Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the petitioner, Jay Watson, filed a grievance against his employer, the Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks (FWP or agency), claiming he was underpaid for six years due to an agency error in implementing a new pay system. The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, ruled in favor of Watson and reversed the Final Agency Decision issued by the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA or Board). The court also awarded attorney fees to Watson. FWP appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana.The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not err in reversing BOPA’s decision. The court found that BOPA incorrectly applied the Montana Wage Payment Act (MWPA) to Watson's grievance, which was pursued under the agency's grievance process. The court found that the MWPA provides a process independent from the agency grievance process and its restrictions and benefits do not apply to Watson's claim. As such, the MWPA's three-year limitation does not apply to Watson’s claim, and the court affirmed the District Court’s reinstatement of the Hearing Officer’s pay determination.However, the Supreme Court held that the District Court erred in awarding attorney fees to Watson. The court noted that Montana follows the “American Rule” regarding fee awards, which provides that “absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.” There was no contractual or statutory authority providing for attorney fee awards for prevailing parties in this case, and the court found that this case was not frivolous litigation or litigated inappropriately by FWP. Therefore, an exception to the generally applicable American Rule was not established. The court reversed the attorney fee award and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "Watson v. FWP" on Justia Law

In this case from the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the defendant, Joshua Richard Larson, appealed the revocation of his suspended sentence by the Fourth Judicial District Court. Larson argued that the revocation proceeding should have been dismissed with prejudice due to his first appearance in court occurring sixty-six days after his arrest, exceeding the statutory 60-day limit. The District Court acknowledged the delay but dismissed the revocation petition without prejudice, leading to the State refiling the petition, Larson admitting the allegations, and the court revoking his suspended sentence.The Supreme Court of Montana sided with the lower court, affirming its decision. It held that Larson’s initial appearance before the Justice Court on the same day he was served with the warrant fulfilled the requirements of the statute. Although this appearance was not before the District Court, the justices ruled that this didn't materially affect Larson's substantial rights. Therefore, the delay in his appearance before the District Court didn't violate his due process rights. The Supreme Court also concluded that Larson wasn't prejudiced by the delay, and so the District Court didn't err in refusing to dismiss the petition with prejudice. View "State v. Larson" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, a dispute arose over the distribution of a deceased person's estate, particularly a 1978 Ford pickup truck. The decedent was Ronald Glen Kemmer, who died intestate and was survived by his four adult children: Travis Kemmer, Becky Mastley, Collette Cole, and Ronda Gilge, referred to as the Heirs. Travis Kemmer served as the Personal Representative (PR) of the Estate. The Heirs could not agree on the disposition of the truck, and a conflict arose over whether a binding agreement had been reached and whether Travis Kemmer, as PR, had breached his fiduciary duties by not drafting a written agreement on the truck's distribution.The Court found that the PR was not obligated to draft a formal written agreement. The plain language of Montana's Uniform Probate Code (MUPC) requires a written contract executed by all successors to alter the amounts to which they are entitled under the laws of intestacy, and this requirement was not fulfilled in this case. The Court also held that the PR had no duty to piece together emails and texts to determine whether there was a meeting of the minds among successors or to take responsibility for putting any such agreement in writing.As such, the Court reversed the District Court's order that had concluded that the PR had a duty to draft a written agreement and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re Estate of Kemmer" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the plaintiff, Kevin Barber, appealed against his former employer, Bradford Aquatic Group, LLC, alleging wrongful termination. Bradford Aquatic Group, a North Carolina-based company, had employed Barber as a Regional Business Development Manager for its Rocky Mountain region, which includes Montana. The employment contract between Barber and the company included a choice-of-law and forum selection clause, specifying that any disputes arising from the agreement would be governed by North Carolina law and adjudicated in North Carolina courts.Barber, a resident of Montana, argued that Montana law should apply to his claims of wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and bad faith, and that the suit should be heard in Montana. The district court dismissed Barber's claims due to improper venue, based on the choice-of-law and forum selection clauses in the employment agreement.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement was valid and that North Carolina law should apply to Barber's claims. The court also upheld the validity of the forum selection clause, concluding that it is enforceable under North Carolina law. Therefore, the court determined that the dispute should be adjudicated in North Carolina, not Montana. View "Barber v. Bradford Aquatic" on Justia Law

This case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana involves Anthony Reed, the petitioner and appellant, and Catherine Martin, the respondent and appellee. The two parties share a child, L.R., born in 2013. After their separation in 2015, the child has primarily resided with Martin, with Anthony having limited, supervised visitation rights. Anthony has sought to modify the parenting plan on multiple occasions, asserting that his circumstances and those of L.R. have changed significantly over the years, but the District Court has denied his motions.Anthony's assertions of changed circumstances include his graduation from law school, passing of the bar exam, gainful employment as an attorney, entering a committed relationship, and undergoing therapy. He also asserts that L.R.'s growth and development from a toddler to a 10-year-old, his desire to interact with Anthony at his home and in the community, and Martin's alleged parental alienation constitute changes in L.R's circumstances.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that Anthony has met his burden under § 40-4-219(1), MCA, that a change of circumstances of the child has occurred, and that the District Court's failure to hold a hearing and finding otherwise was clearly erroneous. The Court reversed the District Court's denial of Anthony's motion to modify the parenting plan and remanded the case for a hearing to consider amendment of the parenting plan in L.R.'s best interests. The Court also stated that it appears appropriate for the District Court to order a parenting evaluation and, if deemed necessary, appoint a Guardian Ad Litem. View "In re Parenting of L.R." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court following a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff on his nuisance claim against Glacier Electric Co-op, Inc., holding that the district court did not err by instructing the jury that damages could be awarded for nuisance.Plaintiff sued Glacier for damages caused by the flooding of his property, and the case proceeded to a jury trial on both nuisance and negligence claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, finding that Glacier's paving of an alleyway between the properties constituted a nuisance that damaged his property, and awarded $250,000 in damages on the nuisance claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the jury instructions in this case did not constitute reversible error. View "Winkowitsch v. Glacier Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court granting prescriptive easements over two roadways to Defendants, concluding that remand was required with instructions to conform the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment to reflect the Court's holding in this case.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred by concluding that Defendants acquired a prescriptive easement over Quarter Gulch Road; (2) the district court correctly concluded that the prescriptive easement over Olson Road was appurtenant; and (3) remand was required to reflect this Court's holding that the Defendants' prescriptive easement over Olson Road was limited in scope to the historic agricultural, recreational, and residential uses of the road by Defendants and their predecessors between approximately 1948 and 1997. View "Faber v. Raty" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court ruling in favor of the Montana Environmental Information Center and Sierra Club (collectively, Conservation Groups) and vacating the Montana Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) permit for Westmoreland Rosebud Mining, LLC's proposed coal mine expansion, holding that the Board of Environmental Review (Board) made several errors when it upheld DEQ's findings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that reversal of the burden of proof was prejudicial error; (2) the Board committed reversible error in limiting the Conservation Groups' evidence and argument; (3) the district court erred in determining that it was reversible error to admit certain testimony as proper rebuttal; (4) the Board erred when it concluded that no water quality standard violation could occur; (5) the Board properly considered cumulative impact of mining activity in its analysis; (6) the Board properly relied on evidence regarding aquatic life; (7) the attorney fee award was improper; and (8) the district court erred in ruling that the Board was properly included as a party on judicial review. View "Mont. Environmental Information Center v. Westmoreland Rosebud Mining" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Ryan Adamson's motion for relief and an order granting Sylvia Moody's petition for subsequent administration of the Estate of Victor Starkel, holding that the district court did not err by reopening the Estate pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-1016.After Starkel died his daughter, Moody, filed for an informal testate probate. Eight years after the district court closed the Estate, Moody initiated this lawsuit against Adamson, with whom Starkel had entered into a written stock pledge agreement (SPA), claiming conversion, security fraud, and other claims. Adamson challenged Moody's standing on the basis that the Estate was closed. Moody subsequently petitioned to re-open the Estate and to be re-appointed as the personal representative. The district court granted the motion pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-1016 and reopened the estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reopening the Estate on the basis that the SPA constituted a subsequently discovered asset. View "In re Estate of Starkel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment entered by the district court following a jury trial in which Defendant was found guilty of criminal mischief and sentenced to six days in jail but with a deferred sentence conditioned upon successful completion of probation and payment of restitution over four years, holding that the district court erred in the determination of the amount of restitution to be imposed.A jury found Defendant guilty of criminal mischief for breaking and damaging parts of vehicles belonging to Douglas Nelsen and Keith Nelsen. After a sentencing hearing, the district court ordered restitution in the amount of $11420.13, including $1,222 for the Dakota and Sentra, $5,219.98 for the Ford Mustang, $1,850 for the Astro, $3,125 for the Grand Prix, and $105.15 in costs for a rental car. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err by concluding that restitution could be imposed for all the damage that was alleged under the single count of criminal mischief; but (2) erred in the determination of the amount of restitution to be imposed for damage to the Mustang. View "State v. Arthun" on Justia Law