Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the plaintiff, Kevin Barber, appealed against his former employer, Bradford Aquatic Group, LLC, alleging wrongful termination. Bradford Aquatic Group, a North Carolina-based company, had employed Barber as a Regional Business Development Manager for its Rocky Mountain region, which includes Montana. The employment contract between Barber and the company included a choice-of-law and forum selection clause, specifying that any disputes arising from the agreement would be governed by North Carolina law and adjudicated in North Carolina courts.Barber, a resident of Montana, argued that Montana law should apply to his claims of wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and bad faith, and that the suit should be heard in Montana. The district court dismissed Barber's claims due to improper venue, based on the choice-of-law and forum selection clauses in the employment agreement.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement was valid and that North Carolina law should apply to Barber's claims. The court also upheld the validity of the forum selection clause, concluding that it is enforceable under North Carolina law. Therefore, the court determined that the dispute should be adjudicated in North Carolina, not Montana. View "Barber v. Bradford Aquatic" on Justia Law

This case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana involves Anthony Reed, the petitioner and appellant, and Catherine Martin, the respondent and appellee. The two parties share a child, L.R., born in 2013. After their separation in 2015, the child has primarily resided with Martin, with Anthony having limited, supervised visitation rights. Anthony has sought to modify the parenting plan on multiple occasions, asserting that his circumstances and those of L.R. have changed significantly over the years, but the District Court has denied his motions.Anthony's assertions of changed circumstances include his graduation from law school, passing of the bar exam, gainful employment as an attorney, entering a committed relationship, and undergoing therapy. He also asserts that L.R.'s growth and development from a toddler to a 10-year-old, his desire to interact with Anthony at his home and in the community, and Martin's alleged parental alienation constitute changes in L.R's circumstances.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that Anthony has met his burden under § 40-4-219(1), MCA, that a change of circumstances of the child has occurred, and that the District Court's failure to hold a hearing and finding otherwise was clearly erroneous. The Court reversed the District Court's denial of Anthony's motion to modify the parenting plan and remanded the case for a hearing to consider amendment of the parenting plan in L.R.'s best interests. The Court also stated that it appears appropriate for the District Court to order a parenting evaluation and, if deemed necessary, appoint a Guardian Ad Litem. View "In re Parenting of L.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court following a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff on his nuisance claim against Glacier Electric Co-op, Inc., holding that the district court did not err by instructing the jury that damages could be awarded for nuisance.Plaintiff sued Glacier for damages caused by the flooding of his property, and the case proceeded to a jury trial on both nuisance and negligence claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, finding that Glacier's paving of an alleyway between the properties constituted a nuisance that damaged his property, and awarded $250,000 in damages on the nuisance claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury instructions in this case did not constitute reversible error. View "Winkowitsch v. Glacier Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court granting prescriptive easements over two roadways to Defendants, concluding that remand was required with instructions to conform the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment to reflect the Court's holding in this case.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred by concluding that Defendants acquired a prescriptive easement over Quarter Gulch Road; (2) the district court correctly concluded that the prescriptive easement over Olson Road was appurtenant; and (3) remand was required to reflect this Court's holding that the Defendants' prescriptive easement over Olson Road was limited in scope to the historic agricultural, recreational, and residential uses of the road by Defendants and their predecessors between approximately 1948 and 1997. View "Faber v. Raty" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court ruling in favor of the Montana Environmental Information Center and Sierra Club (collectively, Conservation Groups) and vacating the Montana Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) permit for Westmoreland Rosebud Mining, LLC's proposed coal mine expansion, holding that the Board of Environmental Review (Board) made several errors when it upheld DEQ's findings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that reversal of the burden of proof was prejudicial error; (2) the Board committed reversible error in limiting the Conservation Groups' evidence and argument; (3) the district court erred in determining that it was reversible error to admit certain testimony as proper rebuttal; (4) the Board erred when it concluded that no water quality standard violation could occur; (5) the Board properly considered cumulative impact of mining activity in its analysis; (6) the Board properly relied on evidence regarding aquatic life; (7) the attorney fee award was improper; and (8) the district court erred in ruling that the Board was properly included as a party on judicial review. View "Mont. Environmental Information Center v. Westmoreland Rosebud Mining" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Ryan Adamson's motion for relief and an order granting Sylvia Moody's petition for subsequent administration of the Estate of Victor Starkel, holding that the district court did not err by reopening the Estate pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-1016.After Starkel died his daughter, Moody, filed for an informal testate probate. Eight years after the district court closed the Estate, Moody initiated this lawsuit against Adamson, with whom Starkel had entered into a written stock pledge agreement (SPA), claiming conversion, security fraud, and other claims. Adamson challenged Moody's standing on the basis that the Estate was closed. Moody subsequently petitioned to re-open the Estate and to be re-appointed as the personal representative. The district court granted the motion pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-1016 and reopened the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reopening the Estate on the basis that the SPA constituted a subsequently discovered asset. View "In re Estate of Starkel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment entered by the district court following a jury trial in which Defendant was found guilty of criminal mischief and sentenced to six days in jail but with a deferred sentence conditioned upon successful completion of probation and payment of restitution over four years, holding that the district court erred in the determination of the amount of restitution to be imposed.A jury found Defendant guilty of criminal mischief for breaking and damaging parts of vehicles belonging to Douglas Nelsen and Keith Nelsen. After a sentencing hearing, the district court ordered restitution in the amount of $11420.13, including $1,222 for the Dakota and Sentra, $5,219.98 for the Ford Mustang, $1,850 for the Astro, $3,125 for the Grand Prix, and $105.15 in costs for a rental car. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by concluding that restitution could be imposed for all the damage that was alleged under the single count of criminal mischief; but (2) erred in the determination of the amount of restitution to be imposed for damage to the Mustang. View "State v. Arthun" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the determination of the district court granting Hill County, Montana, and Blaine County, Montana summary judgment on the standalone claims brought by the Estate of A.J. Longsoldier, Jr. for negligence and denying its cross-motion for partial summary judgment on liability, holding that remand was required for further proceedings.Longsoldier died in 2009 while in Hill County's custody. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the determination that neither Blaine County, where Longsoldier was arrested, nor Hill County discriminated against Longsoldier on the basis of race or disability. In the second appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling that Hill County could be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the hospital where Longsoldier was treated during his detention. In this third appeal, the Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the district court (1) erred in determining that the Estate's negligence claim against Hill County was barred by principles of issue preclusion; (2) erred in ruling that the Estate may not pursue a negligence claim against Blaine County; and (3) did not err in denying the Estate's motion for partial summary judgment on liability. View "Stricker v. Blaine County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgments of the district court enforcing the parties' mediated memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding a subdivision dispute and then implementing it in the form of a more formal final settlement agreement proposed by Developers for approval by the Town of Fort Peck, Montana, holding that the district court erroneously granted Developers judgment as a matter of law.The district court ultimately concluded that the mediated MOU was an independently valid and enforceable contract in accordance with its written terms and as approved by the Town Council at its closed meeting, thus granting Developers' motion to enforce and implement the mediated MOU. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in granting Developers judgment as a matter of law that the Town Council took action to approve the parties' mediated MOU at its closed meeting and that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether a majority a quorum of the Town Council satisfied the agreed condition precedent to contract formation and enforceability of the MOU. View "Hanson v. Town of Fort Peck" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and order transferring jurisdiction of this matter involving H.R. from youth court to district court, imposing a Department of Corrections (DOC) commitment, auditing two years of supervision to the disposition, and requiring H.R. to register as a sex offender, holding that there was no error.The youth court revoked H.R.'s probation and committed him to the DOC for placement. Upon turning eighteen, H.R. was released, and the State sought to transfer jurisdiction from youth court to district court and to order the supervisory responsibility to transfer from juvenile probation services to adult probation services. The youth court transferred jurisdiction to the district court and supervisory responsibility to adult probation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the youth court exceeded the bounds of its authority under Mont. Code Ann. 41-5-208 because it imposed a new disposition on H.R. in addition to the transfer of jurisdiction and supervision agency because such a new disposition was not available under section 41-5-208. View "State v. H.R." on Justia Law