Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

James Altenhofen was the trustee of the Gibbs’ family trust and Delwin Nordtvedt was the successor trustee. Nordtvedt filed an action requesting that the court determine whether any restrictions existed in the trust agreement limiting the trustee’s power to sell the real and personal property included in the trust estate. The Gibbs filed cross-claims against Nordtvedt. The district court granted summary judgment for Nordtvedt, concluding that the prudent investor rule called for the sale of certain property. The Gibbs then filed a complaint against Nordtvedt and Altenhofen, alleging breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court concluded (1) the claims against Nordtvedt were barred by the doctrines of issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, and claim preclusion; and (2) the claims against Altenhofen were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in finding that some of the Gibbs’ claims against Nordtvedt were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion; (2) did not err in finding that some of the Gibbs’ claims were barred by the doctrines of judicial estoppel and issue preclusion; and (3) did not err in concluding that the claims against Altenhofen were time-barred. View "Gibbs v. Altenhofen" on Justia Law

Decedent was the sister of Linda Hyde and the mother of Kelli Martin. Martin petitioned the district court to adjudicate that her mother died intestate and to appoint her as Decedent's personal representative. Hyde opposed the petition, asserting that Decedent had previously executed a will naming Hyde as executrix. The district court concluded that Decedent had revoked the will, and therefore ruled that Harless died intestate and that Martin was entitled to be appointed as personal representative. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Decedent's will was a valid will that Decedent did not revoke. Remanded with instructions that Decedent's will be probated. View "In re Estate of Harless" on Justia Law

Dorothy Gopher, an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe, died intestate in 2008. Dorothy was survived by seven children (the siblings), and her estate consisted only of a ceremonial tribal flag. One of the siblings, filed an application for informal probate in the district court. As proceedings commenced in district court, several siblings filed a petition before the Blackfeet tribal court to name two other siblings as personal representatives in their parents' estates. The two siblings then filed consecutive motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in district court. The district court continued its proceedings and denied the motions to dismiss. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction and ordered the estate to transfer the flag to co-trustees of a constructive trust on the estate. Meanwhile, the Blackfeet tribal court declined to assert jurisdiction over the estate property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it assumed jurisdiction over the probate of the estate. View "In re Estate of Gopher" on Justia Law

After John Irvine died, the proceeds from three of his investment accounts were paid to his estate. John's mother, Va Va, sought a declaratory judgment that she was the sole beneficiary of all three accounts. John's stepson, Michael, opposed the action. Both Va Va and Michael filed summary judgment motions. Va Va argued that John intended to benefit his estate under the laws of intestacy, not under the terms of his 1983 will, which included Michael as a beneficiary, and that John intended for her to be the contingent beneficiary for all three accounts. To support her contention, Va Va offered testimony from John's financial planner, who testified that he erroneously believed that John did not have a will when he executed beneficiary designation forms for a number of accounts. Va Va argued that the written contracts should be reformed for mutual mistake. The district court concluded that Michael was entitled to summary judgment under the contract terms and that no legal basis existed to require reformation of the contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) the contracts could not be reformed; and (2) proceeds from John's investment accounts were properly paid to his estate. View "Estate of Irvine v. Oaas" on Justia Law

Decedent, the mother of Cathie and Marcy, died testate. Decedent's will expressly made no provision for her daughters. Decedent named Kristine Fankell as the personal representative of her estate. After Fankell's application for informal probate was accepted, Marcy filed a petition for supervised administration of the estate and a petition for formal probate of the will. Cathie subsequently filed an objection to the application and appointment of Fankell as personal representative as well as a motion for substitute of judge. The district court (1) denied Cathie's motion for substitution of judge as untimely, and (2) granted Fankell's motion to strike Cathie's pleadings because she failed timely to intervene and her interests were adequately represented by Marcy. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Cathie's motion for substitution of judge, holding that the court correctly determined Cathie's motion was untimely. View "In re Estate of Quirin" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Bennett, the adult son of Abel and Judy Bennett, died as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Jeremiah died intestate and was survived by two minor children. The district court appointed Sabrina Bennett, Jeremiah's former wife, as the personal representative of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina subsequently petitioned the district court for a declaration that Abel and Judy (the Bennetts) had no standing to claim wrongful death damages as a result of Jeremiah's death. The district court concluded that Jeremiah's children were the sole heirs of the estate and therefore had priority over any wrongful death and survivorship claims. The Bennetts petitioned the Supreme Court for supervisory control. The Court accepted the petition and vacated the portion of the district court's order holding that the Bennetts could not recover wrongful death claims as a matter of law, holding that the Bennetts were entitled to recover wrongful death damage as Jeremiah's parents and survivors. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Bennett died intestate. Jeremiah's two children resided with their mother, Jeremiah's ex-spouse, Sabrina. Jeremiah's father, Abel, was appointed the personal representative (PR) of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina objected to Abel's appointment and nominated herself as the PR in her capacity as guardian and conservator of the children. After a hearing, the district court removed Abel as PR of the estate and appointed Sabrina as PR. Abel appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Abel failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion or failed to follow the law in determining that it was in the best interests of the estate to remove Abel and to appoint Sabrina as PR for Jeremiah's estate. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law

Decedent's will named her daughter Dawn as personal representative of her estate. After the clerk of court accepted Dawn's application for informal probate, Dawn issued a notice to heirs and devisees specifying that the estate was being administered without supervision of the court. Decedent's son, William, subsequently filed a motion for substitute of judge in the proceeding pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804. The district court denied the motion as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the substitution statute did not apply to the informal probate matter because the matter was not under the supervision of the district court and therefore not a "civil action" for purposes of section 3-1-804; and (2) although the proceeding was later converted into a court-supervised administration under which section 3-1-804 would apply, William's motion for substitution was filed prematurely, and was therefore not timely and void. View "In re Estate of Greene" on Justia Law

Margaret Howard was driving south and John Bradford was driving north on a two-lane highway when the two vehicles collided. Neither Margaret nor John survived. The Howards, the co-personal representatives of Margaret's estate, filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the Bradfords, the co-personal representatives of John's estate, alleging negligence. A jury found that John was not liable in negligence for the death of Margaret. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err ruling that a defense expert's testimony was supported by an adequate factual foundation and by determining that the scientific method used by the expert to reconstruct the accident was reliable and admissible; (2) the Bradfords did not violate the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure by failing to supplement the disclosure of the defense expert; and (3) the district court did not err by denying the Howards' motion for a new trial View "Wheaton v. Bradford" on Justia Law

Appellant, the personal representative of the estate of Decedent, appealed from a final distribution order of the district court, which interpreted Decedent's last will and testament to devise the entirety of Decedent's real property to Appellee, Appellant's brother. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) interpreting Decedent's will to determine that Decedent intended to devise to Appellee 528 acres subject to special farm property valuation; and (2) allowing Appellee to object to the personal representative's proposed distribution of income from the property subject to special farm property valuation more than thirty days after the proposed distribution was submitted for approval. View "Ecton v. Ecton" on Justia Law