Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Contracts
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Starting in 2007, A&C Soaring Eagle, Inc. (A&C) purchased chemicals and fertilizer on account from Fitterer Sales Montana, Inc. (Fitterer). In 2009, Fitterer filed suit alleging that A&C and Clint Mullin, Jr. (Clint), A&C’s president and sole shareholder, personally owed Fitterer $98,184 and that it was owed interest on the amount due. After a bench trial in 2014, the district court found that A&C and Clint personally breached a contract with Fitterer for the sale of goods. The court ordered A&C and Clint to pay Fitterer $114,398, which included unpaid principal and interest calculated at a rate of ten percent per year from June 11, 2007 to November 30, 2014. The court also ordered A&C and Clint to pay $526 per month in prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) a valid, binding contract existed between A&C and Fitterer for the sale of goods; (2) Fitterer was entitled to prejudgment interest on the amount due under the contract; and (3) as conceded on appeal by Fitterer, Clint should be dismissed as a defendant in this case. View "Fitterer v. Mullin" on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts
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In 2009, Carol McClue was involved in a serious car accident. At the time of the accident, Carol had underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance coverage through Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois. In 2011, Carol was diagnosed with bulbar ALS. In 2013, Carol died from the illness. After the diagnosis, Dan McClue, Carol’s husband, submitted claims to Safeco for UIM benefits for damages associated with Carol’s ALS. Safeco denied the claims. Dan subsequently filed suit against Safeco, asserting that Safeco breached the insurance contract by failing to provide UIM benefits for Carol’s ALS. Before trial, the district court granted Safeco’s motions in limine to exclude expert testimony from two doctors - Dr. John Sabow and Dr. Decontee Jimmeh-Fletcher. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment to Safeco on the grounds that, without the expert testimony, Dan did not have admissible evidence to establish that the car accident caused Carol’s ALS. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling barring Dan from using Dr. Jimmeh-Fletcher’s testimony to establish causation in this case; but (2) reversed the district court’s ruling that Dr. Sabow was not qualified to present expert testimony during trial. View "McClue v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill." on Justia Law

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At dispute in this case was a home inspection Don Hall performed of a home purchased by Gregory Hall. Gregory brought this action against Don, the seller of the home, and two real estate brokers, alleging that Defendants failed to disclose material defects in the property. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants with the exception of Don on the grounds that Gregory received a disclosure statement and had imputed knowledge of the defects. The district court entered default judgment against Don after determining that Don had not filed a sufficient answer to the complaint. After a writ of execution was issued, Don requested that the default judgment be set aside and later sought to claim exemptions. The district court denied the requests. The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court striking Don’s motion to set aside default judgment, holding that, under the circumstances of this case and in the interests of justice, Don was entitled to relief from judgment. Remanded. View "Hall v. Hall" on Justia Law

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The predecessor in interest to dck Worldwide Holdings, Inc. (together, Worldwide) entered into a contract with Spanish Peaks Lodge, LLC to serve as the general contractor for for a construction project. Spanish Peaks procured financing with the predecessor in interest to CH SP Acquisition LLC (together, CHSP), and CHSP took a mortgage against Spanish Peaks’ development property. When Spanish Peaks breached the parties’ contract Worldwide filed a construction lien claiming the unpaid portion of the contractor’s fee and the amount Worldwide owed to a subcontractor, Allied Steel, Inc. Allied Steel also filed a construction lien for unpaid services and materials. Allied Steel, Spanish Peaks, and Worldwide entered into a settlement agreement, and CHSP and Worldwide reached a partial settlement under which Worldwide released all of its claims against CHSP except for those at issue on appeal. The district court concluded that the unpaid portion of the contractor’s fee and the subcontractor’s fee were both secured by Worldwide in the amount of $5,476,277 and $661,767, respectively, and lienable as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred by concluding that the unpaid portion of the contractor’s fee was lienable; and (2) erred by concluding that the subcontractor’s fee remained alienable after Allied Steel settled its claim. View "dck Worldwide Holdings Inc. v. CH SP Acquisition LLC" on Justia Law

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The Butte Local Development Corporation (BLDC) filed a complaint against Masters Group International alleging that Masters had failed to pay its obligations under a loan agreement, as modified. Masters filed a third-party complaint against Comerica Bank, alleging, among other claims, that Comerica breached a Forbearance Agreement. A jury found Masters liable to BLDC for $275,251 and found Comerica liable to Masters for a total of $52,037,593, which included punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Comerica, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by implicitly denying Comerica’s severance motion; (2) the district court erred in applying Montana law despite the existence of a contractual Michigan choice-of-law provision, and had the district court properly applied Michigan law, Masters’ tort claims would not have been permitted to go to the jury as stand-alone tort claims, and the jury’s award of $10.5 million in punitive damages must be vacated; (3) the law of both Montana and Michigan supports the district court’s decision to submit the companion questions of contract formation and waiver to the jury; and (4) the district court abused its discretion by allowing Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) evidence to be presented to the jury. Remanded for a new trial on the contract claims applying Michigan law. View "Masters Group Int’l v. Comerica Bank" on Justia Law

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Montana Health Network, Inc. (MHN), which maintains the Montana Health Network Health Insurance Plan & Trust (the Plan), and Great Falls Orthopedic Associates (GFOA) executed a document (the Adoption Agreement) under which GFOA would adopt the Plan to obtain coverage for its employees. GFOA later stated that it wished to withdraw from the Plan. At the time, the Plan covered approximately thirty eligible GFOA employees. MHN denied GFOA’s attempt to withdraw from the Plan on the basis that GFOA failed to give timely notice to avoid automatic renewal of the Adoption Agreement. Thereafter, GFOA submitted waivers of coverage for twenty-seven of its covered employees and ceased submitting premium payments for those employees. MHN denied the waivers, but GFOA did not remit payment for the premiums of the twenty-seven employees who submitted waivers. MHN filed a breach of contract action against CFOA. The district court granted summary judgment to GFOA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in finding the contract ambiguous and in granting summary judgment to GFOA; and (2) GOFA was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees accrued while defending this appeal. View "Mont. Health Network, Inc. v. Great Falls Orthopedic Assocs." on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts
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Bottrell Family Investments Limited Partnership and Defendants entered into a contract providing that Defendants would buy Bottrell’s interest in an LLC. Defendants failed to close and forfeited their share to Bottrell according to the terms of the contract. Bottrell later sold some of the LLC’s physical assets and transferred employees to other subsidiaries. Bottrell brought this action seeking damages under the contract as well as a declaratory judgment that the contract was still effective and that Defendants breached the contract. The district court awarded summary judgment to Defendants, concluding that Bottrell elected to pursue the remedy of forfeiture and rescinded the contract and that the doctrine of laches would bar Bottrell’s suit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract did not limit Bottrell to the remedies provided in the contract; and (2) Defendants did not show extraordinary circumstances or prejudice sufficient to justify the application of laches. Remanded for the district court to enter judgment in Bottrell’s favor and to calculate damages. View "Bottrell Family Invs. Ltd. P’ship v. Diversified Fin., Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Contracts
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The Montana Public Service Commission determined that Whitehall Wind, LLC had not established a legally enforceable obligation during contract negotiations with NorthWestern Energy for the sale and purchase of electric energy generated by a proposed wind facility. The district court reversed, determining that NorthWestern’s refusal to negotiate created a legally enforceable obligation entitling Whitehall to a long-term avoided cost rate. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision and order and remanded for reinstatement of the Commission’s order, holding that the Commission did not exceed its statutory authority in concluding that evidence of a utility’s refusal to negotiate, without more, is insufficient to establish that a qualifying facility has committed itself to the proposed project. View "Whitehall Wind, LLC v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm’n" on Justia Law

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After Karrie Lynn Serrania went to Discovery Dental Group, PLLC (DDG) for a toothache, DDG referred her account to LPH, Inc., a debt collection agency. Serrania later sued LPH and DDC, alleging, among other claims, that LPH violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). LPH and DDG counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court (1) sanctioned Serrania’s attorney for failing to attend a pretrial conference, (2) entered summary judgment against Serrania on the contract and FDCPA claims, and (3) sanctioned Serrania and her attorney for their conduct in the course of litigation. After the district court entered judgment, Serrania underwent bankruptcy, and her dental debts and the district court’s orders were discharged. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) some of Serrania’s arguments on appeal are moot, but her appeal of the district court’s summary judgment order on her FDPCA claim is live, and her attorney has an interest in overturning the sanctions entered against him; (2) the district court correctly entered judgment to LPH on the FDCPA claim; and (3) the district court erred in ordering Serrania and her attorney jointly to pay $24,797 to DDG and $41,113 to LPH as sanctions. View "Serrania v. LPH, Inc." on Justia Law

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During a highway paving project a storm caused recently applied primer to emulsify in rainwater. The oil splashed onto passing vehicles, causing damage. The vehicle owners brought claims against the State, which the State paid. A.M. Welles, Inc. (Welles), the general contractor on the job, reimbursed the State for what it paid to the vehicle owners. The State then sued Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. (Liberty), the insurer for the job, seeking indemnification for the costs that Welles did not cover. Welles, in turn, sued the subcontractors for the project, Montana Materials, Inc., RSJ, Inc., and GLJ, Inc. (collectively, “Jensen”), seeking indemnification under the subcontract. The district court granted summary judgment for Jensen on Welles’s indemnification claim and dismissed the State’s action against Liberty for failure to prosecute. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in denying Welles’s motion for summary judgment, as Welles was entitled to indemnification under the subcontract; and (2) abused its discretion by dismissing the State’s action against Liberty for failure to prosecute. Remanded. View "A.M. Welles, Inc. v. Mont. Materials, Inc." on Justia Law