Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court affirming the Acting Roosevelt County Superintendent of School's grant of a territory transfer from Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 to Froid Elementary School District No. 65 pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 20-6-105, holding that the Acting Superintendent did not abuse her discretion, and that Poplar's constitutional challenges failed.On appeal, Poplar argued that the Acting Superintendent's decision granting the territory transfer petition constituted an abuse of discretion and that section 20-6-105, the territory transfer statute, is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the Acting Superintendent did not abuse her discretion in granting the petition to transfer the transfer territory; (2) the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Poplar's facial constitutional challenge; and (3) Poplar's as-applied challenge failed because a school district does not have a constitutional right to due process. View "Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 v. Froid Elementary School District No. 65" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault with a weapon, a felony, holding that the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into Defendant's request to substitute counsel.On appeal, Defendant argued that when she requested that her counsel be replaced, the trial court's inquiry into her complaints was inadequate. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into the nature and causes of the apparent conflicts and alleged breakdown in communication between Defendant and her counsel; and (2) because Defendant failed to present material facts demonstrating that there was an irreconcilable conflict or breakdown in communication such that she was unable to mount an adequate defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request to substitute counsel. View "State v. Khongwiset" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court vacating and modifying the orders of the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) reducing standard-offer contract rates and maximum contract lengths for small solar qualifying facilities (QFs), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in determining that the PSC's calculation of the avoided-cost rate was arbitrary and unlawful; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that the PSC arbitrarily and unreasonably calculated QF capacity contribution values and arbitrarily and unreasonably reduced maximum-length QF-1 contracts to fifteen years. View "Vote Solar v. Montana Department of Public Service Regulation" on Justia Law

In this fifth case arising from an ongoing dispute between Plaintiffs and Glacier County and certain county officials (collectively, the County), the Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of a financial receiver for the County, holding that the court abused its discretion.Plaintiffs alleged claims against the County regarding alleged financial mismanagement and non-compliance with government budgeting, auditing, and tax laws. By motion filed prior to filing their complaint, Plaintiffs sought appointment of a financial receiver pendente lite to assure that the budgeting, tax levying, expenditure and disbursement, and accounting laws were strictly complied with. The district court refused to appoint a receiver for the purpose requested by Plaintiffs but appointed a more limited receivership to determine the extent of personal liability for the County officials for deficit spending. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in appointing a receiver for a stated purpose in excess of and unrelated to the limited purpose of a receivership pendente lite; and (2) erred in basing the receivership on a preliminary adjudication of the ultimate merits of its underclass claims for relief and on a reason that did not establish or contribute to the requisite necessity for appointment of a receiver under section 27-20-102(3). View "Gottlob v. DesRosier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss claims asserted against Glacier County officials (collectively, the County) in Plaintiffs' complaint due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the district court did not err.This was the fourth case arising from a dispute between Plaintiffs and the County regarding alleged financial mismanagement and non-compliance with government budgeting, auditing, and tax laws. The County sought dismissal of certain claims under Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking because no express or implied right to remedy existed. The district court denied the motion on the ground that Mont. Code Ann. 15-1-406 through -408 provided and express private right and related remedies, and thus related subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed without prejudice to issues properly preserved and raised pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), holding that the district court did not err in denying the County's Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss. View "Gottlob v. DesRosier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the district court holding Plaintiff liable for additional taxes Defendants owed as a result of Plaintiff's prepayment on the contract, holding that Plaintiff was obligated to pay additional taxes that were incurred by Defendants over the term of the contract.Plaintiff entered into an agreement with Defendants for the purchase of real property. Plaintiff later sued, alleging that its obligations under the agreement were satisfied and seeking an order requiring Defendants to reconvey the property to Plaintiff. Defendants counterclaimed for breach of contract. After a trial, the district court held that Plaintiff had not fulfilled all obligations under the contract. The court awarded Defendants damages and denied Defendants' request for prejudgment interest on the damage award. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly found that Plaintiff did not extinguish its obligations under the contract; (2) correctly denied Defendants' motion for prejudgment interest; but (3) erred when it interpreted the relevant documents to obligate Plaintiff to pay the additional taxes that were incurred by Defendants in the year the prepayment was made instead of the total additional taxes Defendants incurred over the term of the contract. View "First National Properties, LLC v. Hilstead Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Matthew Monforton's petition for judicial review of a final agency decision by the office of the Commissioner of Political Practices (COPP) dismissing an ethics complaint that Monforton had lodged against Jonathan Motl based on statements that Motl had made during a radio interview, holding that Motl's statements did not violate Mont. Code Ann. 2-2-136(4) of the Montana Code of Ethics.In his complaint, Monforton alleged that Motl's statements during a radio interview constituted improper election advocacy in violation of section 2-2-121(3)(a), an ethics rule that prohibits public officers and employees from using "public time, facilities, [and] equipment" to "solicit support for or opposition to the...election of a person to public office." The deputy COPP dismissed the ethics complaint. The district court upheld the dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's decision to uphold the dismissal of Monforton's ethics complaint on the basis that Motl's statements did not constitute unlawful opposition to the election at issue under section 2-2-121(3)(a). View "Monforton v. Motl" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, methamphetamine, and criminal possession of dangerous drugs, methamphetamine, holding that the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to disclose the identity of a confidential informant.After Defendant was charged, Defendant filed a motion asking the district court to compel the State to disclose the identity of the confidential informant that led to Defendant's arrest. The district court denied the motion. After a second trial, the jury convicted Defendant. On appeal, Defendant argued that she had the right to know the identity of the informant because the informant played a continuous, active, and primary role in the alleged crime. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that, considering the circumstances of the case balanced against the public's interest in withholding the confidential informant's identity, the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion to compel disclosure of the informant's identity. View "State v. Walston" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that the district court abused its discretion and compromised Defendant's right to a fair trial when it allowed expert witness testimony on statistics about false reports of sexual assault.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court's admission of the expert testimony regarding the statistics about false reports of rape prejudiced his right to a fair trial by turning the case into a "trial by statistic" rather than a case based on specific facts. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the expert testimony regarding the rate of false reports of sexual assault was improper, and the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony; and (2) Defendant's right to a fair trial was violated by the improper admission of the false reporting statistics. View "State v. Grimshaw" on Justia Law

In this case involving six water right claims on Big Warm Creek the Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court's final order, holding that the Water Court did not err or abuse its discretion.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Water Court (1) did not err by finding no ambiguity in the language of the deeds conveying portions of the Phillips Ranch, and the appurtenant water rights, from David Drum to Lloyd Knudsen, Wayne Norman, and Springdale Colony, Inc.; (2) did not err by declining to resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent; (3) did not err by apportioning the water pro-rata based on the parties’ historical use; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by denying Little Big Warm Ranch’s post-judgment motion for relief from the court’s final order. View "Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll" on Justia Law