Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting Defendant summary judgment on Plaintiff's asserted negligence (liquor liability) and negligence (premises liability) claims, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff's co-pled negligence (premises liability) claim was subject to the two-year Montana Dram Shop Act statute of limitations. See Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-710(6).Plaintiff pled two base tort claims against Defendant - a negligence (liquor liability) claim and a separate negligence (premises liability) claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that both of Plaintiff's base tort claims were time-barred by the two-year Dram Shop Act statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the district court erroneously concluded that section 27-1-710(6) time-barred Plaintiff's negligence (premises liability) claim. View "Babcock v. Casey's Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's ruling that the Dearborn Meadows Land Owners Association, Inc. (DMLOA) established on behalf of its members an implied easement by preexisting use and a prescriptive easement over Powerline Road across the property of JRN Holdings, LLC, holding that the district court erred in part.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not err in declaring an implied easement by preexisting use for residential use of the Dearborn Meadows properties that had no other means of access to reach their land; (2) erred in determining that the implied easement extended to other DMLOA members; (3) did not err in determining that all DMLOA members held a prescriptive easement for both residential and recreational uses; (4) erred in ruling that either an implied easement or a prescriptive easement existed for use by the public; and (5) erred by awarding attorney fees to the DMLOA. View "JRN Holdings, LLC v. Dearborn Meadows Land Owners Ass'n, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions for felony driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs (DUI) and misdemeanor obstructing a peace officer, holding that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel and that Defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance.At issue was whether Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to object to an incorrect jury instruction, which lowered the State's burden of proof on the offense of obstructing a peace officer. The Supreme Court held that Defendant did receive ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorneys neither objected to the incorrect instruction nor proposed the correct one themselves and that a new trial was warranted. View "State v. Secrease" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the district court terminating Mother's and Father's respective parental rights to their child, holding that the district court did not err.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) did not erroneously proceed to a youth-in-need-of-care (YINC) adjudication, temporary legal custody, and parental rights termination without a determination of the child's eligibility for enrollment in the Lakota Sioux Tribe; (2) did not erroneously re-adjudicate the child as a YINC or later erroneously find under Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609(1)(f) that it had; and (3) did not erroneously terminate Father's parental rights under section 41-3-609(1)(f)(ii) without sufficient evidence to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his conduct or condition of unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time. View "In re L.H." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must file a motion to substitute a presiding district judge within thirty days of service of the summons or of an adverse party's appearance, whichever occurs first, and that Plaintiff's motion for substitution of judge in this case was void at its inception.Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging breach of a confidentiality agreement. The case was originally assigned to the Honorable Robert Whelan. Defendant filed a motion to change venue, after which Plaintiff filed a motion for substitution of judge. Judge Whelan issued an order inviting assumption of jurisdiction, and the matter was transferred to the Honorable Kurt Krueger. Judge Krueger denied Defendant's motion to change venue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because Plaintiff filed his motion for substitution of judge more than thirty days after he served Defendant the motion was void at its inception, and Judge Whelan improperly transferred the case to Judge Krueger; and (2) because Judge Krueger lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, any orders he issued must be vacated. View "Holms v. Bretz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Defendant's pro se motion to vacate and challenge to jurisdiction and the subsequent order of revocation and imposition of sentence revoking Defendant's previous sentence and sentencing him for failure to register as a sexual offender, holding that the State's delay in bringing Defendant to Montana to appear before a judge in his revocation proceeding violated his right to due process.Defendant pled guilty to failure to register as a sexual offender and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which was suspended. The State later filed a petition for revocation of sentence, alleging that Defendant violated the terms of his probation and absconded from supervision. Defendant was subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury for failing to register as a sex offender after traveling from Montana to New York. Defendant's federal charge was later dismissed, and Defendant personally appeared in the district court. The court then revoked Defendant's prior sentence and imposed a sentence of almost three years. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State violated Defendant's right to due process by failing to bring him before a judge to answer his revocation proceedings for nearly two years. View "State v. Cameron" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking additional credit for time served, holding that Petitioner demonstrated that he was entitled to the writ.In 2004, Petitioner was convicted of felony aggravated assault. In 2013, he was granted parole. In 2019, while released on parole, Petitioner was arrested for felony criminal endangerment. Petitioner remained in custody through sentencing, and in 2020, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the felony criminal endangerment charge. In this action, Petitioner challenged the legality of his sentence on the criminal endangerment charge, asserting that Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-403(1) required the district court to credit him with the 489 days he spent incarcerated on the offense prior to sentencing. The Supreme Court agreed and remanded the matter to the district court to amend Defendant's sentence to include credit for time served, a total of 489 days. View "Killam v. Salmonsen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court accepted a state law question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding whether, under Montana law, parasitic emotional distress damages are available for an underlying negligence claim for personal property damage or loss, answering the question in the negative.After Plaintiffs took their vehicle to Costco's tire center a Costco employee gave the keys to a man who falsely claimed to be Plaintiffs' son. Plaintiffs found their vehicle, but several items had been stolen. Plaintiffs sued, bringing claims of bailment and negligence. In instructing the jury, the district court told jurors that if they found for Plaintiffs on the negligence claim, they must determine the amount of damages to compensate them for any parasitic damages caused. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs. Costco appealed the award for non-property damages, arguing that the verdict was premised on the federal district court's incorrect instruction for consideration of parasitic emotional distress damages arising from the loss of personal property. The Ninth Circuit then certified the question at issue. The Supreme Court answered that parasitic emotional distress damages are not available for an underlying negligence claim for personal property damage or loss. View "Childress v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment to the Montana Department of Revenue and dismissing Appellants' claims that the Department tortiously, unconstitutionally, and in breach of contract interfered with B.Y.O.B., Inc.'s (BYOB) attempts to transfer its ownership of an agency franchise agreement (AFA) for liquor sales, holding that the district court did not err.After the Department took action to terminate the AFA at issue for alleged violations of the Montana liquor laws, BYOB attempted to sell its interest and transfer ownership of the AFA it held with the Department. When the effort was unsuccessful, Appellants brought this suit. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department, finding that Appellants' AFA transfer-related claims were barred by quasi-judicial immunity or, alternatively, by the parties' settlement agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its rulings related to BYOB's attempts to assign the AFA to third parties. View "B.Y.O.B., Inc. v. Montana Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence for indecent exposure to a minor, holding that the district court did not err in its evidentiary rulings and did not impose and unduly harsh sentence.On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erroneously allowed cross-examination of Defendant about a prior allegation of sexual misconduct toward his daughters to rebut his assertion that he previously had an "awesome" relationship with his daughters. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant opened the door to the limited cross-examination allowed regarding the otherwise inadmissible allegations; and (2) Defendant's assertion that his sentence was "unduly harsh" was not subject to review on direct appeal. View "State v. McGhee" on Justia Law