Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves T.S. (Mother) and A.A. (Father) who appealed the termination of their parental rights to their minor children (D.A., L.A., and F.A.) by the Montana Second Judicial District Court. The Child and Family Services Division of the Montana Department of Health and Human Services (Department) became involved with the family in August 2019 when two of the children were found wandering the streets unsupervised. The Department had previously been involved with the family due to allegations of child abuse or neglect. In August 2019, the Department removed the children from the parents' care and placed them in a protective kinship placement. The parents were given treatment plans to follow for potential reunification with their children.Despite multiple extensions to complete their treatment plans, neither parent had successfully completed all requirements by January 2022. As a result, the Department transitioned to court-ordered guardianships as the new permanency plan for the children. In March 2022, the Department petitioned for termination of parental rights due to the parents' failure to complete their treatment plans and their inability to provide adequate parental care. The District Court issued judgments terminating the parents' respective parental rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that the District Court's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and that the parents had failed to demonstrate that any material District Court finding of fact was clearly erroneous. The court also held that the District Court did not terminate the parents' respective parental rights without clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable family preservation and reunification efforts. The court concluded that the District Court correctly terminated the parents' respective parental rights under § 41-3-609(1)(f), MCA. View "In re F.A." on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs, including Forward Montana, Leo Gallagher, Montana Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Gary Zadick, who challenged the constitutionality of two amendments to Senate Bill 319 (SB 319) passed by the Montana Legislature during the 2021 legislative session. The amendments, added during a closed-door committee meeting, were unrelated to the original subject of the bill, which was campaign finance. The plaintiffs argued that the amendments violated two sections of the Montana Constitution: Article V, Section 11(1), which requires that a law not be so altered or amended on its passage through the legislature as to change its original purpose, and Article V, Section 11(3), which requires that each bill contain only one subject, clearly expressed in its title.The District Court of the First Judicial District ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the amendments violated the aforementioned sections of the Montana Constitution. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the contested sections of SB 319. The State of Montana, the defendant in the case, did not appeal the decision, effectively acknowledging the unconstitutionality of the bill.The plaintiffs then sought attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine and the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). The District Court denied the request, finding that the case was a "garden-variety" constitutional challenge undeserving of attorney fees under the doctrine. The court also denied fees under the UDJA, finding that the circumstances did not make fees equitable.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, ruling that the plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine. The court found that the plaintiffs had vindicated important constitutional rights and that private enforcement was necessary due to the State's defense of the unconstitutional law. The court remanded the case to the District Court for calculation of attorney fees. View "Forward Montana v. State" on Justia Law

The parties, Nancy M. Steward and Joseph H. Steward, were married in 2006 and divorced in 2020, with two minor children. The court adopted their Stipulated Parenting Plan (SPP), which included a child support arrangement. After the court adopted the SPP, Joseph requested a modification of child support from the Montana Child Support Services Division (CSSD). CSSD issued a modified order determining Joseph's child support obligation to be less than initially stipulated. Nancy contested the date of commencement of the modified child support, asserting it should not have commenced until the month after she received notification from CSSD of the modified amount.The issue on appeal was whether the District Court abused its discretion in commencing modified child support prior to Nancy receiving actual notification of the modified child support order and amount from CSSD. Nancy argued that under § 40-4-208, MCA, and Healy, child support may only be modified subsequent to her receipt of actual notice of the CSSD modification notice and order. Joseph argued that the statute supported modification of the court’s original child support order for any installments accruing subsequent to when he served Nancy notice of his request for hearing on child support modification with CSSD.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court ruled that the District Court correctly interpreted the law and appropriately determined the commencement of the modified child support after notice to Nancy of Joseph’s request to modify child support, as permitted by § 40-4-208(1), MCA. The Supreme Court also overruled any interpretation of Healy that limits a district court’s authority to modify child support installments accruing after a party’s receipt of actual notice of the CSSD modification notice and order when that party was appropriately put on notice of the other party’s pursuit of modification of child support well before CSSD’s notice and order. View "In re Marriage of Steward" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Montana reversed and remanded a decision of the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. The case involved Saddlebrook Investments (Saddlebrook), assignee of Stuart Simonsen, and Krohne Fund, L.P. (Krohne Fund). Saddlebrook appealed against the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Krohne Fund on Saddlebrook’s claims of malicious prosecution and abuse of process.The Supreme Court found that the district court had erred in applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar Saddlebrook from pursuing its claims. The court noted that a party is not judicially estopped from asserting a cause of action not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor’s schedules or disclosure statements. However, this does not apply when the bankruptcy trustee is pursuing the action for the benefit of creditors. Once substituted, a bankruptcy trustee is free to pursue the debtor’s nondisclosed claim.In this case, the Trustee had knowledge of Simonsen’s claims and authorized the state court suit. The Supreme Court concluded that because the Trustee had control of Simonsen’s abuse of process claim through the bankruptcy estate, the District Court erred when it estopped Saddlebrook from pursuing that claim. Therefore, Saddlebrook is not judicially estopped from pursuing its malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims against Krohne Fund. View "Saddlebrook Investments v. Krohne Fund" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana ruled on a case involving a dispute over a proposed ballot initiative related to reproductive rights. In the case, Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights and Samuel Dickman, M.D. (MSRR) sought a declaratory judgment arguing that the Attorney General’s proposed ballot statement for Constitutional Initiative 14 (CI-14) was argumentative, prejudicial, and inaccurate. MSRR also contended that their own proposed ballot statement was clear and impartial and should have been approved by the Attorney General.The court considered whether MSRR could challenge the Attorney General’s ballot statement under relevant statutes and whether the Attorney General had violated certain sections of the Montana Code Annotated by submitting an argumentative, prejudicial, and/or inaccurate ballot statement for CI-14 and by declining to approve MSRR’s proposed ballot statement.The court concluded that the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute led to an absurd result that abrogated due process. Therefore, MSRR could challenge the Attorney General’s ballot statement under the relevant statutes. The court also found the Attorney General’s ballot statement for CI-14 failed to comply with statutory requirements as it did not fairly present the voters with what was proposed within the Initiative.However, the court disagreed with MSRR’s contention that the Attorney General was required to approve its ballot statement. The court concluded that while the Attorney General’s statement was deficient, he had the statutory authority to determine if MSRR's ballot statement complied with the requirements. The court then crafted a new ballot statement that complied with statutory requirements. View "Montanans Securing Reproductive Rights v. Knudsen" on Justia Law

This case concerns the constitutionality of several Montana election laws. The plaintiffs, a variety of political and human rights organizations, sued the Montana Secretary of State, arguing that certain election laws were unconstitutional. The challenged laws included provisions restricting absentee voting, changing voter registration deadlines, banning paid absentee ballot collection, and revising voter ID requirements.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's judgment, finding that each of the challenged statutes were unconstitutional. The Court held that the laws either impermissibly interfered with or minimally burdened the right to vote, a fundamental right under the Montana Constitution. The Court applied a strict scrutiny or a middle-tier analysis, depending on the extent of the burden on the right to vote, and determined that the state failed to show that the laws were the least onerous path to a compelling state interest or were reasonable and more important than the burden on the right to vote. The Court rejected the Secretary of State's argument that the laws were necessary for administrative efficiency and to ensure the integrity, reliability, and fairness of the election process. View "Democratic Party v. Jacobsen" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between members of Black Gold Enterprises, LLC, a company formed in 2013, including plaintiff Adam Pummill, plaintiff Kurtis Robertson, and defendant Joshua T. Patterson. The source of the dispute was the payment of rent from Patterson's businesses to Black Gold for the use of a property. Patterson eventually stopped paying rent, leading to the involvement of a receiver, James Galipeau, to manage the property.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana considered the appeal by Patterson against the award of fees to the receiver and his attorney from interplead funds held by the Clerk of Court, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion. Patterson also contested the District Court's decision that the lien on the property, arising from a loan agreement between Patterson's business and Black Gold, was invalid.The Supreme Court, applying the Hickey factors to assess the reasonableness of the receiver's fees, found no abuse of discretion by the District Court. The court concluded that the receiver's work in the complex, time-consuming case was essential, and the sale of the property (Black Gold's only asset) was reasonably executed. The court also found that the District Court had the inherent power to distribute interplead funds for services related to the receivership, rejecting Patterson's claim that the dispersal should have waited until a final disposition.Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decisions regarding the award of the receiver and attorney fees and the method of their payment. The court did not address the issue of the validity of the lien on the property. View "Pummill v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Eric Boudette, who was convicted of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, First Offense, following a jury trial on May 31, 2022. Boudette appealed the verdict, asserting that his motion to dismiss for prosecutorial misconduct was wrongly denied. He also contended that his plea for a new trial was wrongly denied on the grounds that his arrest was an unlawful seizure, the Justice Court lacked jurisdiction to try the case, and the statutory speedy trial deadline had expired by the time his trial was held.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case following Boudette's appeal against the District Court's affirmation of the Justice Court's decision. The Supreme Court analyzed several aspects of the case, including jurisdiction, the Community Caretaker Doctrine, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and the speedy trial issue.The Court ruled that Boudette could rightfully be charged in either county where he was found driving under the influence. They also determined that the arresting officer acted in her capacity as a community caretaker when she entered Boudette's vehicle to check on his wellbeing, thus making the arrest lawful. Regarding the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, the Court found no evidence of perjury or the State unreasonably impeding Boudette from obtaining an independent blood test. Lastly, the Court declared that Boudette had waived his right to a speedy trial by requesting a continuance.Hence, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s decision. View "State v. Boudette" on Justia Law

In Montana, Robert Murray Gibbons was found guilty of driving under the influence, his fifth or subsequent offense. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, Gibbons raised three issues. First, he argued that the District Court incorrectly instructed the jury that he did not need to be conscious to be in actual physical control of his vehicle. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the instruction was consistent with the preventative purpose of the state's DUI statute.Second, Gibbons argued that the State’s rebuttal argument, which suggested that he could have introduced photographic evidence that was available to him during discovery, violated his constitutional rights. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the State was entitled to respond to Gibbons’ accusation that it had improperly withheld evidence.Finally, Gibbons challenged the constitutionality of the statute that imposed a mandatory minimum $5,000 fine for his offense, arguing that it did not take into account a defendant’s ability to pay. The Supreme Court agreed with Gibbons on this point, finding that the statute was facially unconstitutional because it required the imposition of a mandatory fine in every case without considering constitutionally required proportionality factors, such as the financial burden on the defendant and the defendant’s ability to pay.Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed Gibbons’s DUI conviction, but reversed the $5,000 fine and remanded the case to the District Court for recalculation of the fine in line with its opinion. View "State v. R. Gibbons" on Justia Law

In November 2019, Vietnam veteran Bruce Schroder was charged with criminal mischief, a felony, after he removed an Uber sign from driver Jamie Hauge's car and pounded on the vehicle when several younger women offered Hauge cash for the ride and pushed Schroder out of the way. Schroder's charge was later reduced to a misdemeanor in exchange for his guilty plea and an agreement to pay restitution up to $4,930.07 as determined by the court. At the sentencing hearing, the court issued a 6-month deferred sentence and imposed a total of $2,039.20 in restitution and fees to be paid in monthly installments of $340.Schroder appealed the decision, arguing that the District Court erred in imposing restitution against him without fully considering his ability to pay. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana disagreed. The court found that there was a plea agreement in place where Schroder had agreed to pay restitution in any amount up to $4,930.07 as determined by the court. By signing this agreement, Schroder had affirmatively represented to the court that he had the ability to pay that amount. Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, Schroder made no claim of duress or undue pressure in entering the plea agreement.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana thus affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that while it is better practice for a district court to thoroughly analyze a defendant’s ability to pay restitution, fines, and fees at sentencing, under these circumstances, it could not fault the District Court for not making a more thorough inquiry into Schroder’s financial ability to pay. View "State v. Schroder" on Justia Law