Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On appeal from a guilty plea to possessing 144 pounds of marijuana the Supreme Court remanded this case to the district court for recalculation of Defendant's fine, holding that Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-130(1) is facially unconstitutional to the extent it does not allow the sentencing judge to consider whether the thirty-five percent market value fine is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense.Section 45-9-130(1) requires a district court to impose a mandatory thirty-five percent market value fine in drug possession convictions. Pursuant to section 45-9-130(1), the district fined Defendant $75,600, which was thirty-five percent of the market value of the marijuana she was convicted of possessing. On appeal, Defendant argued that the mandatory thirty-five percent market value fine imposed in every drug possession conviction violated her constitutional right against excessive fines because the statute does require consideration of the offender's financial resources, the nature of the crime committed, and the nature of the burden the required fine would have on the offender. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that section 45-9-130(1) is facially unconstitutional and that a sentencing judge may not impose the thirty-five percent market value fine without considering the factors in Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-231(3). View "State v. Yang" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Mother's parental rights to her three children, holding that the Department of Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division (Department) provided reasonable efforts to avoid removal and to reunify Mother with her children and that the district court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights to the children.Specifically, the Court held (1) The Department made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of the children and to reunite Mother with the children, but those efforts were hindered by Mother's apathy or active refusal to engage with the Department; and (2) the district court did not err in determining that the conduct or condition rendering Mother unfit, unable, or unwilling to parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. View "In re R.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Daniel Boudette's motion to extinguish an Arizona Decree of Dissolution of Marriage that Tammy Boudette registered in Montana under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, holding that the court was not required to apply Arizona law in this case.Six years after Tammy registered the Arizona the Arizona judgment in Montana, Daniel moved to extinguish the registered Arizona judgment because Arizona's statute of limitations for enforcing judgments had expired. In response, Tammy argued that Montana's longer statute of limitations applied to foreign judgments filed in Montana. The district court granted the motion to extinguish, ruling that the Full Faith and Credit Clause required that Arizona law be applied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Montana law allows a registered foreign judgment to be enforced just as a Montana judgment would be, and the principle of full faith and credit does not require forum states to apply foreign rendering states' statutes of limitation for enforcement; and (2) therefore, the Arizona judgment registered in Montana was subject to Montana's statute of limitations. View "Oskerson v. Boudette" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court affirming the judgment of the municipal court denying Defendant's motions to suppress evidence, holding that the municipal court erred when it determined that a particularized suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation existed at the completion of a community caretaker stop.Specifically, the Court held that the municipal court's determination that the police officer obtained a particularized suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation during the scope of his community caretaker stop of Defendant was clearly erroneous because the objective factors present at the completion of the community caretaker stop, in the absence of the additional indicators observed later, did not support an inference that Defendant had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Therefore, the Court reversed the municipal court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, vacated Defendant's conviction for misdemeanor DUI, and remanded the matter with instructions to dismiss the case with prejudice. View "State v. Metz" on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning whether the district court properly determined that the City of Billings (City) did not owe unpaid longevity or other unpaid wages to its police officers (Officers) the Supreme Court affirmed the court's longevity determination and remanded for consideration of the non-longevity claims applying the appropriate limitations and look-back periods.The Officers sued the City to recover unpaid wages, including longevity pay and other employment benefits, under the Wage Protection Act, Mont. Code Ann. 39-3-206. In a prior appeal, the Supreme Court remanded for a determination of whether the City owed the Officers unpaid longevity and other wages, penalties, costs and attorney fees. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, finding the longevity issue dispositive. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded that the City did not owe the Officers unpaid longevity; but (2) erred in dismissing without consideration the Officers' claims for non-longevity wage items and in declining to address the applicable statute of limitations, look-back period, and potential award of penalties, attorney fees and costs for those claims. View "Watters v. City of Billings" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to Child, holding that the record did not support that the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division (Department) engaged in active efforts to provide Father with remedial services and rehabilitative programs to prevent the breakup of Child's family, as required by 25 U.S.C. 1912(d).Child in this case was an Indian child, thus requiring that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) apply to the proceedings. After a termination hearing, the district court concluded the Department had made active efforts as required by ICWA, Father was not able safely to parent Child, and it was in Child's best interest to terminate Father's parental rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Department failed to provide Father with active efforts throughout the custody proceedings as required by ICWA. View "In re K.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that each party in this case held an express easement over the other's property based on their predecessor's easement agreement and that agreement's subsequent incorporation into later conveyances, holding that the court's conclusions were without error.Stephen and Sharon Wiegele and West Dry Creek Ranch, LLC owned adjacent properties in Park County, Montana. Each party asserted an express easement over the other's property and denied that their properties were burdened by the other's claimed easements. The district court held that West Dry Creek had an express easement over the Wiegeles' property and that the Wiegeles had an express easement over West Dry Creek's property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. View "Wiegele v. West Dry Creek Ranch, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Rose Everett-Martin's motion to set aside the jury's verdict of trespassing, holding that the district court did not err in entering a judgment granting equitable relief in the form of possession of real property.Shirley Renz filed a complaint for possession or trespass against her daughter, Rose, alleging that Rose had occupied Shirley's twenty-acre property with Shirley's express permission and had begun interfering with Shirley's use and enjoyment of the property. Rose counterclaimed for, among other things, unjust enrichment. The jury determined (1) Rose was trespassing on Shirley's property, but the trespass did not cause Shirley money damages; and (2) Shirley was unjustly enriched at the expense of Rose. The district court awarded $35,000 in favor of Rose and ordered possession of the real property to Shirley. On appeal, Rose argued that the court's judgment granting equitable relief did not comport with the jury's trespass finding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in entering a judgment granting possession of real property. View "Renz v. Everett-Martin" on Justia Law

In this appeal challenging a criminal sentence the Supreme Court remanded for entry of an amended judgment, holding that Defendant was entitled to twenty-two days credit for twenty-two days he served in Silver Bow County.In 2016, Defendant pled guilty to possession of dangerous drugs in Deer Lodge County. Defendant served a total of sixty-one days in Deer Lodge County custody prior to his release. In 2017, Defendant was arrested for possession of dangerous drugs in Cascade County and, separately, was charged with forgery in Silver Bow County Justice Court. The Cascade County District Court sentenced Defendant on the possession of dangerous drugs charge and ordered his release. Defendant was then transferred to Silver Bow County. The district court imposed a five-year commitment on the possession of dangerous drugs charge. The court gave Defendant credit for the sixty-one days he was detained in the Deer Lodge County jail and denied his request for additional credit for time served while he was incarcerated in Cascade County and Silver Bow County. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that Defendant should have been credited with twenty-two days served in Silver Bow County custody. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court entering summary judgment in favor of the City of Missoula declaring that a city ordinance was not prohibited under Montana law, holding that the district court erred by concluding that the City may require background checks on firearm transfers without violating the statutory prohibition upon local government regulation of the "purchase, sale or other transfer" of firearms.In 2016, the City of Missoula, a self-governing municipality, adopted Ordinance 3581, which imposed a requirement upon persons purchasing or otherwise receiving a firearm in the City to pass a national instant background check. The Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that cities with self-government powers were prohibited by Montana law from enforcing a local regulation or ordinance requiring background checks of firearm sales or transfers. The City filed this action challenging the Attorney General's opinion and seeking a declaration that the ordinance was lawful. The district court concluded that the ordinance was authorized under the statutory exception in Mont. Code Ann. 45-8-351(2) and entered summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the express statutory prohibition upon cities in section 45-8-351(1) is a limitation on the City's self-governing powers. View "City of Missoula v. Fox" on Justia Law