Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court to terminate a 2013 stipulated parental agreement that had afforded Grandparents contact and visitation rights with respect to their grandchild (Child), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court correctly determined that the parties' agreement was a grandparent visitation agreement formed under Mont. Code Ann. 40-9-102 rather than a parental interest agreement under Mon. Code Ann. 40-4-228; and (2) the district court correctly applied the legal standard for termination of a section 40-9-102 grandparent visitation agreement. View "In re Parenting of K.J.K." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court terminating Father's parental rights to his two children, holding that the district court err and that Father did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred when it allowed the children's guardian ad litem (GAL) to question witnesses at Father's termination hearing, but despite the error, the district court properly terminated Father's parental rights without consideration of the information learned from the GAL's examination of the witnesses; (2) the Department of Public Health and Human Services provided reasonable efforts to reunify Father with the children; (3) the district court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights; (4) the district court did not err in extending temporary legal custody of the children to the Department; and (5) Father did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because he failed to indicate how the alleged claim prejudiced his substantial rights. View "In re B.F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in favor of AWIN Real Estate, LLC (AWIN) on its claim that Whitehead Homes, Inc. (WHI) breached an investment agreement between the parties and in favor of WHI on an unpled claim that AWIN breached the parties' operating agreement, holding that the court lacked record evidence to award WHI damages for AWIN's breach of the operating agreement.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court's interpretation of the ambiguous language in the investment agreement to hold WHI in breach was reasonable in light of the circumstances of the case; and (2) the district court lacked sufficient evidence to support its award of $55,000 in damages to WHI for AWIN's alleged breach of the operating agreement. The Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings on attorney's fees consistent with this opinion. View "AWIN Real Estate, LLC v. Whitehead Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a probation search of the room Defendant rented from a person on probation, holding that Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his residence.Defendant rented a room from Parischere Hughes (Paris), who was on misdemeanor probation and subject to probation searches. During a probation search of Paris's residence, law enforcement officers searched Defendant's residence and found drugs and drug paraphernalia. Defendant was charged criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search exceeded the scope of any lawful probation search of Paris's residence. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's rights to privacy in his person and residence were not diminished by Paris's probationary status. View "State v. Thomas" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellants' complaint and denying Appellants' motion to amend their complaint, holding that Appellants' declaratory judgment claims challenging the constitutionality of Mont. Code Ann. 17-1-512 and amended Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-2320 did not present a justiciable controversy.Appellants sought a declaration that section 17-1-512 and the amended section 39-71-2320 violated several provisions of the United States and Montana Constitutions. Appellants further sought a permanent injunction enjoining the enforcement and authorization of the statutes. The district court dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants' declaratory judgment claims challenging the constitutionality of section 17-1-512 and amended section 39-71-2320 did not present a justiciable controversy. View "Moody's Market, Inc. v. Montana State Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying the petition filed by the City of Bozeman seeking judicial review of a final order of the Department of Natural Resources (DNRC) granting Utility Solutions, LLC's application to change a water right, holding that the court did not err in determining that the City's water facility plan did not qualify as an interest protectable from adverse effects under Mont. Code Ann. 85-2-402(2)(a).Utility Solutions filed its change application for authorization to change the place of use of its water use permit. The City filed an objection, arguing that the application would adversely affect the City's possessory interest in the area that was established by the City's adoption of a growth policy, as expanded geographically by an updated water facility plan. The DNRC hearing examiner granted the change application, concluding that although the change application resulted in a geographic overlap of the place of use with the City's water facility plan, the overlap did not result in an adverse effect within the meaning of section 85-2-402(2)(a). The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in affirming the DNRC's determination that Utility Solutions carried its burden to prove the City did not have an interest protectable from adverse effects. View "City of Bozeman v. Montana Department of Natural Resources & Conservation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court affirming the Acting Roosevelt County Superintendent of School's grant of a territory transfer from Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 to Froid Elementary School District No. 65 pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 20-6-105, holding that the Acting Superintendent did not abuse her discretion, and that Poplar's constitutional challenges failed.On appeal, Poplar argued that the Acting Superintendent's decision granting the territory transfer petition constituted an abuse of discretion and that section 20-6-105, the territory transfer statute, is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly determined that the Acting Superintendent did not abuse her discretion in granting the petition to transfer the transfer territory; (2) the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel barred Poplar's facial constitutional challenge; and (3) Poplar's as-applied challenge failed because a school district does not have a constitutional right to due process. View "Poplar Elementary School District No. 9 v. Froid Elementary School District No. 65" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of assault with a weapon, a felony, holding that the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into Defendant's request to substitute counsel.On appeal, Defendant argued that when she requested that her counsel be replaced, the trial court's inquiry into her complaints was inadequate. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the district court conducted an adequate inquiry into the nature and causes of the apparent conflicts and alleged breakdown in communication between Defendant and her counsel; and (2) because Defendant failed to present material facts demonstrating that there was an irreconcilable conflict or breakdown in communication such that she was unable to mount an adequate defense, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request to substitute counsel. View "State v. Khongwiset" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court vacating and modifying the orders of the Montana Public Service Commission (PSC) reducing standard-offer contract rates and maximum contract lengths for small solar qualifying facilities (QFs), holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not err in determining that the PSC's calculation of the avoided-cost rate was arbitrary and unlawful; and (2) the district court did not err in concluding that the PSC arbitrarily and unreasonably calculated QF capacity contribution values and arbitrarily and unreasonably reduced maximum-length QF-1 contracts to fifteen years. View "Vote Solar v. Montana Department of Public Service Regulation" on Justia Law

In this fifth case arising from an ongoing dispute between Plaintiffs and Glacier County and certain county officials (collectively, the County), the Supreme Court reversed the district court's grant of Plaintiffs' motion for appointment of a financial receiver for the County, holding that the court abused its discretion.Plaintiffs alleged claims against the County regarding alleged financial mismanagement and non-compliance with government budgeting, auditing, and tax laws. By motion filed prior to filing their complaint, Plaintiffs sought appointment of a financial receiver pendente lite to assure that the budgeting, tax levying, expenditure and disbursement, and accounting laws were strictly complied with. The district court refused to appoint a receiver for the purpose requested by Plaintiffs but appointed a more limited receivership to determine the extent of personal liability for the County officials for deficit spending. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in appointing a receiver for a stated purpose in excess of and unrelated to the limited purpose of a receivership pendente lite; and (2) erred in basing the receivership on a preliminary adjudication of the ultimate merits of its underclass claims for relief and on a reason that did not establish or contribute to the requisite necessity for appointment of a receiver under section 27-20-102(3). View "Gottlob v. DesRosier" on Justia Law