Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Burglington Northern & Sante Fe Railway Company (BNSF) contaminated the environment surrounding the Livingston Rail Yard (Yard). Plaintiffs, individuals who owned property adjacent to the Yard, sued BNSF in federal court for damages to their property based on claims of, inter alia, nuisance, negligence, and trespass. The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of BNSF, finding that the applicable statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs' claims. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the continuing tort doctrine should apply to the claims presented by Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held (1) the continuing tort doctrine in Montana tolls the statute of limitations for property damage claims of nuisance and/or trespass resulting from contamination that has stabilized, continues to migrate, and is not readily or easily abatable; and (2) the limitations period begins to run when abatement is not reasonable or complete abatement cannot be achieved, and a permanent injury exists. View "Burley v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co." on Justia Law

NorthWestern Energy proposed constructing an electric transmission line from Montana to Idaho and submitted its application for a certificate from the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). While preparing a draft of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), Jefferson County informed DEQ that it expected DEQ to consult with the County in determining the route. Jefferson County subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus and injunction relief against DEQ, (1) seeking an order requiring DEQ to comply with the Montana Environmental Policy Act and other environmental legislation, and (2) requesting DEQ be enjoined from releasing a draft EIS. NorthWestern subsequently intervened. The district court ruled in favor of Jefferson County after determining that DEQ had not satisfied its duty to consult with Jefferson County under Mont. Code Ann. 75-1-201(1)(c) and enjoined DEP from releasing the Draft EIS until it had done so. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) at this stage in the process, DEQ had not violated a clear legal duty to consult with the County prior to issuing its draft EIS; and (2) because the County had adequate legal remedies once DEQ rendered a final agency action, the County was not entitled to mandamus or injunctive relief.

Plaintiffs, ranches and their owners, owned an irrigation ditch on which they relied to irrigate hay fields for their cattle operation. The ditch ran through Nataliya Joukova's property. The dispute between the parties arose when Joukova placed a culvert in the ditch bottom and built a bridge of rock and gravel across a portion of the ditch for which Plaintiffs had secondary easement rights for ditch maintenance. The district court concluded that the culvert and bridge could remain in place as they did not unreasonably interfere with Plaintiffs' secondary easement rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in allowing Joukova's culvert and rock bridge to remain in the irrigation ditch as (1) Joukova's construction of a structure permanently blocking use of a portion of Plaintiffs' secondary easement inarguably encroached on the easement, and (2) the law governing easements makes clear that construction of the culvert constituted an unreasonably interference with Plaintiffs' easement rights, for which the statute required Joukova to obtain written permission.

Appellant, Summer Night Oil Company, and Appellees, individuals and oil companies, resolved a dispute over the operation of two oil wells through a settlement agreement. Appellant filed a motion to compel performance of the agreement after the parties failed to perform timely their obligations under the agreement. Specifically, Appellant asked the district court to compel Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents under the agreement. Appellees responded with a request to compel Appellant to pay a fine due to the EPA and a payment owed to Appellees under the agreement. Both parties sought attorney fees. The district court enforced what it determined to be the plain meaning of the agreement's terms, and (1) ordered Appellant to pay the fine owed to the EPA, (2) ordered Appellant to pay Appellee the amount owed it under the agreement, (3) ordered Appellees to deliver all title clearance documents to an escrow agent, and (4) declined to award attorney fees to either party. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly denied Appellant's motion to compel performance of the agreement according to Appellant's terms, and (2) the district court correctly denied Appellant's motion to alter or amend its judgment.

Montana Trout Unlimited (MTU) appealed from an order of the water court dismissing its objections to water right claims by claimants Beaverhead Water Company, et al. Those claims were contained in the water court's temporary preliminary decree for the Big Hole River Basin. At issue in the appeal was whether the water court erred in holding (1) that only the Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks may represent the public recreational and conservation interests in water adjudication proceedings, and (2) that only water right claimants may request a hearing on their objections in water adjudication proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) there is no statutory or regulatory restriction on who is entitled to file an objection to a claim of water right contained in a temporary preliminary decree, and (2) based on the state's ownership of the waters of Montana which it holds in public trust and the undisputed specific interests of the members of MTU in the Big Hole River basin, MTU has a sufficient ownership interest in water or its use to demonstrate good cause to require the water court to hold a hearing on its objections under Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-223.

The City of Great Falls, Benefis Health Care, and Electric City Power (ECP) filed a complaint with the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) challenging the lawfulness of NorthWestern Energy's (NWE) refusal to allow ECP to provide electricity supply to meters owned by the City and Benefis. The PSC issued a final order concluding that ECP could not provide electricity supply service to the disputed meters, basing its decision upon its interpretation that "customer," as contained in Mont. Code Ann. 69-8-201(2), meant an individual meter or point of delivery, rather than an entity or person. The City, Benefis, and ECP appealed the final order. The district court reversed, finding error in the PSC's statutory interpretation, and remanded the matter to the PSC to allow all of the City's and Benefis' meters to receive electricity supply service from ECP. NWE and the PSC appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court correctly determined that under the statute, the term "customer" means an entity or person rather than an individual meter and, accordingly, correctly permitted the City and Benefis to receive electricity from ECP at the disputed meters.