Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services’ attempt to recover $5,360.89 in Medicaid benefits paid on behalf of a deceased recipient, Florence Pound. The sole heir, Minta Johnson, inherited Pound’s home, the primary estate asset valued at approximately $200,000. After Pound’s death, Johnson, as personal representative, published notice to creditors as required by Montana law. The Department submitted its claim one day after the four-month statutory deadline for creditor claims had expired, and the Probate Court denied the claim as untimely. The estate was then distributed entirely to Johnson.Following the denial of its claim in the Eleventh Judicial District Court (Probate Court), the Department filed a new action in the Fourth Judicial District Court, seeking recovery from Johnson personally under a separate statute, § 53-6-167(2), MCA, which allows the Department to seek reimbursement from anyone who received property from the estate. The District Court granted summary judgment to Johnson, reasoning that the Department’s untimely creditor’s claim barred further action and that issue preclusion applied because the same underlying issue had already been decided in probate.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the matter de novo. It held that the Department’s statutory right under § 53-6-167(2), MCA, to recover Medicaid benefits from an heir is independent of the probate creditor claim process, and that a missed probate deadline does not bar a subsequent action against an heir. The Court further found that issue preclusion did not apply because the probate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the Department’s statutory claim against the heir, and the issues in the two proceedings were not identical. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s dismissal and remanded for judgment in favor of the Department. View "Department of Public Health and Human Services v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After being arrested for violating probation related to a past conviction and facing a new charge for failing to register as a sex offender, the plaintiff was indicted in federal court for possession of a firearm as a prohibited person. Initially represented by the defendant, a federal public defender, the plaintiff entered a guilty plea. Before sentencing, the attorney withdrew due to communication breakdown, and a new counsel was appointed. The plaintiff was ultimately sentenced to prison and supervised release. He later filed a motion in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, unlawful searches, fabricated evidence, and coercion regarding his plea. The federal court rejected these claims, finding no supporting evidence and that the searches and arrest had been lawful.Subsequently, the plaintiff brought a civil action in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, alleging professional negligence by his former attorney based on similar allegations already raised in the federal proceeding. The district court noted the plaintiff’s failure to timely and properly disclose expert witnesses but primarily analyzed whether his claims were barred by collateral estoppel. It found that the issues had already been litigated and decided in the federal court, and thus granted summary judgment for the defendant, dismissing all claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that all four elements of collateral estoppel were satisfied: the issues were identical to those litigated in federal court, there was a final judgment on the merits, the parties were the same, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims previously. Therefore, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of the claims, holding they were barred by collateral estoppel. View "Benton v. Babcock" on Justia Law

A 45-year-old man encountered a 15-year-old girl, T.K., and her friends at a house party in Butte, Montana. Over two occasions, he purchased alcohol for them. On the night in question, after drinking heavily, T.K. and another friend asked the man for a ride to get more alcohol. He drove them to a gas station, bought whiskey, and later drove them back to Butte. T.K. was heavily intoxicated and, after a series of events including sexual activity in the car involving the man and another adult, T.K. was ultimately taken by the man to his hotel. Surveillance footage showed him carrying an unconscious and limp T.K. into the hotel. She woke later, confused, missing clothes, and feeling sore. A hospital exam found injuries and DNA matching the man. T.K. was underage and highly intoxicated.The State of Montana charged the man with sexual intercourse without consent. At trial in the Second Judicial District Court in Butte-Silver Bow County, the prosecution presented evidence of T.K.’s incapacity due to age and intoxication. The jury was given a stipulation regarding the mental state required (“knowingly”) that used an incorrect, result-based definition. The jury returned a guilty verdict, specifically finding that the man was guilty because T.K. was under 16 and because she was incapacitated.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant argued the erroneous jury instruction violated his rights and that his counsel was ineffective for agreeing to it. The Court held that, although the instruction was incorrect, the evidence at trial clearly demonstrated the defendant’s awareness of T.K.’s incapacity. Therefore, he was not prejudiced by the error. The Court declined to exercise plain error review and also rejected the ineffective assistance claim for lack of prejudice. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Davisson" on Justia Law

The defendant was charged with multiple felonies, including Incest, Tampering With or Fabricating Physical Evidence, and sixteen counts of Sexual Abuse of Children. He entered a binding plea agreement to plead guilty to four counts of Sexual Abuse of Children in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and a net sentence of forty years, with twenty suspended. At the plea hearing, the defendant affirmed he understood the agreement, had discussed it with counsel, and was entering his plea voluntarily without coercion. Several weeks later, he sent communications to the court and the State, asserting that his prior counsel had pressured him into accepting the plea.Following these communications, attorney McKittrick formally replaced attorney Martin as defense counsel. The Eighth Judicial District Court held a hearing to address the defendant’s request for substitution of counsel, applying the standards from State v. Johnson, 2019 MT 34. At the hearing, the defendant claimed he had been pressured by his previous attorney, referencing conversations about sentencing risks. McKittrick, present during those discussions, described them as a standard risk-versus-reward analysis, not coercion. The District Court found no actual conflict of interest, irreconcilable conflict, or complete breakdown in communication warranting substitution and denied the request.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying substitution of counsel. Applying the abuse of discretion standard and reviewing the procedures and analysis used below, the Supreme Court found the District Court conducted an adequate inquiry and properly applied settled law. The main holding is that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for substitution of counsel because the concerns raised did not amount to an actual conflict, irreconcilable conflict, or complete breakdown in communication. The decision of the District Court was affirmed. View "State v. Carlin" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between two formerly married individuals regarding possession of their cat, Yasmine, following their divorce in 2015. Their Marital Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) specified that the wife would be awarded possession of the cat, but the husband would care for Yasmine until the wife requested possession. If the husband’s new residence did not permit cats after the sale of the marital home, he was required to notify the wife, who then had 20 days to take custody or arrange for the cat’s care. After the marital home was sold in 2016, the husband notified the wife, but she was unable to take possession or arrange care for Yasmine immediately and requested more time. The husband agreed to a short extension, but the wife did not act within that period, and the cat remained with the husband. Several years later, in 2023, the wife sought custody of Yasmine, but the husband refused, claiming she had forfeited her rights under the MPSA.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, held a hearing in January 2024 on the wife’s motion for contempt, alleging the husband violated the MPSA. The court found that the husband had provided proper notice, the wife was aware of this, and she failed to take the cat or arrange for its care within the agreed-upon timeframe. The court denied the contempt motion and issued its findings and order in February 2024. Subsequent motions by the wife for reconsideration and an out-of-time appeal were denied or deemed denied.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the MPSA did not grant the wife an indefinite right to possess Yasmine and that her rights under the agreement expired months after the time extension, not years later. The court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s denial of the contempt motion. View "Marriage of Burgard & Jacobsen" on Justia Law

After the Department of Public Health and Human Services received a report that the mother of a fourteen-year-old, J.D., had been arrested for allegedly making numerous inappropriate calls to a sheriff’s dispatch over two years, J.D. was left without another adult with legal custody. The Department placed J.D. with his aunt, T.M., on an emergency basis. The Department’s case focused on concerns about the mother’s mental health, including reports of erratic behavior during her custody and prior departmental involvement. The Department filed a petition for emergency protective services, adjudication of J.D. as a youth in need of care (YINC), and temporary legal custody, supported by an affidavit describing alleged neglect and the need for immediate protection due to the mother’s mental health.The Fifth Judicial District Court, Beaverhead County, held a show cause hearing in March 2023, where the mother denied the allegations but stipulated to cause. At an adjudicatory hearing in April 2023, the Department presented testimony primarily regarding the mother’s mental health and past incidents, such as throwing objects, but did not establish any present physical or psychological harm to J.D. or substantial risk thereof. J.D.’s counsel advised the court that J.D. was not afraid of his mother. The District Court adjudicated J.D. as a YINC, finding the mother’s mental health issues presented a risk to J.D.’s well-being and granted the Department temporary legal custody, later imposing a guardianship.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana applied an abuse of discretion standard. The Court held that the District Court’s finding of abuse and neglect was not supported by substantial evidence, as the Department failed to demonstrate a specific, imminent risk of harm to J.D. resulting from the mother’s conduct. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated both the adjudication of J.D. as a YINC and the subsequent guardianship order. View "Matter of J.D." on Justia Law

A dispute arose among members of a family-owned limited liability company (LLC) established in 1994 with an original dissolution date of December 31, 2024. In 2015, one member, Seth, provided notice of his withdrawal. Shortly after, the remaining members—Horatio (the siblings’ father), Cameron, and Lindsay—held a meeting and, over Lindsay’s objection, voted by supermajority to convert the LLC to a perpetual-term entity. This action was later formalized through an amendment filed with the state. Horatio subsequently passed away, and Cameron became personal representative of his estate, controlling Horatio’s LLC interest.After these events, Lindsay, individually, on behalf of her minor children, and as a derivative plaintiff for the LLC, initiated an action in the Montana Sixth Judicial District Court. She sought a declaratory judgment enforcing the operating agreement’s (OA) dissolution provision and contended that the OA required unanimous written consent for amendment—rendering the 2015 supermajority vote ineffective. Cameron moved to dismiss some claims and later sought to join the LLC as a defendant. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, granted summary judgment to Cameron and the LLC on the validity of the amendment, ordered the LLC joined as a defendant, and required Lindsay to pay fees for a non-party hybrid witness’s deposition.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the OA provided two valid pathways to amendment—by unanimous written consent or by a 67% supermajority, and that the 2015 vote validly converted the LLC to a perpetual entity. The court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and its joinder order. However, it reversed the order requiring Lindsay to pay the non-party witness’s fees, limiting compensation to the statutory witness fee unless otherwise agreed. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. View "Barbier v. Burns" on Justia Law

Two homeowners who purchased a residence in a Montana subdivision governed by covenants brought suit against their neighbors and the homeowners’ association after plans were approved for a new home to be built on an adjacent lot. The plaintiffs objected that the proposed construction would obstruct their mountain views. The subdivision’s covenants required that building placement “should take into consideration” neighboring dwellings, with “allowance for views and solar gains.” The association’s design review committee initially approved the plans, then rescinded approval after objections, requesting revised plans showing the plaintiffs’ residence. The defendants did not submit revised plans and ultimately received reinstated approval from the association’s board, which decided to let the parties resolve their dispute independently. The plaintiffs then filed suit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, denied the plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Subsequently, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, interpreting the covenants as not creating an enforceable obligation to protect views, and awarded attorney fees and costs to the defendants as prevailing parties.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the denial of preliminary relief should be separately addressed, whether summary judgment was properly granted, and whether attorney fees were correctly awarded. The Supreme Court held that the orders denying preliminary relief had merged into the final judgment and did not require separate review. The Court reversed summary judgment, concluding the covenants created a mandatory obligation to genuinely consider neighboring impacts, including views. The Court found material questions of fact remained as to whether the defendants and the association sufficiently considered the plaintiffs’ views, precluding summary judgment. The attorney fee award was also reversed, as no party was yet prevailing. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Waddell v. Studer" on Justia Law

The biological parents of a minor child, born in January 2018, have a contentious history involving allegations of abuse, criminal charges, and a ten-year order of protection against the father, Daniel Whitby, based on the mother's allegations of assault and rape. The mother, Reina Irene Cazabal-Boe, petitioned for a parenting plan that would exclude Whitby from all contact and visitation with the child, citing safety concerns. Whitby counter-petitioned, alleging drug use and abuse by Cazabal-Boe. A hearing was held in 2018, but Whitby did not attend, and the Standing Master adopted the mother’s proposed plan, giving her sole parenting rights and denying Whitby any contact.Following Whitby’s guilty pleas to various offenses against Cazabal-Boe, he twice sought to modify the parenting plan, alleging changed circumstances such as rehabilitation, sobriety, completion of anger management courses, and psychological evaluations. Both times, the Standing Master—first in 2019 and again in 2025—denied his motions without an evidentiary hearing, finding no change in circumstances affecting the child and awarded attorney fees against Whitby, labeling his repeated motions as vexatious. The Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court adopted these findings, denying a hearing and refusing to amend the plan.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case, applying abuse of discretion and clearly erroneous standards. It found that Whitby’s affidavits, if true, plausibly alleged a change in circumstances that required a hearing under Montana law. The Court held that the District Court erred by denying a hearing and by awarding attorney fees without proper findings. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s denial of a hearing, vacated the merits denial of amendment, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine if modification of the parenting plan is warranted, also reversing the attorney fees award. View "In re Parenting of A.M.B." on Justia Law

C.M.B., a child born in 2018, was removed from her mother’s care following repeated reports and incidents of domestic violence, substance abuse, and unsafe conditions in her home. Law enforcement and Child and Family Services (CFS) intervened after a particularly concerning event in May 2023, finding the home unsanitary and the children exposed to potentially violent situations. Over several years, the family had been subject to multiple investigations for neglect and abuse. After removal, C.M.B. and her siblings were placed in foster or kinship care. The mother was unable to consistently participate in visits or comply fully with her treatment plan, partially due to her own legal and housing difficulties.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, adjudicated C.M.B. as a youth in need of care and granted temporary legal custody to the Department. The mother stipulated to the initial petition but later struggled to engage with required services. After extensive proceedings, including testimony from therapists and social workers, the district court found that the mother did not provide a safe or stable home, failed to make meaningful progress on her treatment plan, and that her conditions were unlikely to change within a reasonable time. The court terminated parental rights and granted permanent legal custody to the Department.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the mother challenged both her standing to assert ineffective assistance of counsel claims on behalf of C.M.B. and the district court’s findings regarding her ability to change. The Supreme Court held that the mother lacked standing to assert C.M.B.’s statutory and constitutional rights to counsel, as she did not show a personal constitutional violation. Additionally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating parental rights, finding the decision supported by substantial evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination and permanent custody order. View "In re C.M.B." on Justia Law