Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Shawn Fowler, a former Montana state trooper, sued the Department of Justice, Montana Highway Patrol (MHP) alleging constructive discharge in violation of the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA). He also alleged breach of contract by the Montana Public Employees Association (MPEA) for declining his request to arbitrate. Fowler claimed that he was forced to retire due to a hostile work environment, which was mainly due to disciplinary action taken against him for mishandling two suspected DUI traffic stops in 2017. The MHP argued that Fowler, who was covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), failed to exhaust the grievance procedures of the CBA before filing a lawsuit.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the judgment of the Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County. The Supreme Court held that an employee covered by a CBA can't bring a claim under the WDEA. The Court determined that Fowler’s alleged constructive discharge was covered by the CBA and he was required to exhaust the grievance procedures for a constructive discharge through the CBA. The Court found that Fowler did not grieve any of the events preceding his suspension, which he claimed contributed to his constructive discharge, and he resigned from employment prior to exhausting the grievance procedure of the CBA. The Court concluded that the District Court erred in denying the State’s two motions for summary judgment and reversed the judgment. View "Fowler v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

In the case heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Caryn Miske, the plaintiff and appellant, was appealing a district court decision that granted the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) summary judgment on all of her claims that arose from her termination by the DNRC from the Flathead Basin Commission.The primary facts of the case involve Miske's employment as the Executive Director of the Flathead Basin Commission, a body established by the 1983 Legislature to protect the environment of Flathead Lake and its tributaries. The Commission is administratively attached to the DNRC, a relationship that Miske argued allowed the Commission independent authority over staffing decisions. However, the DNRC contended that the Commission and DNRC share concurrent authority over staffing decisions.The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the DNRC on all of Miske's claims. It held that, based on the plain language and structure of the relevant statutes, the DNRC and the Commission have concurrent authority over staffing decisions, and therefore, Miske was a DNRC employee.The court also ruled that the DNRC didn't commit intentional interference with contractual relations as it wasn't a stranger to Miske's relationship with the Commission. Additionally, the court found that Miske's lobbying efforts on behalf of the Commission were made in her capacity as a DNRC employee and thus were not protected political speech. Lastly, the court held that the DNRC had good cause to terminate Miske due to her repeated failures to provide the DNRC with state-issued credit card statements, which constituted a legitimate business reason for her termination. View "Miske v. DNRC" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the petitioner, Jay Watson, filed a grievance against his employer, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP or agency), claiming he was underpaid for six years due to an agency error in implementing a new pay system. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, ruled in favor of Watson and reversed the Final Agency Decision issued by the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA or Board). The court also awarded attorney fees to Watson. FWP appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not err in reversing BOPA’s decision. The court found that BOPA incorrectly applied the Montana Wage Payment Act (MWPA) to Watson's grievance, which was pursued under the agency's grievance process. The court found that the MWPA provides a process independent from the agency grievance process and its restrictions and benefits do not apply to Watson's claim. As such, the MWPA's three-year limitation does not apply to Watson’s claim, and the court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the Hearing Officer’s pay determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson. The court noted that Montana follows the “American Rule” regarding fee awards, which provides that “absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.” There was no contractual or statutory authority providing for attorney fee awards for prevailing parties in this case, and the court found that this case was not frivolous litigation or litigated inappropriately by FWP. Therefore, an exception to the generally applicable American Rule was not established. The court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "Watson v. FWP" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the plaintiff, Kevin Barber, appealed against his former employer, Bradford Aquatic Group, LLC, alleging wrongful termination. Bradford Aquatic Group, a North Carolina-based company, had employed Barber as a Regional Business Development Manager for its Rocky Mountain region, which includes Montana. The employment contract between Barber and the company included a choice-of-law and forum selection clause, specifying that any disputes arising from the agreement would be governed by North Carolina law and adjudicated in North Carolina courts.Barber, a resident of Montana, argued that Montana law should apply to his claims of wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and bad faith, and that the suit should be heard in Montana. The district court dismissed Barber's claims due to improper venue, based on the choice-of-law and forum selection clauses in the employment agreement.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement was valid and that North Carolina law should apply to Barber's claims. The court also upheld the validity of the forum selection clause, concluding that it is enforceable under North Carolina law. Therefore, the court determined that the dispute should be adjudicated in North Carolina, not Montana. View "Barber v. Bradford Aquatic" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and orders approving a settlement between Robert Allum and Montana State Fund and dismissing Allum's claims for benefits, holding that Allum resolved all of his dispute benefits, and therefore, the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) did not have jurisdiction over Allum's remaining stand-alone constitutional challenges.The State Fund accepted liability for the knee injury Allum received at work. Later, Allum notified State Fund that he also asserted a back condition resultant from his knee injury. Allum filed a petition seeking a hearing on his injury claims and also sought a hearing on his claims challenging the constitutionality of the Montana Workers' Compensation Act and the WCC. Allum and State Fund settled the injury claims prior to trial. The WCC approved the settlement agreement and then concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address Allum's constitutional challenges because Allum had resolved all of his benefit disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC's conclusions of law were correct. View "Allum v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) determining that Johnny Lee Sheldon's claim was compensable, that Contessa Bryer, Sheldon's guardian and conservator, was entitled to her attorney fees, and that a statutory penalty should be imposed against Accident Fund General Insurance Company, holding that the WCC did not err.Sheldon was rendered incapacitated and mentally incompetent after a workplace accident. Because Accident Fund General Insurance Company refused to accept liability for Sheldon's workers' compensation claim Bryer, Sheldon's guardian and conservator, petitioned the WCC for a hearing. The WCC ruled that Accident Fund was liable for Sheldon's injuries and that Bryer was entitled to attorney fees and a statutory penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err when it (1) ruled that the statute of limitations was tolled during the time that Sheldon had no appointed guardian; (2) found that substantial credible evidence supported the WCC's finding that Sheldon was working with argon when the pressure relief valve burst; and (3) awarded attorney fees under Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-611 and by imposing a penalty against Accident Fund under Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-2907. View "Bryer v. Accident Fund General Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted certification of a state law question submitted by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and answered that the holding in Galbreath v. Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., 890 P.2d 382 (Mont. 1995), has not been superseded by the 1999 statutory amendments to Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-801.At issue was whether, in an action for wrongful discharge pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-904, an employer may defend an employee's termination solely for reasons given in a discharge letter, as held in Galbreath, or whether the 1999 statutory amendments, which allowed employers to use reasons other than the reason provided in the discharge letter to defend against a wrongful discharge action, superseded the Galbreath Rule. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that the Galbreath Rule was not superseded by the 1999 statutory amendments. View "Smith v. Charter Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) granting in part and denying in part Petitioner's motion for summary judgment, holding that the WCC erred in part.At issue on appeal was whether the WCC erred when it ruled that the aggregate wages of Petitioner, a disabled worker, calculated at the time of injury, are used to determine Petitioner's permanent partial disability (PPD) benefit rate regardless of Petitioner's actual wage loss at maximum healing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the WCC erred by ruling that Petitioner's PPD indemnity benefit rate was aggregated from both of her time-of-injury employments when she was only precluded from one employment upon reaching maximum medical improvement. View "Barnhart v. Mont. State Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders entered by the district court on review of the Human Rights Commission's (HRC) final agency decision regarding Plaintiff's sexual discrimination claims against Defendant, her former employer, holding that the district court erred in part.The hearing officer found discrimination and awarded Plaintiff $415,786. The HRC affirmed the finding of discrimination and slightly altered the hearing officer's damages calculations, resulting in an increase in the overall award. The district court upheld the finding of discrimination but concluded that the HRC's use of a four-year cap for front pay damages was arbitrary and capricious, thus increasing Plaintiff's front-pay damage award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in affirming the determination that Plaintiff was exposed to a hostile and abusive work environment and was subjected to sexual harassment and retaliation; (2) erred in reversing the HRC's front-pay damage award; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in its determination of Plaintiff's attorney fee award. View "Norval Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Lawson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court rejecting Plaintiff's appeal of the Montana Human Rights Commission's rejection of his claims grounded in political discrimination, holding that while the district court erred in ruling that Appellant had to pursue his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim under the exclusive remedy of the Montana Human Rights Act (MHRA), claim preclusion now barred him from relitigating that claim.Plaintiff, the undersheriff of Missoula County, was reassigned to the position of senior deputy when his opponent in an election race won the office of Missoula County Sheriff. Plaintiff brought a human rights complaint alleging, inter alia, retaliation, discrimination, and constructive discharge based on his demotion. The Commission denied the complaint. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging wrongful discharge, intentional infliction of emotion distress, unlawful political discrimination, and unlawful retaliation. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the MHRA was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court improperly dismissed Plaintiff's section 1983 claim; and (2) because the underlying facts in Plaintiff's amended complaint were the same as his human rights complaint, the claims were precluded by the final judgment of the administrative proceedings. View "Clark v. McDermott" on Justia Law