Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this insurance dispute the Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's determination that Carla King was not entitled to her taxable costs and her claimed nontaxable costs after a jury found in favor of King, holding that the district court erred in concluding that King was not entitled to her claimed nontaxable costs.King was injured when her vehicle was hit by a drunk driver. King sought underinsured motorist coverage from State Farm, but King and State Farm did not agree on the value of King's claim. State Farm had offered to settle the claim for $20,000. The jury found that King had suffered damages in the amount of $410,000. The district court entered judgment against State Farm in the amount of the policy limit of $50,000. The district court awarded King $20,000 in attorney fees and denied King's claimed litigation expenses and costs. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court correctly held that King was not entitled to her taxable costs as provided by Mont. Code Ann. 25-10-201 because they were not timely filed; and (2) the district court erred in concluding that King was not entitled to her claimed nontaxable costs because those litigation costs were part of the insurance exception to the American Rule. View "King v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Vision Net, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to the Montana Department of Revenue (DOR), holding that the district court did not err by holding that the DOR properly centrally assessed Vision Net's property.Vision Net filed a petition for declaratory judgment challenging the DOR's decision to reclassify its property. The district court held that the DOR could properly centrally assess Vision Net's property, resulting in a significant increase in Vision Net's state tax liability. On appeal, Vision Net argued that DOR's central assessment violated its statutory rights and its constitutional rights of equal protection and equalization under Mont. Const. art. II, 4 and art. VII, 3. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly held that Vision Net was subject to central assessment and that Vision Net's constitutional challenge was without merit. View "Vision Net, Inc. v. State, Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court on remand issuing financial sanctions against the State for discovery abuse and denying Appellant's request for a new trial, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion with its chosen sanction for the State's discovery abuse.During his criminal trial, Defendant moved for a mistrial as a sanction for the State's failure to provide a certain video. The district court denied the motion, ruling that the State did not have to produce the video. The jury found Defendant guilty of assault with a weapon and driving while license suspended or revoked. On appeal, the State conceded that it wrongfully withheld the video from Defendant. The Supreme Court remanded to the district court to determine the appropriate sanction. On remand, the district court found that Defendant was not prejudiced by the State's discovery abuse and that no new trial was warranted. The court then issued a financial sanction against the State. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a new trial due to a lack of prejudice and issue financial sanctions against the State. View "State v. Pope" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, aggravated kidnapping, tampering with a witness, and misdemeanor assault, holding that Defendant failed to identify any errors in the proceedings below.Specifically, the Court held (1) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Defendant's prior conduct under the transaction rule; (2) the prosecution did not commit misconduct by introducing racial slurs because the statements were relevant and admissible under the transaction rule to provide necessary context for jurors; and (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from Defendant's phone. View "State v. Haithcox" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order enjoining the Montana Department of Public Service Regulation (PSC) from propounding discovery in a dispute between Republic Services of Montana and North Valley Refuse (collectively, Petitioners), removing the PSC from the matter and ordering appointment of an independent hearing examiner to preside over the case, holding that the district court erred in requiring the PSC to appoint an independent hearing examiner.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err by issuing a writ of prohibition barring the PSC from propounding discovery because the standards were satisfied for issuance of a writ of prohibition; but (2) the district court erred by issuing a writ of mandate requiring the PSC to appoint an independent hearing examiner. Because the authority for removal of the entire PSC based upon the independent actions of a staff member were insufficient, and the remedy under the circumstances was overbroad, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Allied Waste Services of N.A., LLC v. Montana Department of Public Service Regulation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of deliberate homicide for the death of his wife, Kathryn, fifteen years earlier, holding that the district court abused its discretion in admitting a deceased forensic pathologist's opinion statements through an FBI agent who was present at the autopsy on Kathryn's body, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was violated.Specifically, the Court held (1) Defendant was not unconstitutionally prejudiced by the fifteen-year delay between Kathryn's death and the charge; (2) the State presented sufficient evidence in his case-in-chief to overcome Defendant's motion to dismiss the case for insufficient evidence; but (3) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the deceased pathologist's statements that bruises on Kathryn's neck were "troubling" because the State used the statements as an out-of-court substitute for the trial testimony of the deceased pathologist and Defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine or confront the accusation. The Court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "State v. Laird" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of negligent homicide, holding that Defendant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to serve a subpoena upon or otherwise preserve the testimony of a crucial defense witness for trial.Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide and two counts of felony criminal endangerment. The district court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment and imposed restitution to be paid to Justin Gallup and Tiffany Rowell. Defendant appealed the negligent homicide conviction and also asserted that the district court erred by failing to deduct the $50,000 paid by his insurance - $25,000 to both Gallup and Rowell - from each's restitution award. The Supreme Court reversed the negligent homicide conviction, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective because there was no justifiable reason not to subpoena the crucial witness sufficiently in advance of trial to assure his attendance; and (2) the district court erred in failing to deduct funds paid by Defendant's insurance to Gallup and Powell from their restitution awards. View "State v. Santoro" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights, holding that Father's due process rights were infringed by ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in his parental rights being inappropriately terminated.On appeal, Father argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his court-appointed counsel failed assiduously to advocate for him throughout her representation. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Father's initial appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and because of that ineffective assistance, Father was prejudiced, and his parental rights were terminated. The Court remanded this case for the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division to conduct initial preliminary assessment of Father as the first placement option for the child consistent with its policies and this opinion. View "In re E.Y.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed a portion of the order of the district court ordering Defendant to pay $25,835.37 in restitution to his former employer after he pleaded no contest to theft of property by embezzlement, holding that Mont. Code Ann.46-18-243 did not authorize all the restitution that the district court ordered.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court had no authority to order restitution for the cost of the wages paid to other employees to recreate Defendant's work, the reimbursement of wages paid to Defendant for time off and training, or the billable value of the hours that his employer's office administrator and president worked with law enforcement on the case. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the district court (1) erred in ordering $4,326.92 in "lost wages"; (2) erred in ordering $1,788.39 in restitution to reimburse the employer for the wages it paid Defendant for training, conferences, and paid time off; and (3) erred in ordering $2,635 in restitution for the billable value of the officer administrator's time and $5,239 for the billable value of the president's time spent cooperating with law enforcement. View "State v. Lowry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, burglary, and sexual assault, holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to strike juror M.J. for cause.After the jurors were selected in this case, the bailiff informed the court that a juror, M.J., had stated to the bailiff that "he is pretty sure the Defendant is guilty" based upon the juror's assessment of the statements used by defense counsel during voir dire. The court denied defense counsel's subsequent motion to strike M.J. for cause, and the trial resumed with M.J. being empaneled and sworn. After Defendant was convicted he appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on a totality of circumstances, there was a troubling pattern that should have resulted in M.J.'s removal, and the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss M.J. for cause. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law