Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court committing N.A. to Montana State Hospital (MSH) for a period of up to ninety days, holding that the district court committed reversible error when it allowed testimony by video conferencing at the commitment hearing over N.A.'s objection.The State filed a petition for N.A.'s involuntary commitment alleging that N.A. presented an imminent risk of harm to herself based upon her statements of suicidality. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that N.A. suffered from a mental disorder and required commitment and ordered that N.A. be involuntarily placed at MSH in Warm Springs for a period of up to ninety days. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court committed reversible error when it allowed testimony by video conferencing over N.A.'s objection. View "In re N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim with prejudice, holding that the district court erred.Defendant filed a civil complaint on behalf of Whitefish Credit Union (WCU) alleging that Plaintiff committed fraud when she foreclosed on certain property. Defendant also reported the fraud allegations to federal law enforcement authorities, resulting in Plaintiff's indictment. Before Plaintiff's resulting criminal charges and civil fraud claims were eventually dismissed Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and received a discharge. Plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and constructive fraud based on Defendant's involvement in initiating fraud proceedings against her. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff was judicially estopped from pursuing her claims because she failed to disclose the claims as assets in her personal bankruptcy. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's civil malicious prosecution claim; and (2) properly granted summary judgment to the extent it applied judicial estoppel to Plaintiff's claim as premised on the criminal charges that were brought against her. View "McAtee v. Morrison & Frampton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing as moot Appellant's claim for declaratory judgment that The Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company had a duty as an insurer to provide its insured's policy to a third-party claimant when the insured's liability was reasonably clear, holding that the district court improperly dismissed The Hartford from the action.The district court dismissed the case as moot after the insureds provided the policy at issue to Appellant. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred in dismissing the case because The Hartford failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the inapplicability of the voluntary cessation exception to mootness. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the district court erred by failing to apply the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine and dismissing the claims against The Hartford. View "Wilkie v. Hartford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff's asserted negligence (liquor liability) and negligence (premises liability) claims, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff's co-pled negligence (premises liability) claim was subject to the two-year Montana Dram Shop Act statute of limitations. See Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-710(6).Plaintiff pled two base tort claims against Defendant - a negligence (liquor liability) claim and a separate negligence (premises liability) claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that both of Plaintiff's base tort claims were time-barred by the two-year Dram Shop Act statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the district court erroneously concluded that section 27-1-710(6) time-barred Plaintiff's negligence (premises liability) claim. View "Babcock v. Casey's Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's ruling that the Dearborn Meadows Land Owners Association, Inc. (DMLOA) established on behalf of its members an implied easement by preexisting use and a prescriptive easement over Powerline Road across the property of JRN Holdings, LLC, holding that the district court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in declaring an implied easement by preexisting use for residential use of the Dearborn Meadows properties that had no other means of access to reach their land; (2) erred in determining that the implied easement extended to other DMLOA members; (3) did not err in determining that all DMLOA members held a prescriptive easement for both residential and recreational uses; (4) erred in ruling that either an implied easement or a prescriptive easement existed for use by the public; and (5) erred by awarding attorney fees to the DMLOA. View "JRN Holdings, LLC v. Dearborn Meadows Land Owners Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for felony driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI) and misdemeanor obstructing a peace officer, holding that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel and that Defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance.At issue was whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to object to an incorrect jury instruction, which lowered the State's burden of proof on the offense of obstructing a peace officer. The Supreme Court held that Defendant did receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorneys neither objected to the incorrect instruction nor proposed the correct one themselves and that a new trial was warranted. View "State v. Secrease" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the district court terminating Mother's and Father's respective parental rights to their child, holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not erroneously proceed to a youth-in-need-of-care (YINC) adjudication, temporary legal custody, and parental rights termination without a determination of the child's eligibility for enrollment in the Lakota Sioux Tribe; (2) did not erroneously re-adjudicate the child as a YINC or later erroneously find under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609(1)(f) that it had; and (3) did not erroneously terminate Father's parental rights under section 41-3-609(1)(f)(ii) without sufficient evidence to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his conduct or condition of unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. View "In re L.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must file a motion to substitute a presiding district judge within thirty days of service of the summons or of an adverse party's appearance, whichever occurs first, and that Plaintiff's motion for substitution of judge in this case was void at its inception.Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging breach of a confidentiality agreement. The case was originally assigned to the Honorable Robert Whelan. Defendant filed a motion to change venue, after which Plaintiff filed a motion for substitution of judge. Judge Whelan issued an order inviting assumption of jurisdiction, and the matter was transferred to the Honorable Kurt Krueger. Judge Krueger denied Defendant's motion to change venue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Plaintiff filed his motion for substitution of judge more than thirty days after he served Defendant the motion was void at its inception, and Judge Whelan improperly transferred the case to Judge Krueger; and (2) because Judge Krueger lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, any orders he issued must be vacated. View "Holms v. Bretz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's pro se motion to vacate and challenge to jurisdiction and the subsequent order of revocation and imposition of sentence revoking Defendant's previous sentence and sentencing him for failure to register as a sexual offender, holding that the State's delay in bringing Defendant to Montana to appear before a judge in his revocation proceeding violated his right to due process.Defendant pled guilty to failure to register as a sexual offender and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which was suspended. The State later filed a petition for revocation of sentence, alleging that Defendant violated the terms of his probation and absconded from supervision. Defendant was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for failing to register as a sex offender after traveling from Montana to New York. Defendant's federal charge was later dismissed, and Defendant personally appeared in the district court. The court then revoked Defendant's prior sentence and imposed a sentence of almost three years. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State violated Defendant's right to due process by failing to bring him before a judge to answer his revocation proceedings for nearly two years. View "State v. Cameron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking additional credit for time served, holding that Petitioner demonstrated that he was entitled to the writ.In 2004, Petitioner was convicted of felony aggravated assault. In 2013, he was granted parole. In 2019, while released on parole, Petitioner was arrested for felony criminal endangerment. Petitioner remained in custody through sentencing, and in 2020, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the felony criminal endangerment charge. In this action, Petitioner challenged the legality of his sentence on the criminal endangerment charge, asserting that Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-403(1) required the district court to credit him with the 489 days he spent incarcerated on the offense prior to sentencing. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the matter to the district court to amend Defendant's sentence to include credit for time served, a total of 489 days. View "Killam v. Salmonsen" on Justia Law