Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the sentencing order and judgment issued by the district court imposing a four-year suspended sentence for Defendant's convictions for criminal possession of dangerous drugs, holding that Defendant received ineffective assistance during the sentencing hearing.On appeal, Defendant argued that she received ineffective assistance of counsel when her attorney, while arguing for a deferred sentence, failed to inform the district court of his authority to impose an alternative sentence under Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-202. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed Defendant's sentence, and remanded for resentencing, holding that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentence when her counsel failed to cite the Alternative Sentencing Authority, Mont. Code Ann. 45-9-202, as authority for Defendant's eligibility for a deferred sentence. View "State v. Wright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court upholding the Broadwater Conservation District's (BCD) declaratory ruling determining that Montana Gulch is a "stream" subject to the regulatory provisions of The Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act of 1975, Mont. Code Ann. 75-7-103, holding that there was no error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the BCD and the district court did not err in determining that Montana Gulch could be classified as a "natural, perennial-flowing stream" under the jurisdiction of the Streambed Act upon a finding that it would have flowed perennially without human activity; (2) the BCD properly examined historical evidence when determining whether Montana Gulch would have flowed perennially in the absence of human activity; (3) the BCD's determination that Montana Gulch was under the Streambed Act's jurisdiction was not arbitrary and capricious; and (4) the BCD and the district court did not err in considering subsurface flows in Montana Gulch. View "Fortner v. Broadwater Conservation District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of three counts of felony sexual intercourse without consent with a victim twelve years old or younger, holding that eliciting testimony that vouched for the victim's credibility and the prosecutor's personally commenting on the victim's reliability as a witness undermined Defendant's right to a fair trial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the State's questioning of its expert witnesses, whom bolstered the victim's credibility, and the prosecutor's statement during closing argument that the victim was a "reliable witness" undermined his right to a fair trial. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the convictions, holding that the testimony elicited from four witnesses vouching for the victim's credibility and the prosecutor personally commenting that the victim was a reliable witness who had no incentive to lie violated Defendant's right to a fair trial. View "State v. Byrne" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that the district court did not err in granting Defendants' motion to dismiss.Plaintiff was employed with Defendant for seven years until he was terminated for testing positive for THC in a random drug and alcohol urine analysis test. Plaintiff had been prescribed medical marijuana as treatment for his diagnosed PTSD and challenged his termination, alleging wrongful discharge from employment and employment discrimination and seeking a declaratory judgment that Mont. Code Ann. 50-46-320(4)(b) and (5)(b) were unconstitutional as applied to his case. The district court dismissed the claims, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to notify his supervisor that he had been using medical marijuana, as required the company's policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to follow Defendants' policy constituted good cause for termination. View "Barthel v. Barretts" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part four provisions of a district court order and amended parenting plan in this case, holding that certain provisions in the provisions in the court's amended parenting plan were erroneous.The amended parenting plan at issue required Sarah Willmon and her husband to attend family counseling, allowed her ex-husband, Marlen Russell, to contact the children regularly, required the parties to mediate future disputes, and split between the parties the tax dependency deductions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred to the extent it ordered Sarah's current husband to attend family counseling; (2) abused its discretion when it ordered that Marlen may contact the children "regularly"; (3) erred when it ordered future conflicts to be subject to mandatory mediation; and (4) did not err when it divided the tax dependency deductions between the parties. View "In re Parenting of P.H.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court affirming Defendant's conviction for misdemeanor resisting arrest, holding that there was no error.On appeal, Defendant argued that the municipal court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for an in camera review of the arresting officer's personnel file for incidents of excessive use of force and that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the municipal court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for an in camera review of the officer's personnel file for instances of excessive force; and (2) the State presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction for resisting arrest. View "State v. Howard" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of sexual intercourse without consent, holding that Defendant's constitutional right to confront his accusers was violated during his second criminal trial.The victim, T.C., was thirteen years old, deaf, and developmentally delayed. During trial, the district court found T.C. incompetent and declared a mistrial. At the second trial, Defendant objected to the hearsay testimony from five witnesses who would testify to what T.C. told them. Defendant argued that his right to confrontation was violated when he was denied his request to interview or depose T.C. and when he could not cross-examine T.C. during trial. Defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting T.C. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant's constitutional right of confrontation was violated when the court admitted testimony from three witnesses about T.C.'s out-of-court statements without Defendant having a prior opportunity to cross-examine T.C., and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Tome" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court committing N.A. to Montana State Hospital (MSH) for a period of up to ninety days, holding that the district court committed reversible error when it allowed testimony by video conferencing at the commitment hearing over N.A.'s objection.The State filed a petition for N.A.'s involuntary commitment alleging that N.A. presented an imminent risk of harm to herself based upon her statements of suicidality. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that N.A. suffered from a mental disorder and required commitment and ordered that N.A. be involuntarily placed at MSH in Warm Springs for a period of up to ninety days. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court committed reversible error when it allowed testimony by video conferencing over N.A.'s objection. View "In re N.A." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the orders of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim with prejudice, holding that the district court erred.Defendant filed a civil complaint on behalf of Whitefish Credit Union (WCU) alleging that Plaintiff committed fraud when she foreclosed on certain property. Defendant also reported the fraud allegations to federal law enforcement authorities, resulting in Plaintiff's indictment. Before Plaintiff's resulting criminal charges and civil fraud claims were eventually dismissed Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy and received a discharge. Plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and constructive fraud based on Defendant's involvement in initiating fraud proceedings against her. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff was judicially estopped from pursuing her claims because she failed to disclose the claims as assets in her personal bankruptcy. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's civil malicious prosecution claim; and (2) properly granted summary judgment to the extent it applied judicial estoppel to Plaintiff's claim as premised on the criminal charges that were brought against her. View "McAtee v. Morrison & Frampton" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court dismissing as moot Appellant's claim for declaratory judgment that The Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company had a duty as an insurer to provide its insured's policy to a third-party claimant when the insured's liability was reasonably clear, holding that the district court improperly dismissed The Hartford from the action.The district court dismissed the case as moot after the insureds provided the policy at issue to Appellant. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred in dismissing the case because The Hartford failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the inapplicability of the voluntary cessation exception to mootness. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the district court erred by failing to apply the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine and dismissing the claims against The Hartford. View "Wilkie v. Hartford" on Justia Law