Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rodney Owen Skurdal, who is not a licensed attorney, attempted to represent Ronald Trow during Trow’s initial appearance in a criminal case in Yellowstone County Justice Court. Judge Jeanne Walker, presiding over the case, ordered Skurdal to vacate the defendant’s table and did not permit him to represent Trow, as Skurdal was not a member of the bar. Trow subsequently entered a plea of not guilty, and a public defender was appointed. Skurdal then filed a lawsuit in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court for Yellowstone County against Judge Walker, later joined by Yellowstone County as a defendant, alleging violations of his and Trow’s rights and advancing various arguments, including those associated with the “Sovereign Citizen” movement.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court dismissed Skurdal’s complaint with prejudice, holding that Judge Walker and Yellowstone County were protected by absolute judicial immunity for actions taken in the course of judicial duties. The court also found that Skurdal, as a non-lawyer, had no statutory or constitutional right to represent another individual in a criminal proceeding in Montana. The court denied leave to amend the complaint, finding that any amendment would be futile due to the immunity defense.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal. The Supreme Court held that Montana law does not permit non-lawyers to represent others in criminal cases, and that Judge Walker’s actions were judicial acts performed within her jurisdiction, entitling her and Yellowstone County to absolute immunity from suit. The Court also concluded that the District Court did not err in denying leave to amend, as further amendment could not overcome the immunity bar. View "Skurdal v. Walker" on Justia Law

A child, J.B., was removed from her mother’s care in 2015 after reports of drug use by the mother. The Department of Public Health and Human Services initially dismissed its petition in 2018 after the father completed a treatment plan and J.B. was cared for by her paternal grandmother. In 2021, J.B. was again removed, this time from her paternal grandmother’s home due to allegations of sexual abuse by an uncle. Over the next several years, J.B. experienced multiple placements, including with relatives and in therapeutic foster care, while the Department attempted to provide services and reunification efforts. The mother’s engagement with the Department and her appointed counsel was sporadic, and she struggled with substance abuse and unstable living conditions.The Seventeenth Judicial District Court adjudicated J.B. as a youth in need of care and approved a treatment plan for the mother, who failed to comply with its requirements. The Fort Belknap Indian Community, recognizing J.B. as an Indian child under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), moved to transfer the case to tribal court. The father objected to the transfer, and the District Court denied the motion. The court later terminated both parents’ rights, finding that the Department made active efforts to reunify the family and that continued custody by the mother would likely result in serious harm to J.B. The mother appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, improper denial of the transfer to tribal court, and insufficient evidence for termination.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decisions. It held that under ICWA, either parent’s objection to transfer to tribal court is an absolute bar, and the father’s written objection was sufficient. The Court found no ineffective assistance of counsel, as the mother’s lack of engagement prevented effective advocacy. Finally, the Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the mother’s parental rights, as the statutory and ICWA requirements were met by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Matter of J.B., YINC" on Justia Law

The defendant was originally sentenced in 2003 in Lewis and Clark County, Montana, to 20 years with 16 years suspended. In 2008, after committing new offenses, he was sentenced in Yellowstone County to five years, to run concurrently with the Lewis and Clark sentence. In 2009, his suspended sentence in the Lewis and Clark case was revoked, and he was resentenced to 16 years with 11 years suspended. The Department of Corrections (DOC) treated the sentences as consecutive, not concurrent, based on statutory default. Over the years, the defendant repeatedly challenged the calculation of his sentences and the credit for time served, arguing that the sentences should have run concurrently and that he was entitled to additional credit for time served.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, most recently revoked the defendant’s suspended sentence in 2023, imposing an 11-year commitment with six years suspended, and granted him 62 days of credit for time served and 1,167 days of elapsed time credit. The defendant appealed, arguing that the court failed to award the proper amount of credit for time served, specifically for periods when he was incarcerated and for time when the sentences should have been running concurrently.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred by not awarding the correct amount of credit for time served. The Court determined that, under Montana law and its own precedents, the revocation sentence could not be run consecutively to the earlier sentence, and the defendant was entitled to additional credit for time served. The Court reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to grant the defendant an additional 2,220 days of credit for time served, in addition to the credits already awarded. View "State v. Keech" on Justia Law

A sheriff’s deputy in Lake County, Montana, stopped the defendant after observing erratic driving and signs of intoxication. The defendant admitted to drinking, partially completed field sobriety tests, refused further testing, and ultimately provided a blood sample showing a high blood alcohol concentration. He was cited for felony DUI. At his initial appearance, the Justice Court set a preliminary hearing and released him on his own recognizance, but he remained incarcerated due to a probation violation from a prior offense. Lake County policy, based on state statutes, allowed up to thirty days for probable cause determinations for defendants not detained specifically on the new charge. The State filed an information twenty-one days after the initial appearance.The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing the delay in determining probable cause was unreasonable. The Twentieth Judicial District Court denied the motion, finding the delay reasonable. After a jury convicted the defendant of felony DUI, the District Court sentenced him to five years with the Department of Corrections, imposed a $5,000 mandatory minimum fine, and required continuous alcohol monitoring (SCRAM) as a parole condition. The defendant appealed, challenging the delay, the SCRAM condition, and the fine.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding the twenty-one-day delay reasonable, given the local policy and lack of prejudice to the defendant. The Supreme Court reversed the imposition of SCRAM as a parole condition, holding that no statute authorized such a condition, and remanded for the condition to be modified as a recommendation to the Board of Pardons and Parole. The Supreme Court also reversed the mandatory minimum fine, holding that under State v. Gibbons, such fines are unconstitutional without individualized assessment of ability to pay, and remanded for resentencing consistent with that requirement. View "State v. Vaska" on Justia Law

Jeannette F. Tasey failed to pay property taxes starting in 2017. In 2018, she applied for an elderly/disabled tax credit program, believing she did not need to pay taxes until her application was decided. On August 1, 2018, the Yellowstone County Treasurer issued a tax lien on her property, which was later assigned to Guardian Tax MT, LLC. Tasey mailed a check for the full amount on July 30, 2021, with an expected delivery date of July 31. However, the Treasurer received and processed the check on August 3, one day after the redemption period expired. The Treasurer rejected the payment and issued a tax deed to Guardian Tax, which then sued to quiet title and declare Tasey a trespasser.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, granted summary judgment in favor of Guardian Tax, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court found Tasey's assertion that the check was received on July 31 to be speculative and unsupported by evidence. Tasey appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Tasey substantially complied with the redemption statute by mailing the payment in good faith, believing it would arrive before the deadline. The court emphasized that redemption statutes should be liberally construed to allow property owners to pay their debts and save their property. The court found that Tasey's actions met the substantial compliance standard and that there was no prejudice to Guardian Tax or the Treasurer’s Office. The court reversed the District Court's summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Guardian Tax v. Tasey" on Justia Law

David Wolfe owned property in Columbia Falls, Montana. In 2000, he executed a will leaving the property to his daughter, Wendy Rae Wolfe. In 2018, David signed a beneficiary deed transferring the property to his brother, Philip M. Wolfe. David passed away in 2023, and Wendy began residing on the property, believing it was hers per the will. Philip, however, claimed ownership based on the 2018 deed and issued a notice for Wendy to vacate.Wendy filed a pro se quiet title action in December 2023, alleging that the will conveyed the property to her and that Philip obtained the deed fraudulently, either by forging David’s signature or through undue influence. Philip counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, granted summary judgment in favor of Philip, concluding that Wendy failed to produce a legally meaningful challenge to the deed.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court found that Wendy presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact regarding undue influence and the validity of David’s signature on the deed. The court noted that Wendy’s evidence, including affidavits and personal knowledge of David’s intentions, was enough to warrant a jury’s consideration. The court concluded that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Philip and reversed the decision, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "In re Estate of David Wolfe" on Justia Law

Kenneth H. Kofler and Billee K. Reis share a minor child, A.V.R. In 2017, Kofler filed a Petition to Establish Parenting Plan in Flathead County District Court, Montana. At that time, Kofler lived in Vancouver, Washington, and Reis and A.V.R. lived in Kalispell, Montana. The court issued a final parenting plan in December 2018, which allowed Kofler to gradually increase his parenting time. In 2019, Kofler requested an amendment to the plan due to his inability to move to Kalispell. Subsequent allegations of abuse by Reis led to a criminal investigation, which did not result in charges. The court issued an interim parenting plan in November 2022, requiring reunification therapy for Kofler and A.V.R.Reis relocated to North Carolina without permission and filed for emergency custody there. The North Carolina court initially granted her request but later dismissed the action after communication with the Montana court, which refused to relinquish jurisdiction. The Montana District Court reaffirmed its jurisdiction and ordered reunification therapy. Reis appealed the court's refusal to transfer jurisdiction and its award of attorney’s fees to Kofler.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's decision to retain jurisdiction, citing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The court found that Montana retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction as there was no pending proceeding in another state. The court also noted that the North Carolina court could not accept jurisdiction while the Montana proceeding was active.However, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the District Court's award of attorney’s fees to Kofler, finding no statutory or contractual basis for such an award. The court emphasized that attorney’s fees are generally not recoverable without specific legal authority. View "In re Parenting of A.V.R." on Justia Law

Robert Sayers filed a complaint in 2021 seeking a declaration that Lippard Road is a public road and damages from Chouteau County for loss of access to his land. Chouteau County argued that the disputed portion of Lippard Road was abandoned in 1916. The disputed portion runs along the head of the Missouri River Breaks. The parties have a history of disputes over Lippard Road, but prior decisions do not impact the current case.The Twelfth Judicial District Court reviewed the case and concluded that the proper legal avenue was a writ of review, not a declaratory judgment. The court found that the Board of County Commissioners had abandoned the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. The court noted that although the record did not show the appointment of viewers or a viewers' report, the curative statute in effect at the time addressed any procedural deficiencies. The court concluded that the Board's decision to abandon the road was supported by substantial evidence and did not materially affect the interests of the county or prejudice the substantial rights of property owners.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's ruling. The court held that the Board of County Commissioners had jurisdiction to consider the abandonment and that the record showed compliance with the statutory requirements for abandonment. The court also held that the curative statute applied, and any procedural deficiencies did not invalidate the abandonment. The court concluded that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or fail to regularly pursue its authority in abandoning the disputed portion of Lippard Road in 1916. View "Sayers v. Chouteau County" on Justia Law

Kevin and Jeannine Extreme appealed from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Mineral County's order enjoining them from violating restrictive covenants applicable to their property in the Sloway Flats Minor Subdivision. The District Court also ordered them to remedy their violations and awarded attorney fees to Sloway Cabin, LLC (Sloway).The District Court found that the covenants were enforceable and that the Extremes had violated them by operating a commercial towing company, diesel repair shop, and impound lot on their property, among other activities. The court enjoined the Extremes from further violations and ordered them to remedy their current violations. The court also awarded attorney fees to Sloway.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the Subdivision’s covenants were clear and unambiguous, and therefore enforceable. The court rejected the Extremes' arguments that the covenants were never meant to be enforced and that their enforcement was barred by the doctrines of waiver and laches. The court found that the Extremes had been repeatedly informed about the covenants and that Sloway had promptly acted to enforce them upon noticing violations. The court also found that the Extremes' arguments regarding the use of surrounding properties were irrelevant as those properties were not subject to the Subdivision’s covenants.The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion by enjoining the Extremes from violating the covenants and that the award of attorney fees to Sloway was proper under the circumstances. The court found that the equities supported an award of attorney fees and that the tangible parameters test was met. View "Sloway Cabin v. Extreme" on Justia Law

Danielle Wood was charged with deliberate homicide for the death of Matthew LaFriniere, based on two theories: direct liability and accountability. During her trial, the jury was instructed on both theories, but the verdict form did not require the jury to specify which theory they based their decision on. Wood was found guilty, and she appealed, arguing that the accountability theory should not have been submitted to the jury due to insufficient evidence. The Montana Supreme Court agreed and reversed her conviction, remanding the case for a new trial.Upon remand, Wood moved to dismiss the case, claiming that a retrial would violate her double jeopardy rights. The Twentieth Judicial District Court denied her motion, reasoning that the Montana Supreme Court had remanded the case for a new trial, not dismissal, and that retrial did not constitute double jeopardy. Wood then sought a writ of supervisory control from the Montana Supreme Court to reverse the District Court's decision.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that double jeopardy did not bar a retrial for deliberate homicide under the direct liability theory. The Court clarified that its previous reversal was based on the lack of evidence for the accountability theory, not the direct liability theory. Therefore, retrying Wood solely on the direct liability theory did not violate her double jeopardy rights. The Court granted Wood's petition for supervisory control but affirmed the District Court's order denying her motion to dismiss, allowing the retrial to proceed on the direct liability theory. View "Wood v. 20th Jud. District Court" on Justia Law