Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mitchell McBroom and Barbara Lewis-Baca, employees of the Missoula Urban Transportation District (MUTD) and members of the Teamsters Local 2 Union, were disciplined with three days of unpaid suspension for conducting union activity during work hours. They challenged this discipline through the grievance process outlined in their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The grievance process concluded with a settlement on May 4, 2023, reducing the discipline to written warnings and granting backpay. Dissatisfied with the settlement, the employees filed an unfair labor practice (ULP) claim against MUTD on June 29, 2023.The Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) reviewed the ULP claim and determined that the six-month statute of limitations for filing the claim had expired. The employees argued that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled due to their reliance on the CBA grievance process. BOPA issued a final order affirming the initial determination that the statute of limitations had lapsed.The employees sought judicial review, arguing that BOPA erred in not tolling the statute of limitations. The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, concluded that BOPA did not err and that the employees could have filed their ULP claim before the expiration of the statute of limitations while the grievance process was ongoing. The employees then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the employees failed to file their ULP claim within the six-month statute of limitations. The court found that the CBA specifically excluded state law claims from the grievance process, and nothing prevented the employees from filing their ULP claim within the statutory period. The court concluded that the statute of limitations was not equitably tolled and upheld the dismissal of the ULP claim. View "McBroom v. Board of Personnel Appeals" on Justia Law

Nicholas Guthneck was hired by Qlarant Integrity Solutions, LLC, a Maryland company working on federally funded contracts, as a health fraud investigator in September 2020. He worked remotely from Montana. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, President Biden issued Executive Order 14042 in September 2021, mandating that federal contractors ensure their employees were vaccinated against COVID-19. Qlarant implemented a vaccination policy in October 2021, requiring employees to submit proof of vaccination by November 24, 2021. Guthneck refused to disclose his vaccination status, citing Montana law (House Bill 702, codified as § 49-2-312, MCA), which prohibits employment discrimination based on vaccination status. Consequently, Qlarant terminated his employment on November 4, 2021.Guthneck filed a discrimination complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (HRB), which found reasonable cause to support his claim. The case was set for a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). Qlarant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Executive Order 14042 preempted Montana law. The OAH hearing officer agreed and dismissed the complaint. Guthneck appealed to the Montana Human Rights Commission (HRC), which vacated the dismissal, stating that the hearing officer lacked authority to determine preemption.Qlarant sought judicial review in the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County. The District Court reversed the HRC's decision, ruling that the hearing officer had the authority to determine preemption and correctly found that Executive Order 14042 preempted § 49-2-312, MCA. Guthneck appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the OAH hearing officer had the authority to determine whether Executive Order 14042 preempted Montana law, as it involved statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional question. The Court also held that Executive Order 14042 expressly preempted § 49-2-312, MCA, for federal contractors like Qlarant during the relevant period. Thus, Qlarant was required to comply with the federal mandate, and Guthneck's termination for refusing to disclose his vaccination status was lawful. View "Qlarant v Guthneck" on Justia Law

The City of Great Falls unilaterally revised its drug and alcohol policy in 2019, expanding the scope of employees subject to random testing and imposing stricter penalties without negotiating with the affected labor unions. The unions filed unfair labor practice complaints, alleging that the City's actions violated the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act (MPECBA). The Montana Board of Personnel Appeals (MBPA) consolidated the complaints and referred them to a hearing examiner, who ruled in favor of the unions, concluding that the City's unilateral policy changes constituted unfair labor practices.The City did not file exceptions to the hearing examiner's proposed decision, which became the final agency decision by default. Instead, the City petitioned for judicial review, arguing that the hearing examiner's decision involved purely legal questions that should be reviewed by the court. The District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, dismissed the petition, citing the City's failure to exhaust administrative remedies by not seeking final agency review.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the City's failure to exhaust the final agency review remedy provided by MPECBA and the Montana Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) precluded judicial review. The Court clarified that there is no jurisprudential exception to the exhaustion requirement for purely legal or constitutional questions in the context of MAPA contested case proceedings. The City's petition for judicial review was thus correctly denied and dismissed. View "Great Falls v. Assoc. of Firefighters" on Justia Law

The City and County of Butte-Silver Bow, Montana (BSB) hired Rhonda Staton as a police officer in 2001, promoting her to detective in 2008. Staton received two verbal reprimands in 2017 and 2018 for tardiness and refusal to investigate underage drinking, respectively. In 2019, Staton filed a hostile work environment complaint, which was not substantiated. In early 2020, Staton lost her department-issued taser, leading to a Fit for Duty Evaluation (FFDE) by Dr. George Watson, who found her unfit for duty. Staton was terminated in August 2020 based on this evaluation and her performance issues.The Butte Police Protective Association (BPPA) filed a grievance on Staton’s behalf, leading to arbitration. Arbitrator A. Ray McCoy found Watson’s FFDE unreliable and ruled that BSB had not established just cause for Staton’s termination. McCoy ordered Staton’s reinstatement, back pay, and an additional evaluation to determine rehabilitative strategies. BSB did not comply with the reinstatement or compensation but arranged for an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME) by Dr. William Patenaude, which did not provide a diagnosis or rehabilitative recommendations.BSB petitioned to vacate the arbitration award, arguing it was a manifest disregard of Montana law. The Second Judicial District Court denied the motion to vacate but remanded the matter to the arbitrator to reconcile the award with Staton’s inability to return to service. BSB appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the arbitrator’s award did not violate Montana law or public policy. The court found that the District Court abused its discretion by remanding the matter, as it exceeded the permissible scope of review for arbitration awards. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order and remanded with instructions to confirm the original arbitration award. View "Butte v Butte Police" on Justia Law

Adrianne Cotton filed a charge of discrimination against the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging retaliation for protected activity when her position was eliminated. Cotton had been employed by DOC since 2011 and held the position of government relations director. She reported concerns about the conduct of DOC Director Reginald Michael in 2017, which led to an investigation. Subsequently, an organizational assessment recommended eliminating Cotton's position, among others, due to budgetary and structural issues.The case was first reviewed by Hearing Officer Holien, who held a contested case hearing and found that DOC had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for eliminating Cotton's position and did not retaliate against her. Cotton appealed to the Human Rights Commission, which rejected Holien's conclusions of law, citing the temporal proximity between Cotton's protected activity and the adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of retaliation. The Commission did not find that Holien's findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence.The case was then reviewed by the District Court of the First Judicial District, which found that the Commission exceeded its statutory authority by reweighing the evidence and substituting its judgment for that of the hearing officer. The District Court reversed the Commission's order and reinstated Holien's decision as the final agency decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court held that the Commission had abused its discretion by not adhering to the proper standard of review and by reweighing evidence that supported Holien's findings. The Supreme Court concluded that the District Court did not err in reinstating Holien's findings as the final agency decision, as they were supported by substantial evidence in the record. View "Cotton v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

In August 2020, Kimberly Strable, who was under 18, inquired about a managerial position at Arby’s in Great Falls but was told she could not apply due to her age. Strable filed an age discrimination claim with the Montana Human Rights Bureau (HRB), which issued a reasonable cause determination. The parties entered into a conciliation process, and Strable’s attorney and Arby’s attorney reached an agreement in principle for a $25,000 settlement, subject to a mutually agreeable settlement agreement. However, the parties did not finalize or sign the draft conciliation agreement, which included affirmative relief provisions required by the HRB.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, granted summary judgment in favor of Arby’s, finding that no enforceable contract existed between the parties. The court noted that the negotiations were part of an ongoing HRB case and that Arby’s had not consented to the affirmative relief provisions, which were essential terms of the conciliation agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The court held that the essential element of consent was lacking because the parties had not agreed on all essential terms, including the HRB’s affirmative relief provisions. The court emphasized that a binding contract requires mutual consent on all essential terms, and in this case, Arby’s could not consent to terms it was unaware of. Therefore, the court concluded that no enforceable contract existed, and summary judgment in favor of Arby’s was appropriate. View "Strable v. Carisch" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Judge Kerry L. Burman, the Glendive City Judge, and Mayor Deb Dion of Glendive, Montana. Judge Burman petitioned for a writ of mandamus to reinstate Mary York to her position as Clerk of Glendive City Court after Mayor Dion terminated York's employment. The termination occurred following a disagreement over the justification for York's attendance at a training conference. York was terminated without notice and escorted out of the court, leaving unfinished work and causing operational disruptions.The District Court initially ordered York's interim reinstatement pending further review. Judge Burman argued that Mayor Dion's actions violated state statute, the court's holding in Carlson v. City of Bozeman, and the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Respondents contended that Mayor Dion had the statutory authority to terminate York, who was still in her probationary period, and that the court's operations were not significantly impaired.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court determined that the matter was more appropriately characterized as an application for a writ of prohibition rather than mandamus. The court found that Mayor Dion's actions disrupted the court's operations and violated § 3-1-111, MCA, which grants courts the authority to control their ministerial officers. The court held that the executive's authority to hire or fire employees must be exercised in a manner that does not impair the court's ability to conduct its business.The Supreme Court of Montana granted the petition for a writ of prohibition, arresting Mayor Dion's action of terminating York's employment. The court emphasized the need for coordination between branches of government to avoid such disruptions. View "Burman v. City of Glendive" on Justia Law

Shawn Fowler, a former Montana state trooper, sued the Department of Justice, Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) alleging constructive discharge in violation of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). He also alleged breach of contract by the Montana Public Employees Association (MPEA) for declining his request to arbitrate. Fowler claimed that he was forced to retire due to a hostile work environment, which was mainly due to disciplinary action taken against him for mishandling two suspected DUI traffic stops in 2017. The MHP argued that Fowler, who was covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), failed to exhaust the grievance procedures of the CBA before filing a lawsuit.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the judgment of the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County. The Supreme Court held that an employee covered by a CBA can't bring a claim under the WDEA. The Court determined that Fowler’s alleged constructive discharge was covered by the CBA and he was required to exhaust the grievance procedures for a constructive discharge through the CBA. The Court found that Fowler did not grieve any of the events preceding his suspension, which he claimed contributed to his constructive discharge, and he resigned from employment prior to exhausting the grievance procedure of the CBA. The Court concluded that the District Court erred in denying the State’s two motions for summary judgment and reversed the judgment. View "Fowler v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

In the case heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Caryn Miske, the plaintiff and appellant, was appealing a district court decision that granted the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) summary judgment on all of her claims that arose from her termination by the DNRC from the Flathead Basin Commission.The primary facts of the case involve Miske's employment as the Executive Director of the Flathead Basin Commission, a body established by the 1983 Legislature to protect the environment of Flathead Lake and its tributaries. The Commission is administratively attached to the DNRC, a relationship that Miske argued allowed the Commission independent authority over staffing decisions. However, the DNRC contended that the Commission and DNRC share concurrent authority over staffing decisions.The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the DNRC on all of Miske's claims. It held that, based on the plain language and structure of the relevant statutes, the DNRC and the Commission have concurrent authority over staffing decisions, and therefore, Miske was a DNRC employee.The court also ruled that the DNRC didn't commit intentional interference with contractual relations as it wasn't a stranger to Miske's relationship with the Commission. Additionally, the court found that Miske's lobbying efforts on behalf of the Commission were made in her capacity as a DNRC employee and thus were not protected political speech. Lastly, the court held that the DNRC had good cause to terminate Miske due to her repeated failures to provide the DNRC with state-issued credit card statements, which constituted a legitimate business reason for her termination. View "Miske v. DNRC" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the petitioner, Jay Watson, filed a grievance against his employer, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP or agency), claiming he was underpaid for six years due to an agency error in implementing a new pay system. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, ruled in favor of Watson and reversed the Final Agency Decision issued by the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA or Board). The court also awarded attorney fees to Watson. FWP appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not err in reversing BOPA’s decision. The court found that BOPA incorrectly applied the Montana Wage Payment Act (MWPA) to Watson's grievance, which was pursued under the agency's grievance process. The court found that the MWPA provides a process independent from the agency grievance process and its restrictions and benefits do not apply to Watson's claim. As such, the MWPA's three-year limitation does not apply to Watson’s claim, and the court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the Hearing Officer’s pay determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson. The court noted that Montana follows the “American Rule” regarding fee awards, which provides that “absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.” There was no contractual or statutory authority providing for attorney fee awards for prevailing parties in this case, and the court found that this case was not frivolous litigation or litigated inappropriately by FWP. Therefore, an exception to the generally applicable American Rule was not established. The court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "Watson v. FWP" on Justia Law