratory judgment. View "Montanans for Nonpartisan Courts v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a law firm and its principal, challenged a Montana statute enacted in 2021 that prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s vaccination status or possession of an immunity passport. The law applies broadly to businesses, governmental entities, employers, and public accommodations, with certain exceptions for schools, daycare facilities, and healthcare providers. One provision of the law also prohibits requiring individuals to receive vaccines authorized only for emergency use or still undergoing safety trials. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated several provisions of the Montana Constitution, including rights to a clean and healthful environment, equal protection, inalienable rights, and the constitutional requirement that a bill’s subject be clearly expressed in its title.The case was first heard in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Richland County. The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed most of their constitutional claims, but allowed the claim regarding the bill’s title and single-subject requirement to proceed. On remand from the Montana Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Netzer Law Office, P.C. v. State, the District Court ultimately held that the main antidiscrimination provision of the law complied with the constitutional clear-title requirement, but that the provision prohibiting mandates for emergency use or trial vaccines did not, and voided that subsection.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims. The Supreme Court held that the law’s title was sufficiently clear and not misleading as to its main antidiscrimination provision, affirming its validity. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s invalidation of the provision regarding emergency use and trial vaccines, holding that this subsection was germane to the bill’s general purpose and did not violate the clear-title or single-subject requirements. Thus, both challenged provisions of the statute were upheld. View "Netzer v. State" on Justia Law

A 70-year-old woman was the subject of a state petition for involuntary civil commitment, alleging she suffered from a severe mental disorder with manic and psychotic features. Over several months, she had multiple encounters with law enforcement and was charged with various offenses, including assault and disorderly conduct. The petition included a psychiatric evaluation and described significant behavioral changes affecting her safety and relationships. At the initial hearing, the woman was represented by counsel, who stated she did not want a trial and wished to be stabilized, and the court read her rights aloud.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, presided over the hearing. The court relied on the representations of counsel and the woman’s brief affirmations to find that she knowingly and intentionally waived her procedural rights, including the right to contest the commitment. The court then ordered her commitment to the Montana State Hospital for up to 90 days, issuing findings that largely repeated the petition’s allegations. The order stated that the woman and her counsel agreed to waive her rights, but the court did not directly question her about the waiver or develop a record of her understanding.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred by failing to make an adequate inquiry or develop a sufficient record to support a finding that the woman knowingly and intentionally waived her rights, as required by Montana law. The Supreme Court emphasized that merely informing a respondent of their rights or relying on general statements from counsel is insufficient. The order of commitment was reversed, reaffirming the necessity for strict compliance with statutory and due process requirements in involuntary commitment proceedings. View "In re P.G.J." on Justia Law

After the death of the previous sheriff, the County Commissioners of Big Horn County appointed Jeramie Middlestead as interim sheriff in November 2023. Middlestead subsequently ran for election to retain the position. Lee A. Bartel filed a complaint in June 2024, alleging that Middlestead was ineligible to serve as sheriff because he was not a resident of, nor registered to vote in, Big Horn County, as required by Montana law. Bartel sought to prevent Middlestead from being sworn in, arguing that his appointment and potential election violated statutory requirements. Despite these allegations, Middlestead won the November 2024 election and was sworn in as sheriff in December 2024.The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn County, presided over by Judge Olivia Rieger after Judge Matthew J. Wald recused himself, considered Bartel’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Middlestead from assuming office. The District Court denied the motion in February 2025, finding that while there were unresolved questions about Middlestead’s qualifications, Bartel had not demonstrated irreparable harm, the equities weighed against granting the injunction since Middlestead had already been sworn in, and that removing the sheriff would not serve the public interest. The court also determined that the statutory standards for granting a preliminary injunction had not been met.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the matter was not moot because the District Court retained the authority to provide effective relief, including potentially ordering Middlestead’s removal if he was found ineligible. The Supreme Court further held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, affirming the lower court’s order and remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Bartel v. Middlestead" on Justia Law

Victory Insurance Company, a Montana property and casualty insurer, issued workers’ compensation policies to several businesses in 2019. Later that year, Victory entered into an agreement with Clear Spring Property and Casualty Company to reinsure and then purchase Victory’s book of business, including the relevant policies. Victory notified its insureds by phone and sent a single email on December 31, 2019, stating that their policies would be “upgraded” to Clear Spring policies effective January 1, 2020. All policies were rewritten under Clear Spring as of that date.The Montana Commissioner of Securities & Insurance (CSI) initiated an enforcement action in December 2022, alleging that Victory had illegally cancelled its policies and could be fined up to $2.7 million. After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment before a CSI Hearing Examiner. The Hearing Examiner found that Victory committed 165 violations of Montana’s insurance code and recommended summary judgment for the CSI. The CSI adopted this recommendation, imposing a $250,000 fine with $150,000 suspended, payable only if further violations occurred within a year. Victory sought judicial review in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, which affirmed the CSI’s decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, applying the same standards as the district court. The Court held that the Hearing Examiner properly granted summary judgment because Victory’s actions constituted cancellations under the insurance code, regardless of whether they could also be considered assignments. The Court also held that Victory’s due process rights were not violated during the fine imposition process, that the statutory delegation of fine authority to the CSI was constitutional, and that Victory was not entitled to a jury trial because there were no material factual disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order. View "Victory Insurance v. State" on Justia Law

Rodney Owen Skurdal, who is not a licensed attorney, attempted to represent Ronald Trow during Trow’s initial appearance in a criminal case in Yellowstone County Justice Court. Judge Jeanne Walker, presiding over the case, ordered Skurdal to vacate the defendant’s table and did not permit him to represent Trow, as Skurdal was not a member of the bar. Trow subsequently entered a plea of not guilty, and a public defender was appointed. Skurdal then filed a lawsuit in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court for Yellowstone County against Judge Walker, later joined by Yellowstone County as a defendant, alleging violations of his and Trow’s rights and advancing various arguments, including those associated with the “Sovereign Citizen” movement.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court dismissed Skurdal’s complaint with prejudice, holding that Judge Walker and Yellowstone County were protected by absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in the course of judicial duties. The court also found that Skurdal, as a non-lawyer, had no statutory or constitutional right to represent another individual in a criminal proceeding in Montana. The court denied leave to amend the complaint, finding that any amendment would be futile due to the immunity defense.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that Montana law does not permit non-lawyers to represent others in criminal cases, and that Judge Walker’s actions were judicial acts performed within her jurisdiction, entitling her and Yellowstone County to absolute immunity from suit. The Court also concluded that the District Court did not err in denying leave to amend, as further amendment could not overcome the immunity bar. View "Skurdal v. Walker" on Justia Law

Robert Sayers filed a complaint in 2021 seeking a declaration that Lippard Road is a public road and damages from Chouteau County for loss of access to his land. Chouteau County argued that the disputed portion of Lippard Road was abandoned in 1916. The disputed portion runs along the head of the Missouri River Breaks. The parties have a history of disputes over Lippard Road, but prior decisions do not impact the current case.The Twelfth Judicial District Court reviewed the case and concluded that the proper legal avenue was a writ of review, not a declaratory judgment. The court found that the Board of County Commissioners had abandoned the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. The court noted that although the record did not show the appointment of viewers or a viewers' report, the curative statute in effect at the time addressed any procedural deficiencies. The court concluded that the Board's decision to abandon the road was supported by substantial evidence and did not materially affect the interests of the county or prejudice the substantial rights of property owners.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's ruling. The court held that the Board of County Commissioners had jurisdiction to consider the abandonment and that the record showed compliance with the statutory requirements for abandonment. The court also held that the curative statute applied, and any procedural deficiencies did not invalidate the abandonment. The court concluded that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or fail to regularly pursue its authority in abandoning the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

Upper Missouri Waterkeeper and seven Broadwater County residents challenged the approval of a subdivision by 71 Ranch, LP, arguing it did not meet the "exempt well" exception for a water rights permit. They sought attorney fees under the Montana Water Use Act, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), and the Private Attorney General Doctrine. The District Court denied their request for fees under all three claims.The First Judicial District Court found that the subdivision's environmental assessment was inadequate and that the County abused its discretion in approving the subdivision. The court ruled in favor of Upper Missouri on most claims but denied their request for attorney fees. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of fees.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the District Court that the Water Use Act did not authorize fees. However, the Supreme Court reversed the denial of fees under the UDJA, finding that the District Court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court held that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the declaratory relief sought by Upper Missouri was necessary to change the status quo. The case was remanded to the District Court to determine a reasonable amount of fees and their apportionment. The Supreme Court did not address the private attorney general claim. View "Upper Missouri v. Department of Natural Resources and Conservation" on Justia Law

Kris Hawkins filed a Realty Transfer Certificate in March 2018, indicating that a property in Florence, Ravalli County, had been transferred to the Olson Trust. The Department of Revenue (DOR) requested documentation identifying the trustee of the Trust in April 2018 and January 2019, but it was never provided. In July 2023, Hawkins, claiming to be the trustee, requested an informal review of the DOR’s appraised value of the property, which was not adjusted. Hawkins appealed to the Ravalli County Tax Appeals Board, but there was doubt about her status as trustee. Despite several requests, Hawkins did not provide the necessary documentation.The Ravalli County Tax Appeals Board denied Hawkins’s request for a reduction in value, and she appealed to the Montana Tax Appeal Board (MTAB). MTAB requested confirmation of Hawkins’s role as trustee multiple times. Hawkins filed a declaration for disqualification of MTAB members, alleging bias, but it was unsupported. She also filed a petition for interlocutory adjudication with the District Court, which was struck because the Trust was not represented by an attorney. Hawkins then requested to substitute herself for the Trust and reinstate the petition. MTAB dismissed the appeal due to lack of documentation, and the District Court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The court held that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory adjudication because the underlying matter had already been dismissed by MTAB. The court found that Hawkins’s affidavit alleging bias was insufficient and that MTAB did not lose jurisdiction after the unfounded declaration. The District Court’s dismissal of the petition was proper. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law

Cascade County discovered petroleum contamination under a county shop complex in 1996 and notified the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). A 2000 report identified the contamination source as four county-owned tanks. The DEQ approved a corrective action plan in 2006, and the County requested the site be designated as a multiple release site for reimbursement eligibility, which the DEQ declined. The County completed remediation in 2008 and submitted receipts to the Montana Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board, but the costs exceeded the statutory maximum for a single release. The Board indicated further reimbursement requests would be denied.The County sought a writ of mandamus to compel the DEQ to assign multiple release numbers, but the DEQ and the County eventually stipulated to dismiss the action in 2013. The County then filed four separate applications for reimbursement in 2014, which the Board denied, stating the DEQ had classified all contaminations under a single release number. The County contested this, and a Hearing Examiner found four discrete releases but ruled the claims were time-barred. The Board adopted most of the Examiner's findings but rejected the conclusion of four releases. The district court later ruled in favor of the County, and the Montana Supreme Court affirmed, directing the Board to reimburse the County.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the Board had a clear legal duty to review the County's reimbursement claims, despite the County not submitting them in the manner required by Board regulations. The Court held that the Board must review and determine the eligibility of the claims submitted by the County for reimbursement of remediation costs. The District Court's order denying the County's writ of mandamus was reversed, and the case was remanded with instructions to issue the alternative writ of mandate. View "Cascade v. Petroleum Tank Release Compensation Board" on Justia Law