Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim brought by the Montana Independent Living Project, Inc. (MILP) that the City of Helena retaliated against it when the City lowered the priority of MILP's request for funding as a result of an unrelated discrimination MILP had filed against the City, holding that the district court properly dismissed MILP as a plaintiff for lack of standing.In granting the City's motion to dismiss, the district court concluded that Mont. Code Ann. 49-2-301 does not allow non-human entities to sue for retaliation, and therefore, MILP had no standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly held that section 49-2-301 does not allow non-human entities to file retaliation claims under the Montana Human Rights Act. View "Maffit v. City of Helena" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part Defendant's convictions for deliberate homicide and tampering with physical evidence, holding that Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated, requiring reversal of his conviction of tampering with physical evidence.On appeal, Defendant argued that he was denied his right under the United States and Montana Constitutions to confront witnesses against him when the State presented a foundational witness in real time by two-way videoconference. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) furtherance of an important public policy to allow the witness to testify via two-way videoconferencing was not demonstrated in this case, and therefore, the first prong of the analysis set forth in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), was not satisfied; and (2) Defendant's right to a fair trial was not undermined by the prosecutor's closing argument. View "State v. Mercier" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the district court resentencing Defendant to life without parole for three counts of deliberate homicide committed when he was a juvenile, holding that the district court erroneously concluded that Defendant was irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible.Defendant was convicted for three murders he committed when he was seventeen years old and was sentenced to three consecutive life terms without the possibility of parole. Defendant later filed a petition for postconviction relief asserting that his sentence was unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). After a hearing, the district court resentenced Defendant to three consecutive life terms. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case for resentencing, holding that the district court (1) did not err when it appointed a neutral expert for the resentencing hearing; (2) did not err when it denied Defendant's request for a jury to determine whether he was irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible; and (3) erred when it refused to consider post-offense evidence of rehabilitation at the resentencing hearing. View "State v. Keefe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's three convictions for sexual abuse of children (possession of child pornography), holding that Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-410(2)(a) does not prohibit multiple convictions for possession of child pornography when the images were discovered on a single day on a single device.Defendant admitted to downloading several photos and videos depicting child pornography and pled guilty to four counts, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss as to three of the counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-625(1)(e) allows conviction for each image of child pornography that Defendant possessed. View "State v. Felde" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order terminating Mother's parental rights to her three children, holding that Mother's attorney did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel.At issue was whether counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance when he stipulated to the request of the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division that no reunification services be provided to Mother. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's termination of Mother's parental rights, holding (1) Mother was not prejudiced by any alleged failure on her attorney's part to object to the Department's request not to provide reunification services; (2) the district court had grounds to terminate Mother's parental rights and made the findings necessary to support termination; and (3) the district court did not err in finding that termination would be in the children's best interests. View "In re D.A.D." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming the order of the City of Missoula Municipal Court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss a petition to revoke sentence, holding that the district court correctly affirmed the municipal court's revocation of Appellant's suspended sentence.In 2017, the City filed a petition to revoke Appellant's sentence for Appellant's compliance violations. Appellant moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the amendment to Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-2013 removed the municipal court's authority to revoke suspended sentences for compliance violations without first showing the probation office had exhausted all statutory alternatives. The municipal court denied the motion and revoked and reimposed Appellant's twelve-month suspended sentence, concluding that the 2017 changes to the statute do not apply to misdemeanors. The district court affirmed, holding (1) the 2017 amendments to section 46-18-2013 certain only to revocation of felony probation and parole; and (2) the municipal court acted within its authority when it revoked Appellant's suspended sentence for violating its terms and conditions. View "City of Missoula v. Pope" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court vacating its prior order to expunge Justin Dickey's misdemeanor records, holding that the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings brought under the Misdemeanor Expungement Clarification Act and that the district court properly determined that venue was not proper under Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-1105.Dickey filed a petition for expungement of his misdemeanor criminal records, referred only to "misdemeanor criminal record(s)" generally. The district court granted the petition. On reconsideration, the district court vacated its prior expungement order and dismissed the matter, determining that venue was improper. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to a proceeding brought under the Expungement Act; and (2) the district court did not err in determining that Dickey's prior speeding violation in Kalispell was insufficient to establish proper venue in the Eleventh Judicial District for expungement of misdemeanors under section 46-18-1105. View "In re Dickey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the sentence and financial assessments imposed by the district court in connection with Defendant's conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), fourth or subsequent offense, holding that the district court erred by assessing a $500 surcharge in compliance with Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-236(1)(b).The district court imposed the statutory minimum fine of $5,000 for felony DUI and sentenced him to a thirteen-month commitment to the Department of Corrections, followed by a three-year suspended sentence subject to certain terms and conditions. Defendant appealed, challenging the denial of his sentencing objections. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err by assessing the $5,000 fine; (2) did not err by assessing the cost of imprisonment, probation, and alcohol treatment pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 61-8-731(4)(b); (3) did not err by assessing a $100 fine pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-232(1); but (4) erred by assessing the $500 surcharge without considering Defendant's ability to pay. View "State v. Ingram" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the jury verdict of the district court following Defendant's conviction of incest against his ten-year-old stepdaughter, holding that the district court erred when it granted the State's motion in limine excluding the testimony of Defendant's expert witness regarding general information of false reports in child sexual abuse cases.In granting the State's motion in limine, the district court deemed Defendant's expert witness unqualified to testify under State v. Scheffelman, 820 P.2d 1293 (Mont. 1991), which allows a party to elicit expert testimony that directly comments on an alleged victim's credibility if the expert satisfies certain criteria. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by applying the Scheffelman exception criteria to exclude the expert witness's testimony, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Reams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the district court that Farmers Insurance Exchange had no duty to defend the Insureds in this case but reversed the district court's holding that the duty to indemnify was not justiciable, holding that when there is no duty to defend there cannot be a duty to indemnify.Defendants in two underlying lawsuits (together, the Insureds) tendered the claims to Farmers, with whom they had a homeowners insurance policy. Farmers concluded that coverage was not available because the claims asserted intentional conduct by the Insureds and filed the instant declaratory judgment action to confirm that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify. The district court granted summary judgment to Farmers, concluding that there was no coverage under the policy and that the issue of indemnification was not justiciable. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly concluded there was no coverage under the policy; (2) did not abuse its discretion in denying the Insureds more time for discovery; but (3) erred in concluding that the issue of whether Farmers had a duty to indemnify was not justiciable. View "Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Wessel" on Justia Law