Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Several parties in Broadwater County, Montana, hold water rights to Beaver Creek based on a 1906 decree. In 1973, a major owner of these rights, Olive McMaster, transferred portions of her interest to others, including the predecessors of CX Ranch, Baum, and Riis. That conveyance imposed specific conditions for water distribution in times of shortage. Years later, disputes arose over changes to the period of use for some of these water rights and whether historical restrictions still governed distribution. In 2018, the parties reached a stipulation that added remarks about the 1973 restrictions to the official records for certain water rights. These remarks were incorporated into a 2018 Water Court order and, subsequently, into a 2022 Preliminary Decree for Basin 41I.During the 2024 irrigation season, the court-appointed Water Commissioner reduced water allocations pro rata among all rights holders due to low water levels and altered the method of delivery to facilitate Riis’ usage downstream. The Hoeffners, who own Pole Creek Ranch and Staubach Creek Ranch, objected to this administration, arguing that their rights were not subject to the 1973 restrictions and that the Water Commissioner’s practices were inconsistent with the applicable decree. The District Court denied their complaint, finding that only parties to the 1973 conveyance could enforce its terms, that the Hoeffners lacked standing, and that pro rata reduction and the delivery method used were permissible.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court’s decision. It held that the Water Commissioner was required to administer water rights in accordance with the 2022 Preliminary Decree for Basin 41I, which incorporated the 2018 Water Court order and its adjudicated terms, including the distribution remarks. The District Court erred by not first determining whether the Water Commissioner’s practices conformed with the decree. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with a decree-first analysis. View "In re Petition for Water Commissioner" on Justia Law

Christopher and Jennifer Atkinson purchased a lot in the Ridgeview Trails Major Subdivision in Livingston, Montana, in 2012. The City of Livingston had approved the subdivision in 2005 and 2006, and a geotechnical report identifying problematic soils was created for the subdivision developers but was not provided to the Atkinsons when they purchased the lot. The Atkinsons received a building permit from the City to construct a residence, which was substantially completed in June 2013. In 2021, the Atkinsons began to observe cracking and structural problems in their home. After later discovering the existence of the geotechnical report, they sued the City in April 2024, alleging negligence and negligent misrepresentation for the City’s failure to disclose known soil issues during the permitting process.The case was heard in the Montana Sixth Judicial District Court, Park County. By agreement, the parties proceeded directly to cross-motions for summary judgment to address threshold legal issues before discovery. The District Court granted summary judgment for the City, holding that the claims were barred by Montana’s statute of repose for construction-related claims, found in § 27-2-208, MCA. The District Court also found that the City owed no duty to the Atkinsons, that the public duty doctrine barred the claims, that the Atkinsons had disclaimed claims relating to permits and inspections, and that the geotechnical report was for the developer’s exclusive use.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the Atkinsons’ claims were barred by the ten-year statute of repose in § 27-2-208, MCA, because their claims arose from the City’s planning and inspection activities and were filed more than ten years after substantial completion of the home. The Court also held that the statute applies to municipalities and that no statutory exception applied. View "Atkinson v. Livingston" on Justia Law

A motor vehicle accident occurred in Butte, Montana, when a snow grader operated by a city employee backed into a sedan driven by the plaintiff at a very low speed. The grader was engaged in snow removal operations, reversing in the process, and displaying flashing lights and a backup alarm. The plaintiff, after passing the grader, positioned her car behind it and came to a stop. The grader then struck her vehicle. Testimony at trial included differing accounts of whether warning devices were observable and whether the plaintiff was attentive to the grader’s movements. The plaintiff claimed injuries resulting from the collision, though evidence regarding the severity and causation of her injuries was contested.The Second Judicial District Court, Butte-Silver Bow County, conducted a jury trial. The jury found the plaintiff 54% negligent and the city 46% negligent, barring her recovery under Montana’s comparative negligence statute. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing irregularity in the proceedings and insufficient evidence to support the verdict. The District Court granted the motion for a new trial on both grounds, relying on statements made by the city’s counsel during closing arguments and finding the evidence did not support the jury’s comparative negligence finding.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in granting a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had not preserved her objections to alleged irregularities in the proceedings because she failed to object contemporaneously or through a specific motion in limine. The Court also determined that the plaintiff had judicially admitted that comparative negligence was a factual issue for the jury, thereby waiving her right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s order granting a new trial and reinstated the jury’s verdict. View "Shahood v. Butte-Silver Bow" on Justia Law

A dispute arose among members of a family-owned limited liability company (LLC) established in 1994 with an original dissolution date of December 31, 2024. In 2015, one member, Seth, provided notice of his withdrawal. Shortly after, the remaining members—Horatio (the siblings’ father), Cameron, and Lindsay—held a meeting and, over Lindsay’s objection, voted by supermajority to convert the LLC to a perpetual-term entity. This action was later formalized through an amendment filed with the state. Horatio subsequently passed away, and Cameron became personal representative of his estate, controlling Horatio’s LLC interest.After these events, Lindsay, individually, on behalf of her minor children, and as a derivative plaintiff for the LLC, initiated an action in the Montana Sixth Judicial District Court. She sought a declaratory judgment enforcing the operating agreement’s (OA) dissolution provision and contended that the OA required unanimous written consent for amendment—rendering the 2015 supermajority vote ineffective. Cameron moved to dismiss some claims and later sought to join the LLC as a defendant. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, granted summary judgment to Cameron and the LLC on the validity of the amendment, ordered the LLC joined as a defendant, and required Lindsay to pay fees for a non-party hybrid witness’s deposition.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the OA provided two valid pathways to amendment—by unanimous written consent or by a 67% supermajority, and that the 2015 vote validly converted the LLC to a perpetual entity. The court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and its joinder order. However, it reversed the order requiring Lindsay to pay the non-party witness’s fees, limiting compensation to the statutory witness fee unless otherwise agreed. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. View "Barbier v. Burns" on Justia Law

Skye Angel Anne Hennon filed a sworn petition in the Judith Basin Justice Court seeking a temporary order of protection against Matthew Weber for herself, her minor son N.G., and Brian Gonzalez. Hennon alleged that Weber had harassed and stalked her through threatening messages and uninvited visits, and referenced a separate legal dispute in Idaho. The Justice Court issued a temporary order of protection and scheduled a hearing, at which both parties appeared and testified. During the hearing, Weber attempted to cross-examine Hennon, but the court allowed Hennon to decline answering a relevant question and ended the cross-examination. Weber presented his own testimony and attempted to submit exhibits, which the court excluded as hearsay. The Justice Court extended the order of protection for Hennon and N.G. for one year.Weber appealed to the Montana Tenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the order of protection for Hennon and N.G., but dismissed it as to Gonzalez, noting that Gonzalez, as an adult, needed to seek his own order. The District Court acknowledged deficiencies in the record, including unclear admitted exhibits and unintelligible audio, but relied on the Justice Court’s position to observe the parties and testimony.Weber then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court abused its discretion and violated Weber’s procedural due process rights by denying him a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Hennon on central factual issues. The Court also found that the District Court abused its discretion by affirming the order of protection despite an incomplete and unclear record. The Supreme Court vacated both lower courts’ orders and remanded the case to the Justice Court for a new evidentiary hearing consistent with statutory and due process requirements. View "Hennon v. Weber" on Justia Law

Tristin Fahrnow was injured when a hot-oil truck operated by an employee of E-5 Oilfield Services struck him on an icy Montana highway. Fahrnow had been inspecting his own vehicle after a prior collision at the intersection, and was standing in the roadway when the E-5 truck lost control and hit him. Fahrnow sued E-5 for negligence under a theory of vicarious liability, alleging that the E-5 driver failed to operate the truck safely given the hazardous conditions. E-5 asserted that Fahrnow’s own actions, including parking in the traffic lane and failing to display warning devices, constituted comparative negligence.The Seventh Judicial District Court of Montana granted summary judgment in favor of E-5, finding that Fahrnow was solely responsible for his injuries as a matter of law. The District Court also denied Fahrnow’s motions for sanctions against E-5 for alleged spoliation of evidence (loss of truck data and employment records) and denied his motion to compel E-5 to answer an interrogatory comparing the parties’ medical experts’ qualifications, granting E-5’s cross-motion for a protective order.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that the record presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding the comparative negligence of both drivers, making summary judgment inappropriate. The Court reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to E-5 and remanded for trial. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Fahrnow’s motions for default judgment as a sanction for spoliation and its denial of the motion to compel further expert discovery, finding no abuse of discretion in those rulings. View "Fahrnow v. E-5 Oil Services" on Justia Law

In February 2016, Kevin Frost kidnapped his estranged wife, Sherri Frost, during a contentious divorce. He lured her into a situation where he could seize her, forced her into his vehicle, and held her for several hours in a barn owned by a family associate. During captivity, Kevin made Sherri severely intoxicated and later delivered her to the emergency room before turning himself in. Kevin pleaded guilty to assault and kidnapping and served a prison sentence. Sherri subsequently filed a civil suit against Kevin, Frost Ranching Corporation (the Ranch), and other parties, seeking damages for injuries and emotional distress resulting from the kidnapping. She alleged that Kevin acted, at least in part, to prevent her from obtaining an interest in the Ranch during the divorce.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, dismissed claims against some defendants and granted summary judgment to Frost Limited Partnership. The court denied summary judgment to the Ranch on vicarious liability, allowing that issue to proceed to trial. At trial, Sherri presented evidence of medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other damages. The jury found Kevin liable for several torts but awarded only $20,000 in damages, which matched the lower end of medical expenses and did not account for pain and suffering. The District Court granted Sherri’s motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s award unsupported by substantial evidence, as it disregarded uncontradicted, credible evidence of pain and suffering. The court also granted the Ranch’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the Ranch could not ratify Kevin’s conduct absent acceptance of any benefit from the kidnapping.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed both rulings. It held that the jury’s damages award was not supported by substantial evidence and that a new trial on damages was warranted. The court also held that, under Montana law, ratification requires acceptance of a benefit, which was absent here, so the Ranch could not be held liable for Kevin’s actions. View "Frost v. Frost" on Justia Law

Three individuals, including the appellant, formed a limited liability company (LLC) to design and sell firearms products, later adding two more members to a second LLC. The first LLC did not have a formal operating agreement, while the second adopted one in early 2019, setting a low company valuation. The appellant’s behavior became erratic and disruptive, leading to accusations against a key business partner and other members, which damaged business relationships and led to the loss of significant contracts. The remaining members of both LLCs unanimously voted to dissociate the appellant, citing his conduct as making it unlawful to continue business with him. The appellant disputed the validity of the operating agreement in the second LLC and challenged the valuation of his interests in both companies, also alleging wrongful dissociation, defamation, and conversion of property.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court found the appellant was properly dissociated from the first LLC under Montana’s Limited Liability Company Act due to the unanimous vote and the unlawfulness of continuing business with him. It also held that the second LLC’s operating agreement was valid and permitted dissociation by unanimous vote. The court valued the appellant’s interests according to the operating agreement for the second LLC and based on company assets for the first LLC. The court denied the appellant’s motion to extend expert disclosure deadlines and partially denied his motion to compel discovery. It also granted summary judgment to the defendants on the conversion claim, finding no evidence of unauthorized control over the appellant’s property.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court’s rulings on dissociation and valuation regarding the second LLC, as well as the summary judgment on the conversion claim. However, it reversed the valuation of the appellant’s interest in the first LLC, holding that the district court erred by failing to consider the company’s “going concern” value as required by statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Herbert v. Shield Arms" on Justia Law

In May 2022, Garry Douglas Seaman shot and killed James Preston Freeman and seriously wounded Heidi Gabert, following the end of his romantic relationship with Gabert, with whom he shares a minor child. Seaman was criminally charged, and Gabert and Dawn Freeman, James’s spouse, filed a civil suit for damages. To prevent Seaman from transferring or selling assets during the litigation, Gabert and Freeman successfully sought a receivership over all of Seaman’s property. After negotiations, the parties reached a settlement memorialized in a memorandum of understanding (MOU), which included $10 million judgments for Gabert and Freeman, liquidation of Seaman’s assets, and a homestead exemption for Seaman.The Nineteenth Judicial District Court, Lincoln County, approved the creation of a designated settlement fund (DSF) to facilitate asset liquidation. Initially, the court’s DSF Order required the Liquidation Receiver to reserve funds from asset sales to pay Seaman’s capital gains taxes, interpreting the MOU’s tax payment provision as unambiguous. Gabert and Freeman moved to amend this order under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), arguing the court erred in its interpretation and that the parties did not intend to reserve funds for Seaman’s capital gains taxes. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court agreed, finding the MOU ambiguous and, based on extrinsic evidence, concluded the parties did not intend to reserve such funds. The court amended its order, striking the provision requiring reservation for capital gains taxes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in amending the DSF Order. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion, correctly found the MOU ambiguous, and its factual finding regarding the parties’ intent was not clearly erroneous. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s amended order. View "Gabert v. Seaman" on Justia Law

After the death of the previous sheriff, the County Commissioners of Big Horn County appointed Jeramie Middlestead as interim sheriff in November 2023. Middlestead subsequently ran for election to retain the position. Lee A. Bartel filed a complaint in June 2024, alleging that Middlestead was ineligible to serve as sheriff because he was not a resident of, nor registered to vote in, Big Horn County, as required by Montana law. Bartel sought to prevent Middlestead from being sworn in, arguing that his appointment and potential election violated statutory requirements. Despite these allegations, Middlestead won the November 2024 election and was sworn in as sheriff in December 2024.The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn County, presided over by Judge Olivia Rieger after Judge Matthew J. Wald recused himself, considered Bartel’s motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent Middlestead from assuming office. The District Court denied the motion in February 2025, finding that while there were unresolved questions about Middlestead’s qualifications, Bartel had not demonstrated irreparable harm, the equities weighed against granting the injunction since Middlestead had already been sworn in, and that removing the sheriff would not serve the public interest. The court also determined that the statutory standards for granting a preliminary injunction had not been met.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the matter was not moot because the District Court retained the authority to provide effective relief, including potentially ordering Middlestead’s removal if he was found ineligible. The Supreme Court further held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction, affirming the lower court’s order and remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Bartel v. Middlestead" on Justia Law