Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
State v. Post
The defendant was cited for a third offense of driving under the influence (DUI) and for driving with a suspended license, both misdemeanors, in November 2021. He was initially convicted in Justice Court and then sought a trial de novo in the District Court. At trial, a jury found him guilty of both offenses. During sentencing, the defendant’s counsel informed the court that the defendant was on a limited income, receiving disability and social security, and requested that the court consider his financial situation when imposing fines and fees, including a request to waive the public defender fee.After the jury verdict in the Twenty-First Judicial District Court, the court sentenced the defendant to jail time, most of which was suspended, and imposed a $3,000 fine with statutory surcharges and a $250 public defender fee. The written judgment also included a $10 technology fee and $50 in prosecution costs, which were not mentioned in the oral pronouncement. The defendant appealed, arguing that the written judgment conflicted with the oral sentence and that the court failed to consider his ability to pay the fines and fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that when there is a conflict between the oral sentence and the written judgment, the oral sentence controls, and thus the $10 technology fee and $50 prosecution costs should not have been included. The court further held that the District Court erred by failing to inquire into the defendant’s ability to pay the public defender fee, the $3,000 fine, and the statutory surcharges, as required by Montana statutes. The Supreme Court reversed the sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Post" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Public Benefits
In re Marriage of Salois
A married couple with four children sought dissolution of their marriage after several years together. The wife, who had primarily cared for the children earlier in the marriage, was employed as a surgical nurse earning about $2,990 per month, while the husband worked as a carpenter earning approximately $7,250 per month. In the dissolution proceedings, the marital estate was divided, with the wife receiving a share of the husband’s retirement and half the equity in the marital home, while the husband retained the home and its associated debt. The court also ordered the husband to pay child support, spousal maintenance, and the wife’s attorney’s fees.The Fourth Judicial District Court of Montana conducted a bench trial and issued a decree that included the award of attorney’s fees to the wife. The only evidence regarding attorney’s fees was the wife’s testimony that she owed her attorney about $2,000 and could be responsible for her own fees, and the husband’s testimony that he had paid his attorney by borrowing from his parents. The District Court found that the husband had been able to pay his attorney’s fees and the wife had not, and ordered the husband to pay the wife’s attorney’s fees without further explanation or reference to legal standards. The husband appealed, and after partial resolution in appellate mediation, the sole issue on appeal was the propriety of the attorney’s fees award.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the District Court abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees without grounding its decision in substantial evidence or applying the governing legal standards. The Supreme Court found that the District Court failed to make necessary findings regarding the necessity and reasonableness of the award and did not provide a sufficient factual or legal basis for its decision. The Supreme Court reversed the award of attorney’s fees. View "In re Marriage of Salois" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
State v. LaForge
The case concerns the fatal shooting of Brett Ness in Billings, Montana, following a series of drug-related disputes. Alexander Garrett LaForge III, along with several others, was involved in confrontations with Ness over an alleged shortfall in a methamphetamine transaction. After escalating tensions and threats, LaForge and a group of associates returned to Ness’s trailer, where LaForge shot Ness in the head with a .45 caliber pistol. Ness died later that day. Multiple co-defendants received plea deals in exchange for their testimony against LaForge.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, presided over LaForge’s trial. LaForge requested a substitution of counsel shortly before trial, citing communication issues and dissatisfaction with his attorney’s preparation. The District Court conducted an inquiry and denied the request, finding no substantial breakdown in communication. During trial, LaForge also requested a cautionary jury instruction regarding the credibility of co-defendants’ testimony, which the District Court declined, instead providing standard witness credibility instructions and a specific instruction regarding one co-defendant’s accountability. The jury convicted LaForge of deliberate homicide. At sentencing, the court ordered LaForge to pay $72,000 in restitution to the victim’s mother for lost business income, based on her testimony about canceled jobs following her son’s death.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying LaForge’s request for substitute counsel or in its jury instructions regarding co-defendant testimony. However, the Supreme Court found that the $72,000 restitution award was not supported by sufficient evidence and that the record was unclear as to whether the victim’s mother, as a business representative, qualified as a “victim” under the restitution statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and other aspects of the judgment, reversed the restitution award, and remanded for a new hearing to determine the proper amount and recipient of restitution. View "State v. LaForge" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Public Benefits
In re Adoption of A.K.M. & R.J.M.
Two minor children’s maternal grandfather and step-grandmother, who were already their court-appointed guardians, filed a petition in March 2024 to terminate both parents’ rights and adopt the children under the Montana Adoption Act. At the time, the children’s father was incarcerated. He was personally served with the summons and petition but did not file a response. The Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court entered his default and set a termination hearing, sending notice to the father at the prison. The father had no attorney, did not appear at the hearing, and the court received no sworn testimony. The court terminated his parental rights by adopting the petitioners’ allegations.After the termination, the father obtained permission to file out-of-time appeals, which were consolidated. He argued that the District Court failed to appoint counsel as required by Montana precedent, did not comply with statutory notice requirements, and violated due process. The record showed that the District Court never advised the father of his right to counsel, made no inquiry into indigency, and did not provide the statutorily required notice warning that failure to appear could result in termination of parental rights. No proof of service of such notice was filed, and the court did not adjourn the hearing despite the father’s absence and lack of proof of service.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the District Court violated the father’s constitutional right to equal protection by failing to advise him of his right to counsel and to inquire into indigency before terminating his parental rights. The court also found that the District Court failed to comply with the Montana Adoption Act’s mandatory notice-of-hearing provisions. The Supreme Court reversed the termination orders and remanded the case, directing the District Court to provide proper advisement, conduct an indigency inquiry, ensure statutory notice, and require clear and convincing evidence before any further termination. View "In re Adoption of A.K.M. & R.J.M." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Frost v. Frost
In February 2016, Kevin Frost kidnapped his estranged wife, Sherri Frost, during a contentious divorce. He lured her into a situation where he could seize her, forced her into his vehicle, and held her for several hours in a barn owned by a family associate. During captivity, Kevin made Sherri severely intoxicated and later delivered her to the emergency room before turning himself in. Kevin pleaded guilty to assault and kidnapping and served a prison sentence. Sherri subsequently filed a civil suit against Kevin, Frost Ranching Corporation (the Ranch), and other parties, seeking damages for injuries and emotional distress resulting from the kidnapping. She alleged that Kevin acted, at least in part, to prevent her from obtaining an interest in the Ranch during the divorce.The Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, dismissed claims against some defendants and granted summary judgment to Frost Limited Partnership. The court denied summary judgment to the Ranch on vicarious liability, allowing that issue to proceed to trial. At trial, Sherri presented evidence of medical expenses, pain and suffering, and other damages. The jury found Kevin liable for several torts but awarded only $20,000 in damages, which matched the lower end of medical expenses and did not account for pain and suffering. The District Court granted Sherri’s motion for a new trial, finding the jury’s award unsupported by substantial evidence, as it disregarded uncontradicted, credible evidence of pain and suffering. The court also granted the Ranch’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the Ranch could not ratify Kevin’s conduct absent acceptance of any benefit from the kidnapping.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed both rulings. It held that the jury’s damages award was not supported by substantial evidence and that a new trial on damages was warranted. The court also held that, under Montana law, ratification requires acceptance of a benefit, which was absent here, so the Ranch could not be held liable for Kevin’s actions. View "Frost v. Frost" on Justia Law
In re Marriage of Anderson
A petitioner filed for a declaration of invalidity of marriage, asserting that the respondent’s consent to the marriage had been induced by duress and fraud. The petition was drafted by the respondent but left unsigned, as she ultimately decided not to pursue it. The petitioner found the paperwork and filed it without the respondent’s knowledge or consent. The respondent was served with the unsigned petition and a consent form, but was not served with a summons or an automatic economic restraining order as required by statute. She did not respond to the petition or attend any hearings, later claiming she was unaware of the proceedings. The petitioner attested to the statements in the petition and consented to the entry of a decree of invalidity.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a final invalidity decree, concluding that the marriage was irretrievably broken due to serious marital discord and no reasonable prospect of reconciliation. The respondent appealed, arguing that she never signed the petition and that the court failed to consider her interests. The petitioner did not oppose the appeal and agreed that the district court’s judgment should be overruled.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in declaring the marriage invalid because it failed to make findings under the statutory grounds for invalidity and instead relied solely on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, which is not relevant to a declaration of invalidity. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s findings, conclusions, and decree of invalidity, and remanded with instructions to strike the unsigned petition and dismiss the cause. View "In re Marriage of Anderson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
State v. Arvidson
The case concerns a defendant who was charged with multiple offenses, including attempted deliberate homicide, criminal endangerment, obstructing a peace officer, and tampering with evidence, following a shooting incident at his home involving law enforcement. The defendant had been target shooting on his property, which led to complaints from neighbors and multiple interactions with police. After a SWAT team arrived and attempted to arrest him, the defendant fired several rounds toward officers and their armored vehicle, believing he and his family were under threat. He was ultimately taken into custody after a standoff.The First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, presided over the trial. The defendant was represented by appointed counsel, who did not pursue a justifiable use of force defense or request instructions for attempted mitigated deliberate homicide as a lesser included offense. The jury convicted the defendant on all charges. After trial, the defendant raised concerns about his counsel’s performance, particularly regarding the lack of mental health evaluation and failure to present certain defenses. The District Court appointed new counsel for sentencing. At sentencing, the court orally pronounced a sentence totaling 46 years of incarceration with 5 years suspended, but the written judgment imposed a longer sentence and included additional conditions not stated orally.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to the failure to present certain defenses or request lesser included offense instructions were not record-based and should be pursued, if at all, in post-conviction proceedings, with counsel appointed for that purpose. The court affirmed the denial of the ineffective assistance claim regarding failure to object to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the mental state element, finding no prejudice. The court reversed the written judgment to the extent it exceeded the oral pronouncement and remanded for entry of an amended judgment consistent with the oral sentence. View "State v. Arvidson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
State v. Shewalter
In 2006, the defendant pled guilty to criminal possession with intent to distribute after a traffic stop revealed marijuana, cash, and drug paraphernalia, and police discovered an outstanding warrant. He was sentenced to a 10-year term with 8 years suspended, to run consecutively to a separate sentence from another county. After beginning the suspended portion of his sentence in 2017, he repeatedly failed to comply with probation conditions, leading to a first revocation in 2018 and a new sentence of 8 years with 5 years suspended. While serving this suspended sentence, he again violated conditions, including new arrests for drug offenses and failing to report, prompting a second revocation proceeding.The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, held hearings on the second revocation. Testimony from the probation officer and law enforcement detailed the defendant’s ongoing noncompliance, including substance use, lack of employment, and failure to maintain a residence. The court revoked the suspended sentence, imposed a 5-year commitment to the Department of Corrections with no time suspended, and denied credit for both time served in detention and for “street time” (elapsed time on probation without incarceration). The court’s oral and written pronouncements did not grant any credit for time served.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the district court erred by not granting credit for time served in detention, as required by statute, and remanded for a factual determination of the correct number of days to be credited. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of credit for elapsed street time, finding the record supported continuous noncompliance. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, concluding there was no prejudice since the district court considered and properly denied street time credit. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "State v. Shewalter" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
In re Marriage of Rehbein and Paddock
Two women were married, divorced, and later remarried. During their relationship, one partner conceived two children using sperm donors, and both women jointly raised the children. After their separation, the biological mother filed for dissolution of marriage, initially stating there were no children of the marriage. The other partner countered, asserting that both children were part of the marriage and sought a parenting plan, later petitioning for a determination of parentage under Montana’s presumptive parentage statute. Both parties presented evidence at trial regarding their respective roles in the children’s lives, with testimony from family, friends, and professionals about their parenting and the children’s best interests.The District Court of the Second Judicial District, Butte-Silver Bow County, held a bench trial and, after hearing evidence, amended the pleadings to consider whether the non-biological parent could be awarded a parental interest under Montana’s third-party parental interest statute (§ 40-4-228, MCA). The court found that both parties had impliedly consented to try this issue, as evidence relevant to the statute was presented without objection. The District Court concluded that the non-biological parent had established a child-parent relationship, that the biological mother had engaged in conduct contrary to the parent-child relationship, and that it was in the children’s best interests to continue their relationship with the non-biological parent. The court entered a parenting plan accordingly.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in amending the pleadings to conform to the evidence and properly awarded a third-party parental interest under § 40-4-228, MCA. The Supreme Court found the District Court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence and that the statutory requirements for awarding a third-party parental interest were met. View "In re Marriage of Rehbein and Paddock" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Herbert v. Shield Arms
Three individuals, including the appellant, formed a limited liability company (LLC) to design and sell firearms products, later adding two more members to a second LLC. The first LLC did not have a formal operating agreement, while the second adopted one in early 2019, setting a low company valuation. The appellant’s behavior became erratic and disruptive, leading to accusations against a key business partner and other members, which damaged business relationships and led to the loss of significant contracts. The remaining members of both LLCs unanimously voted to dissociate the appellant, citing his conduct as making it unlawful to continue business with him. The appellant disputed the validity of the operating agreement in the second LLC and challenged the valuation of his interests in both companies, also alleging wrongful dissociation, defamation, and conversion of property.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court found the appellant was properly dissociated from the first LLC under Montana’s Limited Liability Company Act due to the unanimous vote and the unlawfulness of continuing business with him. It also held that the second LLC’s operating agreement was valid and permitted dissociation by unanimous vote. The court valued the appellant’s interests according to the operating agreement for the second LLC and based on company assets for the first LLC. The court denied the appellant’s motion to extend expert disclosure deadlines and partially denied his motion to compel discovery. It also granted summary judgment to the defendants on the conversion claim, finding no evidence of unauthorized control over the appellant’s property.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court’s rulings on dissociation and valuation regarding the second LLC, as well as the summary judgment on the conversion claim. However, it reversed the valuation of the appellant’s interest in the first LLC, holding that the district court erred by failing to consider the company’s “going concern” value as required by statute. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Herbert v. Shield Arms" on Justia Law