Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an incident in which the defendant was accused of engaging in sexual intercourse without consent with the complainant, K.R., who had spent the afternoon and evening drinking at several bars. The two were acquaintances and exchanged messages on Facebook, with K.R. inviting the defendant to her home. K.R. later testified that she did not remember the events after leaving the bar, including her communications with the defendant, driving home, or leaving her door unlocked. She recalled regaining awareness during a sexual encounter at her home, at which point she told the man to stop. The defendant asserted that he did not know K.R. was unable to consent, pointing to her actions and communications as evidence that she appeared functional.The Second Judicial District Court of Montana presided over the trial. The court excluded evidence of K.R.’s past alcohol use and denied the defense’s request to present expert testimony on the effects of regular alcohol consumption. The court also instructed the jury that the defendant could be found guilty if he was aware of a “high probability” that K.R. was unable to consent, rather than requiring actual knowledge. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to twenty years in prison, with five years suspended.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the district court’s jury instruction on the mental state required for conviction and its exclusion of certain evidence constituted reversible error. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by giving a result-based instruction for “knowingly,” which lowered the State’s burden of proof and violated the defendant’s due process rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of K.R.’s past drinking habits or the expert testimony as offered. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Skye Angel Anne Hennon filed a sworn petition in the Judith Basin Justice Court seeking a temporary order of protection against Matthew Weber for herself, her minor son N.G., and Brian Gonzalez. Hennon alleged that Weber had harassed and stalked her through threatening messages and uninvited visits, and referenced a separate legal dispute in Idaho. The Justice Court issued a temporary order of protection and scheduled a hearing, at which both parties appeared and testified. During the hearing, Weber attempted to cross-examine Hennon, but the court allowed Hennon to decline answering a relevant question and ended the cross-examination. Weber presented his own testimony and attempted to submit exhibits, which the court excluded as hearsay. The Justice Court extended the order of protection for Hennon and N.G. for one year.Weber appealed to the Montana Tenth Judicial District Court, which affirmed the order of protection for Hennon and N.G., but dismissed it as to Gonzalez, noting that Gonzalez, as an adult, needed to seek his own order. The District Court acknowledged deficiencies in the record, including unclear admitted exhibits and unintelligible audio, but relied on the Justice Court’s position to observe the parties and testimony.Weber then appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana. The Supreme Court held that the Justice Court abused its discretion and violated Weber’s procedural due process rights by denying him a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Hennon on central factual issues. The Court also found that the District Court abused its discretion by affirming the order of protection despite an incomplete and unclear record. The Supreme Court vacated both lower courts’ orders and remanded the case to the Justice Court for a new evidentiary hearing consistent with statutory and due process requirements. View "Hennon v. Weber" on Justia Law

Law enforcement in Lewistown, Montana, investigated David Allen Pein for suspected marijuana distribution in 2016, using a confidential informant to conduct controlled purchases. A search of Pein’s residence yielded marijuana, paraphernalia, cash, and other evidence. Pein was charged with nine counts related to possession and distribution of marijuana. In 2017, Pein entered a plea agreement, pleading guilty to one count of felony Criminal Possession of Dangerous Drugs with Intent to Distribute (Count VI), while six other charges were dismissed. Two additional counts—felony Criminal Distribution of Dangerous Drugs (Count IV) and felony Use or Possession of Property Subject to Criminal Forfeiture (Count VIII)—were subject to a deferred prosecution agreement incorporated by reference into the plea agreement.The Tenth Judicial District Court deferred Pein’s sentence on Count VI. After Pein violated the terms of his deferred sentence and deferred prosecution agreement, the State reinstated prosecution on Counts IV and VIII. Pein was convicted by a jury on these counts in 2024 and sentenced to concurrent prison terms. Pein appealed, challenging the validity of incorporating a deferred prosecution agreement into a plea agreement, as well as the classification of marijuana as a Schedule I drug.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that Montana’s plea agreement statute (§ 46-12-211, MCA) does not authorize the incorporation of a deferred prosecution agreement under the pretrial diversion statute (§ 46-16-130, MCA) into a plea agreement. The Court vacated Pein’s convictions for Counts IV and VIII and remanded for further proceedings. The Court affirmed Pein’s conviction on Count VI, rejecting his argument that marijuana is incorrectly classified as a Schedule I drug. The disposition was affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. View "State v. Pein" on Justia Law

The case concerns two children who were removed from their parents’ care in 2018 due to concerns including unmet medical and educational needs, substance exposure, and a history of domestic violence and substance abuse by the parents. The children were placed with their grandparents, who were later appointed as guardians. The parents had supervised visitation, which increased to unsupervised visits after the father’s release from incarceration and the mother’s progress toward sobriety. In 2022, the parents sought to terminate the guardianship, while the grandparents requested recognition as third-party parents. A Guardian ad Litem (GAL) recommended the children remain with the grandparents and that visitation with the parents remain supervised.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, previously granted the grandparents a third-party parental interest and adopted a parenting plan requiring the parents to remain sober and address safety concerns to obtain unsupervised visitation. In early 2025, the grandparents moved to suspend visitation due to new safety concerns and the parents’ failure to continue counseling. The court suspended visitation, held a hearing, and heard testimony from the children’s therapists, who described the children’s anxiety and PTSD symptoms related to time spent with the parents. The court found a change in circumstances and amended the parenting plan to maintain the children’s primary residence with the grandparents and limit the parents to supervised visitation.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the parents’ appeal, which raised procedural and substantive challenges to the district court’s orders. The Supreme Court held that prior decisions regarding the third-party parental interest and related issues were binding under the law of the case doctrine. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s amendment of the parenting plan, concluding that a change in circumstances existed and that the amendment served the children’s best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. View "Parenting of L.M.A.R. & N.R.R." on Justia Law

Mark French, representing himself, was convicted of a misdemeanor in the Sanders County Justice Court, which is not a court of record. He appealed the conviction to the Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court for a trial de novo. After Judge John W. Larson assumed jurisdiction over the appeal, French moved to disqualify him, citing perceived injustices related to the rescheduling of the trial. When that motion was denied, French filed an alternative motion for substitution of judge under Montana law.The Montana Supreme Court previously denied French’s motion to disqualify Judge Larson, finding the issue moot because the trial date had been vacated. The Supreme Court also clarified that Judge Larson had jurisdiction to determine the timeliness of French’s subsequent motion for substitution. Judge Larson then denied French’s motion for substitution, relying on precedent from D.H. v. Montana Fourth Judicial District Court, which addressed substitution in a different context. French then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for supervisory control, arguing that his substitution motion was timely and authorized, that his right to a jury trial was denied, and that the District Court improperly relied on the Justice Court record.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that, when a criminal case is appealed from a justice court that is not a court of record for a trial de novo, the appellant is entitled to one substitution of a district judge under § 3-1-804, MCA, as if the case had originated in district court. The Court reversed the District Court’s denial of French’s motion for substitution and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also found that the Justice Court record was properly transferred and relied upon. French’s request for dismissal of the District Court proceeding was denied. View "French v. 20th Judicial District" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of sexual intercourse without consent in 2017 and sentenced to 40 years in prison, with 20 years suspended. After an appeal, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to the improper admission of statistical evidence and remanded for a new trial. While awaiting retrial, the defendant was released on bail, returned to work, and cared for his mother. At the second trial, both parties presented expert witnesses who testified about general behaviors of sexual assault victims, but did not opine on the specific facts of the case. The State’s expert, Dr. Vanino, remained in the courtroom during the defense expert’s testimony, in violation of a witness exclusion order. The District Court allowed Dr. Vanino to be recalled as a rebuttal witness, and the defense was permitted to recall its own expert in response.After the second conviction, a new psychological evaluation indicated the defendant had made progress in treatment and matured. At resentencing, the defendant requested a sentence consistent with a prior plea offer, while the State sought a harsher sentence. The District Court increased the sentence to 50 years with 30 years suspended, citing the defendant’s decision to appeal, retry the case, lack of remorse, and the impact on the victim.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed two main issues. First, it held that the District Court erred in interpreting Montana Rule of Evidence 615 to categorically exempt expert witnesses from exclusion orders, but found the error harmless because both parties’ experts were allowed to rebut each other and neither testified to case-specific facts. Second, the Court held that the increased sentence after retrial violated due process, as it was based on the defendant’s exercise of constitutional rights and not on new, objective information. The Court affirmed the conviction, reversed the increased sentence, and remanded for amendment of the judgment to restore the original suspended term. View "State v. Grimshaw" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a law firm and its principal, challenged a Montana statute enacted in 2021 that prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s vaccination status or possession of an immunity passport. The law applies broadly to businesses, governmental entities, employers, and public accommodations, with certain exceptions for schools, daycare facilities, and healthcare providers. One provision of the law also prohibits requiring individuals to receive vaccines authorized only for emergency use or still undergoing safety trials. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated several provisions of the Montana Constitution, including rights to a clean and healthful environment, equal protection, inalienable rights, and the constitutional requirement that a bill’s subject be clearly expressed in its title.The case was first heard in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Richland County. The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed most of their constitutional claims, but allowed the claim regarding the bill’s title and single-subject requirement to proceed. On remand from the Montana Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Netzer Law Office, P.C. v. State, the District Court ultimately held that the main antidiscrimination provision of the law complied with the constitutional clear-title requirement, but that the provision prohibiting mandates for emergency use or trial vaccines did not, and voided that subsection.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ other constitutional claims. The Supreme Court held that the law’s title was sufficiently clear and not misleading as to its main antidiscrimination provision, affirming its validity. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s invalidation of the provision regarding emergency use and trial vaccines, holding that this subsection was germane to the bill’s general purpose and did not violate the clear-title or single-subject requirements. Thus, both challenged provisions of the statute were upheld. View "Netzer v. State" on Justia Law

Richard Mabee died from a methamphetamine overdose while confined in the Wheatland County Jail. He had traveled from Washington to Montana, violating his probation, and was arrested after a traffic stop. During booking, officers did not observe signs of drug use or find contraband, but video footage later showed Mabee disposing of a small object in his cell. Early the next morning, Mabee exhibited signs of methamphetamine intoxication, which were observed by Deputy Sweet, who monitored him via video but did not physically check on him until he was found unresponsive. Despite attempts at CPR, Mabee was pronounced dead from an overdose. The source of the methamphetamine was unclear, but the County theorized Mabee had concealed it prior to his confinement.The Estate of Richard Mabee sued Wheatland County for negligence, alleging the jailers failed to provide adequate medical care. The County asserted that Mabee’s own negligence contributed to his death and should diminish or bar recovery. The Fourteenth Judicial District Court, Wheatland County, allowed the County to present a comparative negligence defense and approved a special verdict form for the jury to apportion fault. The jury found both parties negligent, attributing 95% of the fault to Mabee and 5% to the County. As a result, the District Court entered judgment for the County, denying damages to the Estate.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court erred in permitting the comparative negligence defense. The Court held that, absent “special circumstances” where a jailer knows or should know a detainee is at risk of harm, comparative negligence applies and the factfinder may apportion fault. The Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment, concluding the Estate did not preserve any error regarding jury instructions on “special circumstances” and failed to show reversible error. View "Est. of Mabee v. Wheatland County" on Justia Law

A man was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Gallatin County, Montana, where his Jeep left the road, struck a sign, and then drove away. Witnesses reported the incident, and law enforcement traced the vehicle to the man’s residence using the license plate information. Upon arrival, officers observed damage to the Jeep and encountered the man, who exhibited signs of impairment such as bloodshot eyes and a dazed demeanor. The man admitted to purchasing and inhaling a can of Dust-Off, a product containing difluoroethane (DFE), and acknowledged that he had passed out while driving. Field sobriety tests indicated impairment, and a subsequent blood test confirmed the presence of DFE.The Gallatin County Justice Court denied the man’s motions to suppress evidence, which alleged a lack of particularized suspicion, unlawful search and seizure, and a Miranda violation. After a bench trial, the court found him guilty of misdemeanor DUI (third offense). The Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, affirmed the conviction and the denial of the suppression motions, concluding that law enforcement had particularized suspicion, that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the driveway or the exterior of the Jeep, and that no custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings had occurred.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case de novo. It held that law enforcement had particularized suspicion to investigate for DUI based on the totality of the circumstances, including the crash, the man’s behavior, and his admissions. The Court found no unlawful search or seizure, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched, and the man voluntarily provided the Dust-Off can. The Court also determined that no custodial interrogation occurred before arrest, so Miranda warnings were not required. The Court declined to address an unpreserved evidentiary claim and found sufficient evidence supported the DUI conviction. The conviction was affirmed. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

The State petitioned to involuntarily commit J.L.O., alleging she suffered from schizophrenia and posed a danger to herself or others. The petition relied on a report by a licensed clinical social worker (LCSW) who examined J.L.O. the day before the petition was filed. The District Court appointed a licensed professional counselor to examine J.L.O., and scheduled a hearing for January 2, 2024, within the statutory five-day window. J.L.O. was detained at the Montana State Hospital pending the hearing. The State provided J.L.O.’s counsel with the LCSW’s report only after the hearing, and it was discovered that the LCSW was not certified as a “professional person” under Montana law.J.L.O.’s counsel moved to dismiss the commitment petition, arguing that the State failed to have J.L.O. examined by a qualified professional person within the required timeframe. The State conceded the LCSW’s lack of certification but argued that J.L.O.’s request for a continuance waived the five-day hearing deadline. The Fourth Judicial District Court denied the motion to dismiss and proceeded with the commitment process, ultimately appointing a certified professional person who did not personally examine J.L.O. but relied on records and secondhand information. The District Court committed J.L.O. to the Montana State Hospital for up to ninety days and authorized involuntary medication.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and held that the District Court erred by denying J.L.O.’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court found that the statutory requirements for involuntary commitment—including examination by a qualified professional person within the five-day hearing deadline—were not met, and that the error was not harmless. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s Order of Commitment. View "In re J.L.O." on Justia Law