Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants appealed the order of the district court denying their motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the estate of their father, the decedent. At issue was whether the district court erred when it assumed subject matter jurisdiction over the probate of the estate when the decedent was an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe and all of his estate property was located within the exterior boundaries of the Blackfeet Reservation at the time of his death. The court overruled State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court and held that the Blackfeet Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of the decedent's estate and assumption of subject matter jurisdiction by the district court was impermissible because Montana and the Blackfeet Tribe had not taken the necessary steps for Montana to assume civil jurisdiction over the Blackfeet Reservation.

Plaintiffs sued defendants seeking recognition and enforcement of their easement over Prairie Drive in Park County, Montana, near the City of Livingston. The parties raised several issues regarding the district court's findings of facts, conclusions of law, and order dated August 4, 2010. The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the relief ordered by the district court, if properly implemented, would not allow them to use their easement essentially as they did and therefore, the district court both recognized and upheld plaintiffs' easement rights and ordered relief specifically designed to address their complaints. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees and costs where there was no factual support for defendants' argument that they were actually the prevailing party and plaintiffs prevailed on all substantive issues. The court held that the Prairie Drive Subdivision Homeowner's Association ("HOA") had standing to participate in the case where the HOA cured a defect with the Secretary of State when it had been involuntarily dissolved for failure to file its annual report. The court held that there was no evidence that plaintiffs' property right in the easement had been taken or extinguished and the district court correctly concluded that plaintiffs' private easements existed independently of any public right to use the right of way. The court held that there was no merit in the argument that plaintiffs' settlement with the City of Livingston absolved defendants of any liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court except as to the matter of plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney fees and costs and that matter was remanded for further proceedings.

Respondent entered a true plea and was adjudged delinquent in the district court in 2005 for knowingly engaging in sexual acts with a person under 12 years of age, which would have been a crime under 18 U.S.C. 2241(c) and 1153(a) if committed by an adult. At issue, in a certified question, was whether respondent's duty to remain registered as a sex offender under Montana law was contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his now-expired federal juvenile-supervision order that required him to register as a sex offender or was the duty an independent requirement of Montana law that was unaffected by the validity or invalidity of the federal juvenile-supervision conditions. The court held that respondent's state law duty to remain registered as a sex offender was not contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his federal supervision order, but was an independent requirement of Montana law. Therefore, the Montana Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act ("SVORA"), 46-23-501 through 502, directly applied to respondent and he had a continuing duty to register under SVORA, which was entirely independent from the registration conditions imposed by his federal supervision order.

Petitioner appealed from an order of the district court denying his petition for post-conviction relief after he was convicted with two counts of sexual assault for touching the vaginal areas of his co-worker's two stepdaughters. At issue was whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and on direct appeal, and whether prosecutorial misconduct violated petitioner's due process rights. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying petitioner post conviction relief and held that petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel relating to counsel's pretrial investigation, use of expert testimony, decisions regarding objections to vouching and prosecutorial misconduct, admissibility of evidence, and other objections to trial irregularities, as well as on appeal, where petitioner failed to demonstrate the two-part test established in Strickland v. Washington. The court also held that petitioner failed to raise claims of prosecutorial misconduct on direct appeal and could not raise them in post-conviction relief.

Petitioner filed a petition for dissolution in district court and the only contested issue between the parties was the valuation and division of the marital home and surrounding acreage, which was purchased for $45,000 in the mid-1990's. Petitioner had obtained a letter from a realtor stating that the marital home could be worth approximately $250,000-275,000 if the home was in good condition. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's M.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6) motion, which was filed after the district court found the marital home was valued at $22,423, where petitioner alleged that her attorney grossly neglected her case when she failed to identify the realtor as an expert, or any other qualified real estate expert, and failed to prepare any evidence for trial to reflect petitioner's estimated value of the marital home. The court held that under the unique circumstances, where the district court had a statutory obligation to equitably apportion the marital estate and petitioner's counsel totally failed to present evidence on the issue, the district court abused its discretion in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion and should have granted the motion, thereby allowing her to present evidence regarding the value of the marital home so that the district court could make an equitable distribution. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The State brought a complaint against BNSF Railway Co. ("BNSF") in November 2009 seeking a declaratory judgment requiring BNSF to abide by the terms of a 1984 agreement between them and a declaration that BNSF was in violation of that agreement; specific performance by BNSF of the agreement, and damages for BNSF's alleged breach of the agreement. The State subsequently filed an application for a preliminary injunction in June 2010 to prohibit BNSF from terminating the payment to the State and its short line operator per loaded car for each car handled in interchanges as required by Section 9 of the agreement. At issue was whether the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court manifestly abused its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction where it went beyond the State's requested relief and effectively ordered specific performance on the agreement under new terms substantially different than the prior agreed upon terms which severely limited termination of the new interchange agreement and was never part of the 1984 or 1986 agreements. Accordingly, the court reversed the order and resolved the injunction, remanding for further proceedings.

Petitioner ("husband") and respondent ("wife") divorced in May 1993 and entered into a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement ("settlement agreement") where, pursuant to the settlement agreement, husband and wife's two children would live primarily with wife and husband would pay wife child support payments each month plus half the cost of the children's uninsured medical expenses. At issue was whether the district court erred when it concluded that wife's statements filed with the court indicating that husband was current on his child support obligations as of September 2001 constituted judicial admissions and thus precluded an award of back child support; when it determined that wife had filed inconsistent pleadings and imposed sanctions against her; and when it held that husband did not owe wife for back child support. Also at issue was whether the district court erred by failing to award husband his attorney fees pursuant to a "prevailing party" contractual provision when the sanctions imposed on wife covered only a portion of husband's attorney fees. The court held that the district court did not err when it assumed that wife's written statements were true and concluded that the statements were judicial admissions where both documents that contained wife's statements were signed by her attorney at the time and neither were superseded or withdrawn at any point. The court also held that, without knowing the legal basis for sanctions, it was impossible to ascertain whether the award constituted an abuse of discretion and concluded that it was unnecessary to remand in light of the court's disposition of the last issue. The court further held that the district court did not err in concluding that husband did not owe wife back child support where the record established that wife was overpaid child support. The court finally held that the district court erred when it granted husband only a portion of his attorney fees and costs as sanctions against wife where, by the terms of the settlement, husband should have been awarded all of his costs and attorney fees expended in defense of wife's claims because husband was the prevailing party.

Petitioner and respondent had one child together, never married, and split up shortly after respondent became pregnant with the child in 2000. At issue was whether the district court wrongly named petitioner as the primary residential parent, properly calculated respondent's child support obligation, and afforded respondent a fair trial. The court held that the district court properly held that it was in the best interest of the child to reside primarily with petitioner where he provided more continuity and stability of care for the child. The court also held that the district court made several errors in calculating respondent's income for purposes of child support and therefore reversed and remanded for recalculation. The court further held that the district court offered respondent a fair trial where it interviewed the child in chambers to determined the child's preference for primary residential parent.

The Montana Department of Revenue ("Department") appealed a judgment reversing the State Tax Appeal Board's ("STAB") conclusion that the Department had applied a "commonly accepted" method to assess the value of PacificCorp's Montana properties. At issue was whether substantial evidence demonstrated common acceptance of the Department's direct capitalization method that derived earnings-to-price ratios from an industry-wide analysis. Also at issue was whether substantial evidence supported STAB's conclusion that additional obsolescence did not exist to warrant consideration of further adjustments to PacifiCorp's taxable value. The court held that substantial evidence supported the Department's use of earnings-to-price ratios in its direct capitalization approach; that additional depreciation deductions were not warranted; and that the Department did not overvalue PacifiCorp's property. The court also held that MCA 15-8-111(2)(b) did not require the Department to conduct a separate, additional obsolescence study when no evidence suggested that obsolescence existed that has not been accounted for in the taxpayer's Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") Form 1 filing. The court further held that STAB correctly determined that the actual $9.4 billion sales price of PacifiCorp verified that the Department's $7.1 billion assessment had not overvalued PacifiCorp's properties.

Defendant appealed her misdemeanor convictions of driving while the privilege to do so was suspended, failing to carry proof of insurance, and driving under the influence. At issue was whether defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when her counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss on grounds that she did not receive a speedy trial. The court held that defendant's attorney provided ineffective assistance where the attorney's failure to move for dismissal after six months following mistrial was deficient performance and did not meet the objective standard of reasonableness. The court also held that defendant suffered extreme prejudice as a consequence of her attorney's ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the court remanded with instructions for the district court to dismiss and vacate defendant's charges.