Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Three men, including Andre Anthony, entered a Family Dollar Store in Hardin, Montana, and over about ten minutes, one of the men fraudulently completed three transactions at the computerized cash register by pressing the “cash received” button without providing payment. Surveillance video showed Anthony standing near the register, at times distracting the store attendant, while the fraudulent transactions occurred. The men left with three gift cards and a bottle of body wash, totaling $1,512.35. Law enforcement later detained the men and found receipts and merchandise matching the transactions in their vehicle. The store attendant misidentified Anthony as the man who pressed the register button, but Anthony was arrested and charged.Initially, Anthony was charged in Hardin City Court with shoplifting, but the charges were amended to unlawful use of a computer by accountability. After posting bail, Anthony returned to Michigan and requested to appear at hearings by video, which was sometimes permitted. At trial, Anthony appeared by video, but the court denied his request to testify by video after the prosecution rested. The City Court found Anthony guilty on all three counts. On appeal, the District Court for the Twenty-Second Judicial District affirmed the convictions and sentence, finding sufficient evidence and no reversible error in the denial of Anthony’s request to testify by video.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that the evidence was sufficient to support Anthony’s convictions for unlawful use of a computer by accountability, as his actions and presence supported a finding that he aided or abetted the offenses. However, the Supreme Court found that the City Court abused its discretion by allowing Anthony to appear by video for trial but then denying his request to testify by video without clear explanation. The Supreme Court reversed Anthony’s convictions and remanded for a new trial on all counts. View "City of Hardin v. Anthony" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident in which the defendant was accused of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent with the complainant, K.R., who had spent the afternoon and evening drinking at several bars. The two were acquaintances and exchanged messages on Facebook, with K.R. inviting the defendant to her home. K.R. later testified that she did not remember the events after leaving the bar, including her communications with the defendant, driving home, or leaving her door unlocked. She recalled regaining awareness during a sexual encounter at her home, at which point she told the man to stop. The defendant asserted that he did not know K.R. was unable to consent, pointing to her actions and communications as evidence that she appeared functional.The Second Judicial District Court of Montana presided over the trial. The court excluded evidence of K.R.’s past alcohol use and denied the defense’s request to present expert testimony on the effects of regular alcohol consumption. The court also instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty if he was aware of a “high probability” that K.R. was unable to consent, rather than requiring actual knowledge. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison, with five years suspended.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the district court’s jury instruction on the mental state required for conviction and its exclusion of certain evidence constituted reversible error. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by giving a result-based instruction for “knowingly,” which lowered the State’s burden of proof and violated the defendant’s due process rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of K.R.’s past drinking habits or the expert testimony as offered. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Lewistown, Montana, investigated David Allen Pein for suspected marijuana distribution in 2016, using a confidential informant to conduct controlled purchases. A search of Pein’s residence yielded marijuana, paraphernalia, cash, and other evidence. Pein was charged with nine counts related to possession and distribution of marijuana. In 2017, Pein entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to one count of felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs with Intent to Distribute (Count VI), while six other charges were dismissed. Two additional counts—felony Criminal Distribution of Dangerous Drugs (Count IV) and felony Use or Possession of Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture (Count VIII)—were subject to a deferred prosecution agreement incorporated by reference into the plea agreement.The Tenth Judicial District Court deferred Pein’s sentence on Count VI. After Pein violated the terms of his deferred sentence and deferred prosecution agreement, the State reinstated prosecution on Counts IV and VIII. Pein was convicted by a jury on these counts in 2024 and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. Pein appealed, challenging the validity of incorporating a deferred prosecution agreement into a plea agreement, as well as the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Montana’s plea agreement statute (§ 46-12-211, MCA) does not authorize the incorporation of a deferred prosecution agreement under the pretrial diversion statute (§ 46-16-130, MCA) into a plea agreement. The Court vacated Pein’s convictions for Counts IV and VIII and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed Pein’s conviction on Count VI, rejecting his argument that marijuana is incorrectly classified as a Schedule I drug. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. View "State v. Pein" on Justia Law

Mark French, representing himself, was convicted of a misdemeanor in the Sanders County Justice Court, which is not a court of record. He appealed the conviction to the Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court for a trial de novo. After Judge John W. Larson assumed jurisdiction over the appeal, French moved to disqualify him, citing perceived injustices related to the rescheduling of the trial. When that motion was denied, French filed an alternative motion for substitution of judge under Montana law.The Montana Supreme Court previously denied French’s motion to disqualify Judge Larson, finding the issue moot because the trial date had been vacated. The Supreme Court also clarified that Judge Larson had jurisdiction to determine the timeliness of French’s subsequent motion for substitution. Judge Larson then denied French’s motion for substitution, relying on precedent from D.H. v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, which addressed substitution in a different context. French then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for supervisory control, arguing that his substitution motion was timely and authorized, that his right to a jury trial was denied, and that the District Court improperly relied on the Justice Court record.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that, when a criminal case is appealed from a justice court that is not a court of record for a trial de novo, the appellant is entitled to one substitution of a district judge under § 3-1-804, MCA, as if the case had originated in district court. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial of French’s motion for substitution and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also found that the Justice Court record was properly transferred and relied upon. French’s request for dismissal of the District Court proceeding was denied. View "French v. 20th Judicial District" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse without consent in 2017 and sentenced to 40 years in prison, with 20 years suspended. After an appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to the improper admission of statistical evidence and remanded for a new trial. While awaiting retrial, the defendant was released on bail, returned to work, and cared for his mother. At the second trial, both parties presented expert witnesses who testified about general behaviors of sexual assault victims, but did not opine on the specific facts of the case. The State’s expert, Dr. Vanino, remained in the courtroom during the defense expert’s testimony, in violation of a witness exclusion order. The District Court allowed Dr. Vanino to be recalled as a rebuttal witness, and the defense was permitted to recall its own expert in response.After the second conviction, a new psychological evaluation indicated the defendant had made progress in treatment and matured. At resentencing, the defendant requested a sentence consistent with a prior plea offer, while the State sought a harsher sentence. The District Court increased the sentence to 50 years with 30 years suspended, citing the defendant’s decision to appeal, retry the case, lack of remorse, and the impact on the victim.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed two main issues. First, it held that the District Court erred in interpreting Montana Rule of Evidence 615 to categorically exempt expert witnesses from exclusion orders, but found the error harmless because both parties’ experts were allowed to rebut each other and neither testified to case-specific facts. Second, the Court held that the increased sentence after retrial violated due process, as it was based on the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights and not on new, objective information. The Court affirmed the conviction, reversed the increased sentence, and remanded for amendment of the judgment to restore the original suspended term. View "State v. Grimshaw" on Justia Law

A man was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Gallatin County, Montana, where his Jeep left the road, struck a sign, and then drove away. Witnesses reported the incident, and law enforcement traced the vehicle to the man’s residence using the license plate information. Upon arrival, officers observed damage to the Jeep and encountered the man, who exhibited signs of impairment such as bloodshot eyes and a dazed demeanor. The man admitted to purchasing and inhaling a can of Dust-Off, a product containing difluoroethane (DFE), and acknowledged that he had passed out while driving. Field sobriety tests indicated impairment, and a subsequent blood test confirmed the presence of DFE.The Gallatin County Justice Court denied the man’s motions to suppress evidence, which alleged a lack of particularized suspicion, unlawful search and seizure, and a Miranda violation. After a bench trial, the court found him guilty of misdemeanor DUI (third offense). The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, affirmed the conviction and the denial of the suppression motions, concluding that law enforcement had particularized suspicion, that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway or the exterior of the Jeep, and that no custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings had occurred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that law enforcement had particularized suspicion to investigate for DUI based on the totality of the circumstances, including the crash, the man’s behavior, and his admissions. The Court found no unlawful search or seizure, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched, and the man voluntarily provided the Dust-Off can. The Court also determined that no custodial interrogation occurred before arrest, so Miranda warnings were not required. The Court declined to address an unpreserved evidentiary claim and found sufficient evidence supported the DUI conviction. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with several felonies stemming from an incident in July 2024, including assault with a weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted person, and tampering with evidence. He was arraigned on these charges in July 2024 and did not seek to substitute the presiding judge at that time. In June 2025, the State filed an Amended Information adding three new felony counts of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, and the petitioner was arraigned again on these new charges. Within two days of this second arraignment, the petitioner moved to substitute the judge, arguing that the motion was timely because it was filed within ten days of the arraignment on the Amended Information.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, denied the motion, holding it was untimely because the ten-day period for substitution under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, began with the initial arraignment in July 2024, not the subsequent arraignment on the amended charges. The court reasoned that allowing substitution after any arraignment on amended charges could lead to manipulation of the process and disrupt judicial efficiency.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case on a petition for writ of supervisory control. The Court held that the right to substitute a judge in a criminal case under § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, is triggered by the initial arraignment, not by subsequent arraignments on amended informations, even if new charges are added. The Court concluded that the District Court did not err in denying the motion as untimely and denied the petition for writ of supervisory control, remanding the matter for further proceedings. View "Caye v. 20th Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident between Taylor Jean Carlson and her ex-boyfriend, Shane Dalke, following a wedding they both attended. After a series of arguments and confrontations at Dalke’s home, Carlson physically assaulted Dalke and attempted to take his phone, which he was using to record her behavior. During the struggle, the phone was dropped, and Carlson picked it up, unsuccessfully tried to access it, and then destroyed it by throwing it on the concrete multiple times, rendering it inoperable. Police were unable to recover any data from the phone due to the damage.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, presided over Carlson’s trial. She was charged with misdemeanor Partner Family Member Assault and felony Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence. At trial, Carlson’s attorney requested a jury instruction for the misdemeanor offense of Criminal Destruction of or Tampering with a Communication Device as a lesser included offense of the tampering charge. The State opposed, arguing the statutes required different elements. The District Court denied the request, reasoning that the communication device offense contained an element not present in the tampering statute, and thus was not a lesser included offense as a matter of law. Carlson was convicted of tampering with evidence.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the lesser included offense instruction. The Supreme Court held that Criminal Destruction of or Tampering with a Communication Device is not a lesser included offense of Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence because the two statutes have distinct elements, particularly regarding intent and the nature of the conduct criminalized. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision. View "State v. Carlson" on Justia Law

The case concerns an altercation that occurred after Jeffrey Burrington, while driving with his wife, began tailgating another vehicle driven by Ryan Williams. After both vehicles stopped, a verbal confrontation ensued, during which Burrington punched Williams in the face. Williams subsequently sought medical attention and was diagnosed with a fractured mandible, which required him to maintain a liquid diet for six weeks and limited his ability to perform certain job duties as a smokejumper. Burrington was charged with Aggravated Assault, a felony, and the State also proposed a jury instruction for the lesser included offense of Assault.In the Fourth Judicial District Court for Missoula County, Burrington moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Williams did not suffer a serious bodily injury and that he acted in self-defense. The District Court denied the motion, finding these were issues for the jury. At trial, Burrington presented a dual defense: justifiable use of force and lack of serious bodily injury. The jury heard testimony from Williams, medical experts, and both Burrington and his wife regarding prior incidents that shaped their perception of threat. After the State rested, Burrington moved for a directed verdict, which the District Court denied, concluding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to decide.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the motion for a directed verdict, whether plain error review was warranted for unobjected-to trial incidents, and whether cumulative error required a new trial. The Supreme Court held that a rational jury could find Williams’s six-week mandibular injury constituted a “protracted loss or impairment” and thus a serious bodily injury under Montana law. The Court also found no plain error or cumulative error warranting reversal. The conviction and sentence were affirmed. View "State v. Burrington" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Montana began investigating drug trafficking activities involving shipments from California to Butte. Their investigation led them to a residence where a controlled delivery of a package containing fentanyl was made. After the package was delivered and seized, a cooperating witness, Trevor Handy, identified Eric Ramirez as being involved in drug distribution activities and described his association with the residence and other individuals under investigation. Law enforcement obtained and executed a search warrant at an Airbnb where Ramirez was staying, finding drugs, cash, and a loaded handgun in a bedroom linked to Ramirez by physical evidence, including his DNA. Ramirez was charged with criminal possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, methamphetamine, and heroin.The case proceeded to trial in the Montana Second Judicial District Court, Butte-Silver Bow County. During trial, Ramirez testified that he was merely visiting friends and denied involvement in drug distribution. He requested two jury instructions: one on “mere presence,” arguing that being present at the scene was not enough for conviction, and another on witness accountability, seeking to have the jury view the testimony of the cooperating witness with distrust. The District Court denied both requests, finding that the instructions given already adequately covered the law and Ramirez’s theory of defense. The jury convicted Ramirez on the fentanyl and methamphetamine charges but acquitted him on the heroin charge.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in denying the requested jury instructions. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, as the instructions provided fully and fairly instructed the jury on the applicable law and allowed Ramirez to argue his defense. The Court affirmed the convictions, concluding that Ramirez’s substantial rights were not prejudiced by the denial of the proposed instructions. View "State v. Ramirez" on Justia Law