Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the City of Bozeman, holding that Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-114 does not provide an implied private right of action for judicial enforcement of the Montana Water Use Act.Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that the City was in violation of the Act due to unpermitted water use and seeking injunctive relief and attorney fees. The City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the Act does not create a private right of action for enforcement through injunctive relief, nor does it create a private right of action. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss, concluding that section 85-2-114, which allows for judicial enforcement of the Act, doesn't support an implied private right of action for enforcement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the provisions of section 85-2-114 preclude the possibility that the Act provides an implied private right of enforcement of the Act. View "Lyman Creek, LLC v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Plaintiff's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and motion for new trial, holding that the district court correctly denied Plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law and her motion for a new trial.Plaintiff sued Dr. Robert Replogle and Spineology, alleging that Dr. Replogle did not obtain her informed consent for surgery because he did not disclose his financial interest in Spineology to her. The jury returned a verdict for Dr. Replogle, finding that the was not negligent in either obtaining Plaintiff's informed consent or the way he performed surgery. Thereafter, the district court denied Plaintiff's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a reasonable mind could accept the testimony presented at trial that Dr. Replogle was not required to disclose his financial interest in Spineology to obtain Plaintiff's informed consent prior to surgery; and (2) substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict, and neither reversal of that verdict nor a new trial was warranted. View "Howard v. Replogle" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of criminal endangerment, holding that the court abused its discretion when it allowed evidence of Defendant's prior criminal endangerment conviction.Defendant was convicted of criminal endangerment after he purchased a half-gallon of eighty-proof whiskey for a teenager who drank it and suffered near-fatal consequences. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case, holding (1) given the circumstances, a rational jury could have concluded from the evidence that Defendant actually knew there was a substantial risk associated with purchasing a half-gallon of whiskey for a teenager; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in allowing evidence of Defendant's prior criminal endangerment conviction, and Defendant was entitled to a new trial. View "State v. Fleming" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that Appellant failed to prove a set of facts in support of his claim.While detained in jail, Appellant filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus requesting that the district court drop all felony criminal convictions against him on the alleged grounds that the State had no jurisdiction because Appellant was an enrolled member of the Confederated Salish and Kootenani Tribes (CSKT) and committed a crime within the boundaries of the Flathead Indian Reservation. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Appellant argued that the application of Public Law 83-230 (PL-280) by the State was improper and has never been consented to by the CSKT. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's argument that PL-280 was never properly consented to by the CSKT is incorrect; (2) the State properly enacted its enabling legislation under PL-280; and (3) PL-280 and the State's application of PL-280 to the CSKT did not violate the 1855 Hellgate Treaty. View "Lozeau v. Anciaux" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of incest, holding that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to hear during deliberations portions of a victim's taped forensic interview after those portions of the interview had been played to the jury during trial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred when it played portions of the victim's forensic interview two times to the jury - at trial and during jury deliberations. Specifically, Defendant argued that the court erred when it allowed the jury to hear the interview without first isolating the jury's difficulty concerning the evidence. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to isolate the jury's difficulty during deliberations before allowing the jury to watched portions of the video testimony in the jury room and that the error resulted in prejudice to Defendant. View "State v. Hayes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' request to recover assets for the Estate of Edward M. Boland and imposing sanctions on the basis that the allegations of bias made against the court against it by Appellants were frivolous, holding that the district court did not err.This appeal arose from two cases involving the same underlying probate of the Estate. In this consolidated appeal, Appellants - Paul Boland and Mary Gettel, as heirs of the Estate - challenged the court's response to their bias allegations, the order imposing sanctions, and the sanctions imposed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellants were not entitled to a hearing on their petition for order to recover assets; (2) the district court correctly concluded that the allegations of bias made against it were frivolous; (3) the district court did not err by imposing Rule 11 sanctions against Paul and his attorney; and (4) this was a proper case in which to impose sanctions for a frivolous appeal. View "In re Estate of Boland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her child, holding that the district court did not err by concluding that the Department of Public Health and Human Services had made reasonable efforts to help Mother, Mother had not complied with her treatment plan, and the condition rendering Mother unfit was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Mother had failed to complete most of her treatment plan, that the treatment plan was appropriate, and that Mother had failed to complete it and her unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The court then ordered termination of Mother's rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the department made reasonable efforts to help Mother complete her treatment plan and that the district court's did not err by terminating Mother's parental rights. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court distributing assets from the Estate of Della L. Ankrum and the Harold Ankrum Trust to Della and Harold's three children, holding that the district court correctly interpreted Della's handwritten codicil as a wish and not a specific devise of her stock in Ankrum Trucking to Stewart Ankrum.Before Harold's death in 1993, Harold and Della executed identical wills under which the assets of the first spouse to die would go into a trust with the assets distributed equally between their three children upon the death of the surviving spouse. During the couple's lifetimes they created and grew Ankrum Trucking. At issue in this appeal was whether a handwritten codicil to Della's will found after her death made a specific devise of Ankrum Trucking shares to Stewart, one of the couple's children. The district court concluded that the language of the codicil was a wish on the part of Della and not a testamentary transfer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly interpreted Della's codicil as lacking in testamentary intent to specifically devise her shares of Ankrum Trucking to Stewart. View "In re Harold Ankrum Trust Administration & Estate of Della L. Ankrum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Whitefish Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. (the Congregation) had a valid, enforceable easement across the property owned by Giuseppe and Jamie Caltabiano and granting a permanent injunction prohibiting the Caltabianos from interfering with the Congregation's use of the easement, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err when it considered extrinsic evidence and found an easement in favor of the Congregation; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the Caltabianos from interfering with the Congregation's access to its property from Lion Mountain Road; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to award the Congregation attorney fees. View "Whitefish Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Caltabiano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and dismissing Plaintiff's claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and negligence, holding that Wells Fargo did not breach the deed of trust and that Plaintiff's remaining claims presented no genuine issue of material fact.Wells Fargo assumed service of a loan obtained by Plaintiff, who executed a deed of trust with certain property serving as collateral for the loan. Plaintiff failed to pay property taxes assessed to Lot 3, which included the property. Wells Fargo paid the taxes on the entirety of Lot 3 and required Plaintiff to repay those taxes. Plaintiff later brought this suit. The district court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo, reasoning that the deed of trust's unambiguous language permitted Wells Fargo to pay Lot 3's taxes in full. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the deed of trust, Wells Fargo did not breach of the contract by paying the delinquent taxes on lot 3 and requiring Plaintiff to repay those taxes; and (2) because Wells Fargo did not breach the deed of trust, it likewise did not violate a duty owed to Plaintiff under the deed of trust, and as such Plaintiff's remaining claims were properly dismissed. View "Graham-Rogers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law