Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In May 2020, Tommy Jonathan Seth Dellar was receiving dialysis treatment at DaVita Dialysis when he exhibited symptoms of PTSD. After being asked to lower his noise level by technician Ashley Cray, Dellar demanded to be taken off the machine and made threatening statements towards Cray and others in the facility. Law enforcement found Dellar outside the center, where he reiterated his threats. Dellar was charged with felony intimidation under Montana law.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Cascade County held a one-day jury trial in November 2022. Dellar moved for a directed verdict based on insufficient evidence, which the court denied. Dellar also requested that disorderly conduct be considered as a lesser-included offense, but the court rejected this request. The jury found Dellar guilty of felony intimidation. At sentencing, Dellar requested a waiver of all fees, and the State stipulated to waive all except the $50 victim surcharge, which the court imposed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider whether Dellar had the intended purpose to cause Cray to perform the act of removing him from dialysis when he made his statements. The court also held that disorderly conduct is not a lesser-included offense of intimidation as a matter of law, as each offense requires proof of at least one element the other does not. Additionally, the court found that Dellar’s ineffective assistance claim was not record-based and not suitable for review on direct appeal. Finally, the court concluded that the District Court did consider Dellar’s ability to pay the $50 victim surcharge. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decisions. View "State v. Dellar" on Justia Law

An eighteen-year-old defendant attended a post-high school graduation event at the Sweet Grass County fairgrounds, where alcohol and drug use were prohibited. A chaperone reported to the Sweet Grass County Sheriff’s Office that the defendant appeared intoxicated. Deputy Whaley arrived later, conducted alcohol tests on attendees, and observed the defendant and another individual walking towards a vehicle. The deputy, familiar with the defendant’s prior offenses and court-ordered conditions, approached and requested consent to search the vehicle, which the defendant refused. Using a flashlight, the deputy saw a marijuana smoking device in plain view inside the vehicle. The vehicle was seized, and a search warrant was obtained, leading to the discovery of marijuana, paraphernalia, and alcoholic beverages. The defendant was charged with two counts of underage possession of an intoxicating substance (UPIS), one for alcohol and one for marijuana.The defendant pled guilty in justice court and was sentenced for UPIS (3rd and 4th offenses), with sentences running concurrently. He appealed to the District Court, filing motions to suppress evidence for lack of particularized suspicion and to dismiss one count for double jeopardy. The District Court denied both motions, ruling that the plain view doctrine justified the seizure of the vehicle and that the two charges did not violate the multiple conviction statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Deputy Whaley’s initial approach did not constitute a seizure requiring particularized suspicion and that the use of a flashlight to view the marijuana device did not violate the plain view doctrine. The court also held that the two charges for possession of different intoxicating substances did not violate the multiple conviction statute. The court affirmed the District Court’s rulings. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Donna Elizabeth Summers was stopped by Ravalli County Detective Nick Monaco for speeding in May 2022. During the stop, Summers appeared nervous, and Monaco discovered she had a history of drug possession. After issuing a warning for speeding and returning her documents, Monaco asked if he could ask additional questions, to which Summers consented. She admitted to past drug use and allowed Monaco to search her vehicle, where he found methamphetamine and paraphernalia. Summers was charged with felony possession of dangerous drugs and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing the stop was unlawfully prolonged without particularized suspicion.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court denied Summers’s motion to suppress, finding that Monaco had particularized suspicion to extend the stop and that Summers consented to the additional questioning and search. Summers then pleaded no contest to the charges but reserved the right to appeal the suppression ruling.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that Detective Monaco lacked particularized suspicion to transition the traffic stop into a drug investigation. However, the court held that under the totality of the circumstances, Summers’s constitutional rights were not violated because she voluntarily consented to the additional questioning and search. The court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Summers’s motion to suppress evidence. View "State v. D. Summers" on Justia Law

On July 17, 2021, Whitefish Police Officer Chase Garner confronted Paul Kermit Gysler for urinating in public. The encounter escalated, resulting in Gysler assaulting Officer Garner. Gysler claimed self-defense, asserting that Officer Garner approached him aggressively. The State charged Gysler with felony assault on a peace officer. Gysler was arrested and released on bond but was later re-arrested for unrelated charges, leading to multiple delays in his trial.The Eleventh Judicial District Court issued an arrest warrant for Gysler for violating his release conditions. The court ordered a competency evaluation due to concerns about Gysler's mental fitness, which delayed the trial further. Gysler's trial was eventually set for December 12, 2022. He filed a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, which the court denied. The jury found Gysler guilty of assaulting a peace officer.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court analyzed the four factors of a speedy trial claim: length of delay, reasons for delay, the accused’s response to the delay, and prejudice to the accused. The court found that most of the delay was institutional and not due to the State's negligence. The court concluded that Gysler did not suffer oppressive pretrial incarceration, undue anxiety, or impairment of his defense.The court also reviewed the jury instructions. It held that the District Court did not err in instructing the jury on resisting arrest and justified use of force, as the instructions were supported by the evidence and did not nullify Gysler's self-defense claim. The court affirmed the District Court's judgment, finding no violation of Gysler's right to a speedy trial and no error in the jury instructions. View "State v. Gysler" on Justia Law

Joseph Edward Knowles, at age 16, and his girlfriend planned to steal marijuana from Megan Meriwether. During the theft, a fight ensued, and Knowles stabbed Meriwether, resulting in her death. Knowles was charged as an adult with deliberate homicide and tampering with evidence. He pled guilty to deliberate homicide under a plea agreement, and the tampering charge was dismissed. The District Court sentenced him to 60 years in prison without parole restrictions.Knowles appealed the original judgment, which did not reflect his status as a criminally convicted youth under the Criminally Convicted Youth Act (CCYA). The Montana Supreme Court ordered the District Court to amend the judgment to include CCYA provisions, requiring the Department of Corrections (DOC) to submit status reports every six months and for the court to review Knowles’s sentence before he turned 21. However, the District Court did not receive this order until Knowles was 22, and no status reports were filed during the statutory period.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion by reimposing Knowles’s original sentence without the benefits of the CCYA. The Court found that the District Court and DOC failed to follow the CCYA, denying Knowles the rehabilitative opportunities intended by the Act. The Court held that the District Court abused its discretion by determining Knowles had not been substantially rehabilitated without the benefit of ongoing status reports and meaningful rehabilitative programs.The Montana Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s decision and remanded the case, instructing the DOC and District Court to apply the CCYA provisions. Knowles is allowed to request a CCYA sentence review hearing within two years of the opinion date. View "State v. Knowles" on Justia Law

In July 2022, Robert Brady was charged with felony Assault with a Weapon after an incident involving his wife, stepdaughter, and stepdaughter's husband. Brady allegedly pointed a shotgun at his stepdaughter's husband and threatened to kill him. Brady appeared intoxicated and claimed self-defense. He was released on the condition of no contact with the victims. In August 2022, Brady pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. In December 2022, the State petitioned to revoke Brady's release for noncompliance with alcohol monitoring conditions, and he was jailed in January 2023.Brady and the State then signed a plea agreement where Brady would plead guilty in exchange for a three-year deferred sentence recommendation. The agreement restricted Brady from seeking early discharge until two years after sentencing. At the change of plea hearing, Brady pleaded guilty, and the court accepted the plea. However, the court later expressed concerns about following the plea agreement due to Brady's violations and lack of accountability. The prosecutor's comments during sentencing suggested the plea deal was too lenient, leading the court to impose a five-year deferred sentence with additional conditions.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by undermining the recommended sentence. The court held that a district court does not have unilateral authority to restrict a defendant's right to seek early termination of a sentence under Montana law. However, a defendant may agree to such a restriction in a plea agreement. The court vacated Brady's sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge, directing specific performance of the plea agreement in its entirety. View "State v. Brady" on Justia Law

William James Pillans was arrested on February 12, 2018, and charged with Assault with a Weapon. He was released on his own recognizance but was later re-arrested for violating release terms. Subsequently, he faced additional charges for assaulting an officer and threatening corrections officers, leading to multiple arrests and bench warrants. Pillans entered plea agreements in three cases, resulting in concurrent suspended sentences. However, his sentences were revoked multiple times due to further arrests and violations, leading to additional periods of incarceration.The Eleventh Judicial District Court of Flathead County initially sentenced Pillans to concurrent five-year suspended sentences in three cases. After multiple revocations, the court recalculated his credit for time served and elapsed time, ultimately sentencing him to five years with the Department of Corrections with no time suspended. Pillans appealed the District Court's calculation of his credit for time served and elapsed time.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Pillans was not entitled to credit for time served in DC-18-098 between his third arrest and his third release on recognizance, as he was not detained in that case during that period. The court also found that the District Court erred in calculating credit for time served in DC-18-329, as Pillans was not detained in that case until served with a bench warrant. Additionally, the court corrected the calculation of time served between Pillans's original sentencing and first revocation, and between his first and second revocations. The court also determined that Pillans was entitled to additional elapsed time credit for specific periods where no violations were recorded.The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the District Court to adjust Pillans's credit for time served and elapsed time accordingly. View "State v. Pillans" on Justia Law

Charles Ament was charged with felony DUI, his fourth or subsequent offense, after a single-vehicle crash in Flathead County. Montana Highway Patrol Trooper Jon Raymond testified that Ament smelled of alcohol, had difficulty balancing, made strange statements, admitted to drinking three beers, and asked not to be investigated for DUI. Field sobriety tests indicated Ament was under the influence, and a blood draw showed a 0.187 blood alcohol content. Ament represented himself at trial with standby counsel and did not testify or offer any witnesses.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District allowed Ament one day to enter a plea, after which he pleaded not guilty. At a pretrial hearing, the court granted Ament’s motion to represent himself, advising that standby counsel could not interrupt proceedings to issue advice. During trial, Ament objected to Trooper Raymond’s testimony as leading, which the judge overruled. During closing arguments, Ament attempted to discuss his version of the facts, leading the court to instruct the jury to disregard statements not made under oath.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Ament one day to enter his plea. The court also found that Ament did not preserve his objections to Trooper Raymond’s testimony and thus applied plain error review, concluding that Ament did not demonstrate that the admission of this evidence denied him a fundamental right. Regarding the District Court’s comments during closing arguments, the Supreme Court held that the comments did not compromise the fundamental fairness of the trial or the integrity of the judicial process. Finally, the court found that the jury instructions on the presumption of innocence were proper and did not warrant reversal for plain error. View "State v. Ament" on Justia Law

In 2014, Susan Joanne Pajnich was driving with a .280 blood alcohol content and hit a woman who was stopped on the side of the road, causing severe injuries. Pajnich left the scene without providing aid. She pleaded guilty to negligent vehicular assault and received a ten-year sentence with seven years suspended, along with an order to pay restitution.In December 2017, Pajnich began the suspended portion of her sentence. Less than a year later, the State petitioned to revoke her suspended sentence due to violations, including driving under the influence, consuming alcohol, and failing to pay restitution. Pajnich entered a plea agreement admitting to the violations in exchange for the State dropping the DUI charge. The agreement included a recommendation for a seven-year commitment with five years suspended and 111 days of credit for elapsed time. The District Court revoked her suspended sentence and imposed the agreed-upon sentence.Pajnich completed the non-suspended portion of her sentence and returned to community supervision in June 2020. In March 2022, a report of violation was filed alleging further violations, including consuming alcohol and methamphetamine, and failing to make restitution payments. Pajnich admitted to all violations, and the District Court imposed a five-year commitment with credit for ten months of elapsed time and time served. Pajnich appealed this order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that Pajnich could not challenge the calculation of elapsed time on appeal because she did not object to it during the revocation proceedings and there was no mistake of fact. The court affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that the sentence was legal and the calculation of elapsed time was supported by the record. View "State v. Pajnich" on Justia Law

Chad Williams, representing himself, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, claiming he is entitled to elapsed time credit, or street time credit, which the Missoula County District Court did not award. Williams argued that he should receive credit for the time he was on probation from November 25, 2013, to August 16, 2016. The State responded that Williams's petition should be denied, and Williams subsequently filed a "Motion for Relief" regarding the extensions of time granted to the State to respond.Williams entered a guilty plea to attempted deliberate homicide in the Missoula County District Court and was sentenced to fifty years in the Montana State Prison, with twenty-five years suspended, plus a consecutive ten-year term for use of a weapon. He was paroled on May 30, 2007, but his parole was revoked multiple times before he began serving the suspended portion of his sentence on November 25, 2013. The State filed a Petition to Revoke on April 5, 2016, followed by four supplemental petitions. In May 2017, the District Court imposed a twenty-five-year sentence upon revocation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that Williams did not meet his burden to demonstrate a facially invalid sentence. The court noted that the 2015 version of the revocation statute applied to Williams, which allowed the court discretion to award elapsed time credit. The District Court considered the time period Williams claimed but found that he had committed multiple violations during that time, including drug use and absconding. The Supreme Court held that Williams's sentence upon revocation was within statutory parameters and that he had waived any claim of statutory defect by failing to object or appeal the denial of elapsed time credit.The Supreme Court of Montana denied and dismissed Williams's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and his Motion for Relief. View "Williams v. Green" on Justia Law