Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana had to decide if the Thirteenth Judicial District Court erred by disallowing a stipulated agreement for entry of a consent judgment between American Express National Bank (Amex) and Jocelyn Born (Born), and subsequently dismissing the action with prejudice.Born had accumulated a debt of $20,754.69 on her American Express credit card that she failed to repay, despite Amex’s demands for repayment. The parties had entered into a stipulation and consent agreement where Born agreed to the entry of judgment for the amount of her debt, plus costs. After some payments by Born, the amount owed had reduced to $19,368.19. The District Court initially entered a consent judgment for the reduced amount but later the same day vacated the judgment and dismissed the litigation with prejudice.Amex appealed this decision arguing that the District Court misunderstood the nature of the stipulation and consent agreement and treated it as a "cognovit judgment" - a judgment entered in advance of legal action in case of default, rather than a "judgment on consent" - an agreed judgment entered after action is commenced.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana agreed with Amex's argument, finding that the stipulation was a valid consent judgment and constituted a contract between the parties. The court held that the District Court erred in vacating the judgment and abused its discretion by denying Amex's motion for relief. The court reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the matter for entry of a consent judgment as contemplated by the parties' stipulation. View "American Express v. Born" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by William Russell and Mountain View Investments, LLC, (MVI) against a judgment from the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, in favor of 360 Reclaim, LLC. The dispute revolves around a twenty-acre parcel of land in Montana which was purchased by Russell in 2010 and later foreclosed due to defaulted loan payments. 360 Reclaim purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale and then started charging Russell for storage and cleanup of items left on the property. Russell attempted to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, but his payment was rejected as insufficient by 360 Reclaim, which calculated a higher redemption amount that included cleanup costs. The District Court determined that 360 Reclaim was entitled to include cleanup costs as maintenance expenses, rendering Russell's redemption invalid.However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana held that "maintenance expenses," as used in the redemption statute, do not include cleanup costs for the removal of a redemptioner’s personal property. The court found that 360 Reclaim took a calculated risk in purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, knowing its condition and the presence of Russell's personal property. The court reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for further findings and conclusions consistent with this decision. The lower court was directed to determine what credits, if any, Russell and MVI are entitled to against the redemption price and whether Russell’s offer of redemption was in substantial compliance with the redemption statutes. View "360 Reclaim v. Russell" on Justia Law

In the case, Jose Martinez Jr. was convicted by a jury in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, for two counts of incest, criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, solicitation to commit tampering with witnesses or informants, and three counts of criminal contempt. This case arose from allegations by Martinez's stepdaughter, S.M., that he had been sexually abusing her since she was 10 years old. The trial court allowed the admission of statements made by S.M. to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) and a physician, despite Martinez's objection that their admission violated his right of confrontation as S.M. was not present to testify at the trial.The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed Martinez's conviction. It held that S.M.'s statements to the physician were nontestimonial and made for purposes of medical treatment, and thus, were admissible under Montana Rule of Evidence 803(4). However, the court found that S.M.'s statements to the SANE were testimonial and their admission violated Martinez's right to confrontation. Nevertheless, the court ruled that this error was harmless given other evidence produced at trial and because the SANE's testimony was cumulative.The court's decision reflected the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements in the context of the right to confrontation, and the admissibility of statements for purposes of medical treatment under the rules of evidence. The court also demonstrated the application of the harmless error doctrine in the context of a Confrontation Clause violation. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

In this case, Lindsay Burns Barbier contested the validity of the 2016 will of her father, Horatio Burns, alleging that her brother Cameron and his wife Alison exerted undue influence over Horatio. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the validity of the will and the awarding of attorney fees to Horatio’s Estate, but reversed the awarding of attorney fees to Alison and the calculation of interest on the attorney fees. The court found that the lower court did not err in allowing Alison to file a response to Lindsay's petition contesting the will, despite Lindsay's objection that it was untimely and that Alison's interests were fully represented by the Estate. The court also found that Lindsay was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. In terms of attorney fees, the court determined that Alison was not entitled to an award of fees under state law as she was defending her own interest in the will and her participation was not required to defend the validity of the will. Finally, the court found that the lower court incorrectly calculated the applicable interest rate on the attorney fees awarded to the Estate. View "In re Burns" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal by Bryce Caleb Hamernick, against his conviction for Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWOC) in the Fourth Judicial District Court. The Supreme Court of Montana considered whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury that to find Hamernick guilty, it needed to determine that he was simply aware of the high probability that the victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse.The court's decision mainly revolved around the interpretation of the term "knowingly" used in the Montana Code Annotated (MCA) to define the mental state required for the crime of SIWOC. The District Court had used two different definitions of "knowingly" for the two elements of the crime. For the act of sexual intercourse, the court used the "conduct-based" definition, that Hamernick must have been aware of his conduct. For the element of "without consent," the court instructed that Hamernick must have been aware of a high probability that the sexual intercourse was without consent, which the appellant argued lowered the state's burden of proof.The Supreme Court of Montana found that the District Court erred in its instruction. It held that the crime of SIWOC is a conduct-based offense, necessitating an "awareness of conduct" mental state. The court stated that the crime does not consist of sexual intercourse with a high probability the other person does not consent; rather, it is sexual intercourse with the awareness that it is without that person’s consent. The Supreme Court of Montana thus reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "State v. Hamernick" on Justia Law

In the State of Montana v. Sky M. Little Coyote, the Supreme Court of Montana dealt with an appeal by Little Coyote, who had been incarcerated and was appealing the revocation of his suspended sentence. Little Coyote argued that his time served had been incorrectly calculated and that, when correctly accounted for, his sentence had already expired before the State filed its revocation petition. The State argued that Little Coyote was bound by an agreement he had entered into regarding the time served.The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal of the State's Petition for Revocation. The court found that Little Coyote's time served had indeed been inaccurately calculated. It ruled that the parties involved had been operating under a mutual mistake regarding the time Little Coyote had served. The court held that, when correctly calculated and credited, Little Coyote's sentence had expired nearly three months before the State filed its revocation petition. Thus, the disposition imposed on Little Coyote was deemed illegal as the lower court had lacked the authority to revoke or impose a disposition after the expiration of his sentence. View "State v. Little Coyote" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed a district court's decision in a case involving a plaintiff, John Breuer, who sued the State of Montana for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The accident was caused by a student-employee of the University of Montana. Breuer claimed that the accident resulted in a shoulder injury that caused him significant pain and suffering, and loss of established course of life. The State admitted liability for the accident, but disputed that the accident was the sole cause of Breuer's claimed disabilities and pain. The district court excluded evidence of Breuer's pre-accident back injury and related disabilities as alternate cause evidence. The Supreme Court held that this was an error and that the district court's exclusion of this evidence materially prejudiced the State's right to a fair trial. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Breuer v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves Tylor Buttolph who appealed his conviction of stalking. Buttolph had been charged with eight counts of felony stalking, allegedly occurring between October 17, 2019, and April 6, 2020. For each count of stalking, the State listed only one act of misconduct. However, the stalking statute requires a "course of conduct" involving two or more acts. The State used evidence of prior, uncharged conduct to prove the "course of conduct" element.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the conviction. The court held that Buttolph's constitutional right to due process was violated when the State used an act not charged in the information to prove "course of conduct" for the offense of stalking. The court reasoned that the State cannot shift its theory of criminality on the day of trial without violating Buttolph's fundamental right to due process. The charging document was silent as to the second act constituting the course of conduct element of the offense, and thus, there was no "statement of facts constituting the offense charged". View "State v. Buttolph" on Justia Law

In the State of Montana, a group of parents and the non-profit organization Stand Up Montana sued several school districts in Missoula County over the implementation of mask mandates in schools during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs argued that the mask mandates violated their substantive due process rights. The Fourth Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the school districts, finding the mask mandates did not violate the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The Supreme Court reiterated that the mask mandates did not implicate any fundamental rights under Article II of the Montana Constitution, and therefore, the rational basis test was the appropriate standard of review. Under the rational basis test, the court found that the mask mandates were rationally related to the legitimate government interest of stemming the spread of COVID-19, as the school districts had considered information and recommendations from reputable public and private health care providers and agencies, including the CDC, which all recommended universal masking. The court also affirmed the lower court's decision to grant a motion in limine to exclude testimony from the plaintiffs' hybrid witnesses, as the proffered testimony was not relevant to whether the mask policies were rationally related to stemming the spread of COVID-19. View "Stand Up Montana v. Msla Co. Schools" on Justia Law

In the case heard by the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Caryn Miske, the plaintiff and appellant, was appealing a district court decision that granted the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) summary judgment on all of her claims that arose from her termination by the DNRC from the Flathead Basin Commission.The primary facts of the case involve Miske's employment as the Executive Director of the Flathead Basin Commission, a body established by the 1983 Legislature to protect the environment of Flathead Lake and its tributaries. The Commission is administratively attached to the DNRC, a relationship that Miske argued allowed the Commission independent authority over staffing decisions. However, the DNRC contended that the Commission and DNRC share concurrent authority over staffing decisions.The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the DNRC on all of Miske's claims. It held that, based on the plain language and structure of the relevant statutes, the DNRC and the Commission have concurrent authority over staffing decisions, and therefore, Miske was a DNRC employee.The court also ruled that the DNRC didn't commit intentional interference with contractual relations as it wasn't a stranger to Miske's relationship with the Commission. Additionally, the court found that Miske's lobbying efforts on behalf of the Commission were made in her capacity as a DNRC employee and thus were not protected political speech. Lastly, the court held that the DNRC had good cause to terminate Miske due to her repeated failures to provide the DNRC with state-issued credit card statements, which constituted a legitimate business reason for her termination. View "Miske v. DNRC" on Justia Law