Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Contracts
In re Estate of Brenden
Jill Brenden appealed an order from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, which denied her claims against the estate of her late husband, Robert Brenden. Jill sought reimbursement for expenses and objected to the distribution and valuation of certain property in the estate. Barbara Jensen, Robert's sister and the appellee, sought attorney fees. Jill and Robert had a long-term relationship, cohabitated, and married in 2010. They purchased a home together in 2006 and later built another home on a property Robert inherited. Robert was diagnosed with cancer, which went into remission but later returned. Before his death, Robert designated Barbara as the Payable on Death (POD) beneficiary of his bank account.The District Court found that Jill converted funds from Robert's account after his death, despite her claim that Robert instructed her to transfer the funds before he died. The court admitted bank records as business records, which showed the transfers occurred after Robert's death. Jill continued to access the account and transferred funds to herself without notifying the estate. Barbara intervened in the probate action, filing a third-party complaint against Jill for wrongful conversion and deceit. Jill counterclaimed, alleging unjust enrichment and seeking a constructive trust over the proceeds from the sale of their jointly owned home.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the bank records as business records. The court affirmed the District Court's finding that Jill converted the funds in Robert's account, as Barbara became the rightful owner upon Robert's death. However, the court found that Jill was entitled to her share of the proceeds from the sale of their jointly owned home, held in a resulting trust. The court denied Barbara's request for attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Estate of Brenden" on Justia Law
Bluebird v. World Business Lenders
Bluebird Property Rentals, LLC, a Montana limited liability company, and its sole member, Alaina Garcia, received a $450,000 loan from World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) and its subsidiaries in December 2020. The loan, secured by real property in Gallatin County, had an annual percentage rate of approximately 85% and required weekly payments. Bluebird signed several agreements, including a Business Promissory Note and Security Agreement, which listed Axos Bank as the lender, although Bluebird had no prior dealings with Axos. After falling behind on payments, Bluebird sold the collateral property in a distress sale and paid off the loan in October 2022, having paid a total of $945,990.39.Bluebird sued WBL, alleging that WBL engaged in a "rent-a-bank" scheme to evade Montana's usury laws, claiming that Axos Bank was merely a front and that WBL was the true lender. Bluebird sought a declaration that Montana law applied and sought double the interest paid above the maximum allowable rate under Montana law. WBL filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration based on the agreements' arbitration and choice-of-law provisions.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court denied WBL's motion, ruling that Montana law must be applied to determine the enforceability of the arbitration and choice-of-law provisions. The court treated WBL's motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found that the validity of the arbitration clause was for the court to decide, not an arbitrator.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the general rule that courts determine arbitrability was not overcome by the facts of this case. The court found no clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, despite WBL's arguments regarding the incorporation of AAA rules. The court did not address the merits of the enforceability of the arbitration agreement or the choice-of-law provision. View "Bluebird v. World Business Lenders" on Justia Law
Obert v State
Laura Marie Obert, a former Broadwater County Commissioner, was investigated by the Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2015 for allegedly receiving unlawful overtime pay and potential ethics violations. In 2016, Obert entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the Assistant Attorney General, agreeing to repay the excess wages and abstain from voting on matters where she had a conflict of interest. In 2019, based on new allegations of violating the agreement, Obert was charged with felony theft and misdemeanor official misconduct. The district court dismissed these charges in 2021, finding Obert had complied with the agreement and there was insufficient evidence for the misconduct charge.Obert then sued the State of Montana and Broadwater County Attorney Cory Swanson, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, due process violations, and malicious prosecution. The First Judicial District Court dismissed her claims, leading to this appeal.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and made several determinations. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of Obert's breach of contract and good faith and fair dealing claims, holding that these claims were not time-barred and did not accrue until the criminal charges were dismissed. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Obert's bad faith claim, finding no special relationship existed between Obert and the State that would support such a claim. The court also upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, ruling that Swanson was protected by prosecutorial immunity as he acted within his statutory duties. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim, concluding that Obert's procedural due process rights were not violated as the State followed proper procedures in charging her and the district court provided an appropriate forum to address the alleged breach of the agreement. View "Obert v State" on Justia Law
Hubbell v Gull Scuba Center
In 2019, Jesse Hubbell was hired to film a scuba-diving campaign advertisement. He and John Mues rented scuba gear from Gull Scuba Center. Gull’s instructor, Chris Hanson, asked for their diving certification cards. Mues provided his “Advanced Diver” certification, but Jesse did not have his card. Jesse claimed he was PADI certified, and Hanson either did not verify this or did not recall doing so. Jesse drowned three days later while using the rented gear.Ellen Hubbell, Jesse’s widow, sued several defendants, including Gull, alleging negligence for renting the equipment without verifying Jesse’s certification. The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, granted summary judgment in favor of Gull, finding no dispute of material fact regarding Gull’s liability.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by relying on the PRA Membership Standards to establish Gull’s duty to Jesse, as both parties’ experts indicated these standards were generally accepted in the scuba rental industry. The court also upheld the exclusion of Ellen’s expert, Thomas Maddox’s, opinion on industry standards, as it differed substantively from the prior expert’s report, which was beyond the scope allowed by the District Court’s amended scheduling order.Finally, the court agreed with the District Court’s determination that Hanson’s failure to check Jesse’s certification did not cause his death. The court found that even if Hanson had checked Jesse’s certification, Mues, who was of legal age and held an Advanced Diver certification, could have rented the equipment for Jesse. Therefore, the failure to check the certification was not the cause-in-fact of Jesse’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment in favor of Gull. View "Hubbell v Gull Scuba Center" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Contracts, Personal Injury
Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch
Vernon K. Stensvad, the plaintiff, owns a small cattle herd and entered into a Grazing Lease Contract with Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc. in July 2022. The contract stipulated that Stensvad would graze his cattle on Ayers Ranch's property for a fee, with higher winter rates to be determined. Stensvad paid the fees for July and August but later agreed orally to perform labor in exchange for reduced fees. Disputes arose over the quality of Stensvad's work and the amount owed. In October 2023, Ayers Ranch issued an agister’s lien for $78,662.50, seizing Stensvad’s herd. Stensvad sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of his cattle under the lien.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Prairie County granted Stensvad’s application for a preliminary injunction, ordering the cattle to be moved to a third-party feed lot. Ayers Ranch appealed, arguing that the District Court failed to consider all four factors required for a preliminary injunction under Montana law and that a preliminary injunction was not an appropriate remedy for challenging an agister’s lien.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the District Court manifestly abused its discretion by not addressing all four factors of the preliminary injunction standard. The Supreme Court clarified that under the revised standard, a party must satisfy all four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The Court adopted the "serious questions" test from the Ninth Circuit, allowing for flexibility in evaluating these factors. The case was remanded for the District Court to make supplemental findings consistent with this standard. The Supreme Court also held that a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to challenge an agister’s lien and that Stensvad did not have an adequate remedy at law. View "Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch" on Justia Law
Myers v. Kleinhans
A group of residents in the Whitehorse Estates Minor Subdivision filed a complaint against their neighbors, Joseph and Amanda Kleinhans, alleging that the Kleinhans violated the subdivision’s restrictive covenants by converting their garage into an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) and renting it out as an Airbnb. The covenants in question required properties to be used only for single-family dwellings and prohibited the operation of commercial businesses.The District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District, Carbon County, granted summary judgment in favor of the Kleinhans. The court interpreted the single-family dwelling covenant as a structural restriction, not a use restriction, meaning it only limited the type and number of buildings but did not restrict the use of the property to single families. The court also found the commercial business covenant to be ambiguous and concluded it did not prohibit short-term rentals like Airbnb. Consequently, the court awarded the Kleinhans their Bill of Costs amounting to $4,594.35.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the term "commercial business" was not ambiguous and should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, which includes activities conducted for profit. Therefore, the Kleinhans' operation of an Airbnb constituted a commercial business, violating the subdivision’s covenants. The Supreme Court also reversed the award of the Bill of Costs to the Kleinhans and remanded the case to the District Court to enter summary judgment in favor of the neighbors. View "Myers v. Kleinhans" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law
Strable v. Carisch
In August 2020, Kimberly Strable, who was under 18, inquired about a managerial position at Arby’s in Great Falls but was told she could not apply due to her age. Strable filed an age discrimination claim with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (HRB), which issued a reasonable cause determination. The parties entered into a conciliation process, and Strable’s attorney and Arby’s attorney reached an agreement in principle for a $25,000 settlement, subject to a mutually agreeable settlement agreement. However, the parties did not finalize or sign the draft conciliation agreement, which included affirmative relief provisions required by the HRB.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, granted summary judgment in favor of Arby’s, finding that no enforceable contract existed between the parties. The court noted that the negotiations were part of an ongoing HRB case and that Arby’s had not consented to the affirmative relief provisions, which were essential terms of the conciliation agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The court held that the essential element of consent was lacking because the parties had not agreed on all essential terms, including the HRB’s affirmative relief provisions. The court emphasized that a binding contract requires mutual consent on all essential terms, and in this case, Arby’s could not consent to terms it was unaware of. Therefore, the court concluded that no enforceable contract existed, and summary judgment in favor of Arby’s was appropriate. View "Strable v. Carisch" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Contracts, Labor & Employment Law
Doll v. Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC
Wilfred L. Doll and Cheri L. Doll (Dolls) were members of Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC (LBWR), a business formed to manage water rights in Phillips County. Dolls negotiated a settlement with Finch/Dements for senior water rights, which devalued LBWR’s property. LBWR members consented to the settlement on the day they closed on the Finch/Dement property. Dolls later filed a complaint seeking dissolution of LBWR or a buy-out of their shares. LBWR amended its operating agreement to expel adverse members and seek attorney fees and costs, excluding Dolls from the meeting where these amendments were ratified.The Seventeenth Judicial District Court, Phillips County, ruled that Dolls dissociated from LBWR on February 2, 2018, when they filed their complaint. The court also granted LBWR summary judgment on its counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duties and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, applying the eight-year statute of limitation for contracts. A jury awarded LBWR $2.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The District Court ordered Dolls to pay LBWR with 11.25% interest and LBWR to pay Dolls $434,000 per share with 7.5% interest.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s ruling that Dolls dissociated on February 2, 2018, and upheld the calculation of Dolls’ distributional interest. The court determined that the eight-year statute of limitation for contracts applied to LBWR’s counterclaims, as the fiduciary duties arose from the operating agreement. However, the court found that punitive damages were improper because they are not allowed in breach of contract actions under Montana law. The case was remanded to the District Court to modify its judgment to exclude punitive damages. View "Doll v. Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Contracts
Cordero v. Montana State University
Anthony Cordero, a student at Montana State University (MSU) during the Spring 2020 semester, sued MSU for prorated reimbursement of his tuition and fees after the university transitioned to online learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Cordero claimed that MSU breached an express contract to provide in-person education and services. He also asserted claims for breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, due process violation, violation of the takings clause, and inverse condemnation.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County dismissed four of Cordero’s six claims, including the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court granted summary judgment in favor of MSU on the remaining claims, including the express contract claim, and denied Cordero’s motion to certify the case as a class action. The court found that Cordero did not identify a specific, bargained-for promise by MSU to provide in-person education and that he had no compensable property interest in the tuition and fees paid.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that there was an express contract between Cordero and MSU, but it did not include a specific promise to provide in-person education. The court found that MSU had the right to change its regulations and policies, including transitioning to online learning during emergencies. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, noting that an implied contract cannot exist when an express contract is present. The court concluded that MSU did not breach its contractual duties regarding tuition and fees, as it maintained campus facilities and services to the extent possible during the pandemic. View "Cordero v. Montana State University" on Justia Law
Frisk v. Thomas
Robert Frisk owns property at 1196 Swan Hill Drive, Bigfork, Montana, and John and Lori Thomas own the neighboring property at 1194 Swan Hill Drive. The properties share a common driveway and a water well located on Frisk’s property. Disputes arose over the width of the easement for the driveway and access to the water well, leading Frisk to file a lawsuit seeking a declaration of an easement and an injunction against Thomas. Thomas counterclaimed for breach of contract regarding the water well agreement and trespass due to Frisk’s fence and house encroaching on their property.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court granted Frisk a prescriptive easement over 15 feet of the existing roadway and an equitable easement for the encroaching portion of Thomas’s property. The court dismissed Thomas’s breach of contract claims but affirmed his right to access the water well, imposing additional restrictions on this access due to the parties' animosity. Thomas appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and found that Montana law does not recognize the creation of an equitable easement. The court held that Frisk must remove his fence and gate from Thomas’s property but allowed the house to remain due to its de minimis encroachment. The court affirmed the additional restrictions on the water well agreement, finding them reasonable and consistent with the agreement’s terms. The decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Frisk v. Thomas" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Contracts, Real Estate & Property Law