Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Ryan Bloomer was charged with his fourth DUI offense in 2021 and pleaded guilty in 2022. Before he was sentenced for this offense, he was charged with a fifth DUI in April 2023, to which he also pleaded guilty. The District Court sentenced Bloomer for both offenses during the same hearing in May 2023. For the fourth DUI, Bloomer was sentenced under the statute in effect at the time of the offense, § 61-8-731, MCA (2019), to thirteen months at the Department of Corrections (DOC) followed by a five-year suspended sentence. For the fifth DUI, he was sentenced under the new statute, § 61-8-1008(2), MCA (2021), to a concurrent nine-year term with the DOC, with five years suspended.The Fourth Judicial District Court sentenced Bloomer for both DUI offenses during the same hearing. Bloomer challenged the sentence for his fifth DUI, arguing that it was unlawful because he had not been "previously sentenced" for his fourth DUI under § 61-8-1008(1), MCA, before being sentenced for his fifth DUI under § 61-8-1008(2), MCA.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that the plain language of § 61-8-1008(2), MCA, requires that a defendant must have been previously sentenced for a fourth DUI before being sentenced for a fifth DUI. Since Bloomer was sentenced for both offenses contemporaneously, the court concluded that the District Court imposed an unlawful sentence for the fifth DUI. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's sentence for the fifth DUI and remanded the case for resentencing under § 61-8-1008(1), MCA. View "State v. Bloomer" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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James Houston Parker was convicted in May 2023 by a jury in the Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, for two counts of felony tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. The charges stemmed from an incident on June 9, 2022, where officers responded to a call about an assaulted woman, P.H., who had severe facial injuries. P.H. had been at Parker's residence earlier that evening. Officers found blood and bleach at Parker's residence, and Parker had blood and bleach on his shoes. Parker was uncooperative during evidence collection, and his fingerprint was found on a bleach bottle in a nearby dumpster.The District Court instructed the jury to convict Parker based on him acting "knowingly" rather than "purposely," which Parker did not object to at trial. The jury acquitted Parker of aggravated assault but convicted him on the tampering charges. Parker was sentenced to six years in the Department of Corrections.Parker appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, arguing that the District Court committed plain error by using the incorrect mental state in the jury instructions, that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the instruction, and that the prosecutor's actions constituted misconduct. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that although the instruction was erroneous, the overwhelming evidence showed Parker acted with purpose. The court held that the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice or undermine the trial's fairness.The Supreme Court also found that Parker's ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed because there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome even if the objection had been made. Lastly, the court determined that the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct that deprived Parker of a fair trial. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed Parker's conviction. View "State v. Parker" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Ryan Gabriel appealed an Eleventh Judicial District Court order affirming the Justice Court’s order of protection in favor of Kai Groenke, an attorney for Gabriel’s former partner. Gabriel had sent a series of threatening and harassing emails to Groenke, including threats of professional disciplinary action, accusations of mental illness, and threats of violence. Groenke obtained a temporary order of protection, which Gabriel violated by continuing to send harassing communications.The Justice Court held a hearing where Groenke, her father Fritz, and her husband testified about Gabriel’s threatening behavior and its impact on Groenke’s mental health and safety. Gabriel argued that his communications were provoked by Groenke and that he was the victim of harassment. The Justice Court found Gabriel’s behavior to be consistent with stalking and granted a ten-year order of protection.Gabriel appealed to the District Court, which reviewed the case and affirmed the Justice Court’s decision. Gabriel then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and upheld the lower courts' decisions. The court found that Gabriel’s conduct met the statutory definition of stalking, causing substantial emotional distress and fear for safety. The court rejected Gabriel’s arguments about the relevance of the Oregon trial court’s stay and his claims of provocation. The court also declined to address Gabriel’s First Amendment argument, as it was raised for the first time in his reply brief. The Supreme Court affirmed the Justice Court’s order of protection. View "Groenke v. Gabriel" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Richard Edward Paul died intestate on October 3, 2022, leaving behind four daughters: Richann L. Ray, Dawn M. Paul Charron, Shelbi L. Paul, and Danita J. Paul. Richann was appointed as the Personal Representative of the Estate with the consent of her sisters. The Estate's significant asset was a cabin in Lincoln, Montana. The heirs could not agree on the disposition of the cabin, leading to conflict. Shelbi filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, alleging that Richann intended to sell the cabin contrary to their parents' wishes. The District Court denied the motion and ordered mediation for any disputed issues.The heirs continued to discuss the cabin's disposition, and Shelbi filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement based on email communications, which the District Court denied, finding no valid settlement agreement. The heirs proceeded to mediation, resulting in a General Release and Mediated Settlement Agreement, which outlined a procedure for selling the cabin to one or more heirs within 30 days of an appraisal. The cabin was appraised at $234,000, but none of the heirs submitted a bid within the 30-day period. Richann listed the cabin for sale and later filed a motion to approve its sale for $106,100, considering the estimated repair costs. Shelbi opposed the motion, arguing the cabin was not fairly marketed.The Montana Eighth Judicial District Court approved the sale, finding the Agreement resolved all issues and the sale price was reasonable and in the best interest of the Estate. Shelbi filed motions to reconsider, which the District Court denied. Shelbi appealed the order approving the sale.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that the Agreement did not address the situation where no heir qualified to purchase the cabin within the specified time. The Court found that Richann, as Personal Representative, had the statutory authority to sell the cabin and that the sale was reasonable and in the best interest of the Estate. View "In re Estate of Paul" on Justia Law

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Jonathan Partain left his cell phone in his 15-year-old daughter's room and remotely triggered it to record her while she was changing clothes. His daughter discovered the recording, showed it to her mother, deleted it, and confronted Partain, who admitted to his actions. The State charged Partain with Sexual Abuse of Children and Surreptitious Visual Observation or Recordation in a Residence. Partain pleaded guilty to Sexual Abuse of Children in exchange for the dismissal of the second charge and an amendment to the first charge to avoid a mandatory minimum sentence.The Fourth Judicial District Court accepted Partain's guilty plea and dismissed the second charge without prejudice. However, at sentencing, the court dismissed the Sexual Abuse of Children charge sua sponte, reinstated the previously dismissed charge of Surreptitious Visual Observation or Recordation, and found Partain guilty of that charge. The court imposed a two-year deferred sentence for the misdemeanor charge. The State appealed, arguing that the court had no authority to dismiss the guilty plea and reinstate the dismissed charge.The Supreme Court of Montana reviewed the case and held that the District Court had no statutory authority to dismiss the felony charge after accepting Partain's guilty plea and to amend or reinstate the dismissed misdemeanor charge. The court found that the District Court's actions violated the separation of powers by usurping the role of the prosecutor in charging decisions. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case for resentencing on the Sexual Abuse of Children conviction. View "State v. Partain" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 1982, William Clark was convicted of eight counts of sexual intercourse without consent and was designated a dangerous offender, receiving a 30-year prison sentence for each count, to run concurrently. After being paroled, Clark sought relief from the sex offender registration requirement in 2005, which was denied by the district court. The court found that Clark was not eligible for relief under the 2005 Sexual and Violent Offender Registration Act (SVORA) because the victim was compelled to submit by force. This decision was affirmed on appeal.Clark again petitioned for relief in 2024, citing the Montana Supreme Court's decision in State v. Hinman, which held that the 2007 SVORA amendments were punitive and could not be applied retroactively. The State opposed, arguing that Clark remained subject to the 2005 SVORA requirements, which mandated lifetime registration. The Ninth Judicial District Court denied Clark's petition, maintaining that he must continue to register for life under the 2005 SVORA.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court's decision. The Court held that the 2005 SVORA, which was determined to be a civil regulatory scheme and not punitive, could be applied retroactively. Since Clark's offenses occurred before the 2007 amendments, he remained subject to the 2005 SVORA, which required lifetime registration due to the nature of his offense involving force. The Court affirmed the district court's decision, concluding that there was no violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. View "Clark v. State" on Justia Law

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Derik L. Seymour was using a cable crossover exercise machine at the Bulldog Athletic Recreation Center at the University of Montana-Western when the cable snapped, allegedly causing him severe injury. Seymour filed a complaint against the State of Montana and the University of Montana-Western, alleging negligence and negligence-premises liability for improper maintenance of the exercise equipment.The First Judicial District Court found that Seymour failed to present admissible evidence that the State breached its standard of care and granted the State’s motion for summary judgment. Seymour's counsel withdrew, and he proceeded pro se. The court extended discovery deadlines multiple times due to Seymour's failure to respond to the State’s discovery requests. The State filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Seymour had not secured a liability expert to testify at trial. The District Court granted summary judgment, concluding that Seymour had not introduced any admissible evidence that the State breached its duty of care.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Seymour failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the State’s standard of care. The court noted that Seymour did not dispute the necessity of an expert in the District Court and only argued on appeal that an expert was not necessary. The court found that the inspection and maintenance of specialized gym equipment involved technical considerations beyond the common knowledge of lay jurors, requiring expert testimony. The court concluded that Seymour did not present any evidence regarding the State’s standard of care, an essential element of his negligence claims, and affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the State. View "Seymour v. State" on Justia Law

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Livorio Loera was charged with felony vehicular homicide while under the influence after a two-vehicle accident on Interstate 90 resulted in the death of Jerome Socheath. Loera drove the wrong way on the highway and collided with an SUV, causing it to roll and eject Socheath, who died three days later. Loera was found intoxicated and with a blood alcohol content of .124 several hours after the crash. Evidence found in Loera's car included open and unopened alcohol containers and self-help books on addiction.The Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, excluded evidence regarding Socheath's seat belt use, deeming it irrelevant to Loera's conduct. The court also admitted evidence of unopened alcohol and self-help books found in Loera's trunk, considering it relevant to Loera's negligence. Loera appealed these decisions, arguing that the seat belt evidence was necessary for his causation defense and that the trunk evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the seat belt evidence, as it was irrelevant to determining Loera's conduct and causation. The court also found that the transaction rule did not apply to the seat belt evidence. However, the Supreme Court determined that the District Court erred in admitting the trunk evidence, as it was irrelevant to Loera's negligence and intoxication. Despite this error, the court concluded it was harmless due to the overwhelming admissible evidence proving Loera's guilt. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed Loera's conviction. View "State v. Loera" on Justia Law

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Leslie Dean Ernst pleaded guilty to five felony counts of Privacy in Communications in violation of Montana law. He later sought to withdraw his guilty pleas and reduce two of the felony convictions to misdemeanors, which the District Court denied. Ernst appealed the decision.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court initially sentenced Ernst to 25 years in prison with a 15-year parole restriction. Ernst appealed, and the case was remanded for resentencing due to a missing transcript. Before resentencing, Ernst moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutional based on a prior court decision. The District Court denied his motion, finding that Ernst had not shown his prior convictions were unconstitutional. Ernst was resentenced to the same 25-year term with a 15-year parole restriction.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Ernst was charged, convicted, and sentenced under the constitutional portion of the Privacy in Communications statute. The court found that the charging documents, plea agreement, and sentencing did not rely on the unconstitutional prima facie provision. The court also determined that Ernst's guilty plea colloquy was sufficient to establish his intent to harass, annoy, or offend his victims, as required by the statute.Additionally, the court held that Ernst failed to provide direct evidence that his prior convictions were unconstitutional. The presumption of regularity attached to his prior convictions, and Ernst did not meet his burden to show they were invalid. Consequently, the court affirmed the District Court's denial of Ernst's motions and upheld his sentence. View "State v. Ernst" on Justia Law

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In this case, the defendant was involved in an incident where he confronted two men spraying herbicide in a park, attempted to disable their equipment with a knife, and resisted arrest when police arrived. He was charged with multiple misdemeanors, including obstructing, resisting arrest, criminal mischief, disorderly conduct, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant pleaded not guilty and was released on the condition that he appear at all scheduled hearings.The Municipal Court warned the defendant that failure to appear at the final pretrial hearing would result in a waiver of his right to a jury trial. The defendant failed to appear at the final pretrial hearing, and the court subsequently waived his jury trial and set the matter for a bench trial. The defendant did not object to this waiver or to proceeding with a bench trial. He was found guilty of all charges except for possession of drug paraphernalia, which was dismissed due to insufficient evidence. The defendant was sentenced to consecutive suspended sentences for the remaining charges.The defendant appealed to the Fourth Judicial District Court, arguing that the Municipal Court erred in waiving his jury trial right. The District Court affirmed the Municipal Court's decision, concluding that the defendant had been adequately informed of the consequences of failing to appear and had effectively waived his right to a jury trial.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the Municipal Court did not commit plain error in conducting a bench trial. The court found that the defendant had been properly notified of the waiver consequences and had not objected to the waiver or the bench trial. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, concluding that the defendant's waiver of his jury trial right was knowing and voluntary. View "City of Missoula v. Charlie" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law