Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint brought by Lustre Oil Company LLC and Erehwon Oil & Gas, LLC (collectively, Lustre Oil) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the district court did not properly weigh the relevant jurisdictional factors.Lustre Oil filed an action against A&S Mineral Development Company, LLC seeking to quiet title and to invalidate A&S's interests in forty-one of the fifty-seven oil and gases leases operated by A&S within the Fort Beck Indian Reservation, home to the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that A&S was an arm of the Tribes entitling it to immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that A&S's incorporation under Delaware law did not favor immunity and in thus refusing to deny A&S tribal sovereign immunity based on state incorporation alone; and (2) consideration of the White factors weighed against the extension of sovereign immunity to A&S as an arm of the Tribes for the purpose of Lustre Oil's claims in this case. View "Lustre Oil Co. v. Anadarko Minerals, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting a preliminary injunction preventing Robert Oberlander from accessing his leased State school trust land via private roadways in a subdivision, holding that Oberlander had standing to bring a prescriptive easement claim.In 2001, Oberlander acquired his leases and accessed the leased land by traveling over portions of two private roads maintained by the homeowners association (HOA) in this case. In 2021, the HOA applied for a preliminary injunction, claiming that Oberlander's use constituted a trespass, violation of applicable covenants, and unjust enrichment. Oberlander filed a third-party complaint against individual property owners within the HOA, claiming a prescriptive easement. The district court dismissed Oberlander's prescriptive easement claim on the grounds that he lacked standing and then granted the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the preliminary was grounded in the improper conclusion that Oberlander lacked standing because, as an occupant of the dominant tenement, Oberlander had standing to bring a prescriptive easement claim pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 70-17-109. View "Oberlander v. Hennequin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed I'm part the order of the district court granting summary judgment to the State and Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (State) regarding interpretation of a settlement agreement between the parties, holding that the district court erred by reaching the merits of a nonjusticiable issue.In this case stemming from settled litigation between the parties involving the State's rent claims against utility companies for use of riverbed acreage occupied by their hydroelectric projects. On appeal, defendant Avista Corporation argued that the district court erred in concluding that the agreement's provision governing a conditional reduction of rent would not provide a retroactive credit for past rent paid by Avista. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a portion of the district court's order must be reversed as being unripe and constituting an advisory opinion about speculative issues that may never arise; and (2) the district court properly declared that "Avista [was] required to continue to pay the annual full market rental rate as set forth in the Settlement, Consent Judgment, and Lease." View "State Dep't of Natural Resources & Conservation v. Avista Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court affirming the decision of the Board of Supervisors of the Gallatin Conservation District (GCD) that a waterway within property owned by Appellant constituted a "natural, perennial-flowing stream" under the Natural Steambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975 (the 310 Law), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that GCD properly exercised its discretion in evaluating the entirety of the record, including historical evidence, when deciding whether the waterway on Appellant's property fell within the conservation district's jurisdiction; and (2) did not erroneously uphold GCD's determination that substantial evidence supported its conclusion that the waterway constituted a natural perennial-flowing stream as set forth in the 310 Law. View "Pfeil Acquisitions LLC v. Gallatin County Conservation District" on Justia Law

In this foreclosure action arising under the Small Tract Financing Act (STFA), the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting Defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying Plaintiffs' cross motion for summary judgment, holding that the STFA does not contain an indication that a trustee is barred from delegating certain notice duties to agents.Thomas and Mindy Pennell entered into a deed of trust under the STFA to secure financing to purchase certain property. The deed of trust was later assigned to Nationstar Mortgage, which appointed First American Title Company of Montana as successor trustee. When the Pennells defaulted, First American began foreclosure proceedings. Daniel Inman purchased the property at a trustee's sale, and First American executed a trustee's deed conveying the property to him. The Pennells then filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that the trustee's sale and resulting trustee's deed were void because First American failed to follow the requirements of the STFA. The district court granted summary judgment for Nationstar. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Pennells' argument that an indenture trustee is prohibited under the STFA from delegating its notice duties to an agent was without merit; and (2) the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Nationstar. View "Pennell v. Nationstar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the orders of the district court granting Zinvest, LLC's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s complaint alleging that Zinvest failed to give proper notice of pending tax deeds under Mont. Code Ann. 15-18-212 and requesting the tax deeds issued to Invest be declared void, holding that the district court erred.Wells Fargo held a deed of trust against two parcels of land. Because the taxes assessed against each parcel for the tax year 2014 were unpaid the Missoula County treasurer conducted a tax lien sale for both parcels. Missoula County purchased the tax liens, executed a county treasurer's certificate of tax sale for both parcels and assigned the certificates to Zinvest. When Zinvest mailed notices that tax deeds may issue to Wells Fargo, they were returned. The Missoula County treasurer then executed tax deeds conveying the parcels to Zinvest. Wells Fargo subsequently brought its complaint. The district court granted summary judgment for Zinvest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Zinvest's failure to mail notices that the tax deeds may issue to Wells Fargo violated Mont. Code Ann. 15-18-212. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Zinvest, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court issuing a decree quieting title to a claimed easement in favor of Rose Family Trust (Rose), holding that the district court did not err by determining that a "notice of purchaser's interest" (NPI) did not convey title to the easement in dispute.Rose filed this action to quiet title and to enjoin use of the claimant easement by Appellants. The district court ruled in favor of Rose, holding that the NPI at issue did not constitute a valid instrument of conveyance and therefore did not transfer any easement rights to Appellants. On appeal, Appellants argued that the NPI was itself an instrument of conveyance and, alternatively, that the NPI functioned as an abstract of an instrument of conveyance. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed, holding that neither the NPI nor the abstracted contract for deed effectuated title transfer, and therefore, there was no actual conveyance on which Appellants could base their claim. View "Towsley v. Stanzak" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the summary judgment ruling of the district court and resulting final judgment granting Plaintiff judgment that Plaintiff was the sole owner of a formerly co-owned family cabin property and denying Defendant's constructive fraud counterclaim, holding that that the district court erred in part.At issue was cabin property located on land owned by the United States Forest Service in Granite County, Montana. Plaintiff brought this action seeking declaratory judgment that he was the sole owner of the property and asserting a claim for quiet title. Defendant asserted a counterclaim alleging constructive fraud. The district court ruled in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff on his asserted declaratory judgment and quiet title claims; but (2) erred in granting summary judgment to Plaintiff on Defendant's constructive fraud counterclaim. View "Drescher v. Malee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Leonard Schleder and declaring him the owner of the mineral rights at issue in this case, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) correctly interpreted the warranty deed language to reserve to Schleder all his mineral interests in the property; (2) properly considered the chain of title in interpreting the language of the unambiguous warranty deed; and (3) did not err in determining that estoppel by deed did not apply to prevent Schleder from asserting title to the mineral interests. View "Dellit v. Schleder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order entered by the district court denying Skyline Consulting Group's motion to vacate and set aside bond substitution and reinstate construction lien, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Skyline had waived its right to challenge the substitute bond.In this dispute between two subcontractors, Mortensen Woodwork petitioned the district court to substitute Skyline's construction lien against certain property with the intent to pursue foreclosure. Skyline named SP Hotel Owner in the lien. Mortensen then secured a bond from a surety company for 150 percent of the amount Skyline claimed and filed a petition to substitute the bond for the lien. The district court did so. Skyline requested that the district court reinstate its lien because Mortensen was not authorized to substitute a bond. The district court denied the request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Skyline did not waive its right to challenge the substitute bond in a separate arbitration proceeding; and (2) the district court erred in concluding that Montana law authorized Mortensen, a subcontractor, to substitute a bond for Skyline's construction lien. View "Skyline Consulting Group v. Mortensen Woodwork, Inc." on Justia Law