Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the denial of her motion to dismiss the charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs. At issue was whether the district court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503 and -504, MCA. The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that defendant's charges did not fall within the meaning of the "same transaction" under 46-1-202(23)(a), MCA, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-504, MCA. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 46-11-503, MCA, where the plain meaning of the statute required "two or more offenses are knowing to the prosecutor..." and where the prosecutor did not know what the substances were until testing was conducted later.

A jury in the district court concluded that plaintiff did not breach its homeowners insurance policy with defendants and that one defendant had committed fraud when applying for the policy. Defendants appealed a district court order denying their motion for summary judgment and motions in limine and granting plaintiff's motion that defendants order and pay for additional transcripts on appeal. The court held that defendants were not entitled to estopp plaintiff from defending itself because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the one defendant applied for the policy in good faith. The court held that the district court appropriately permitted plaintiff's customer service representative to testify as to her recollection of the defendant's statements. The court further held that the district court acted within its discretion in permitting plaintiff to defend itself via section 33-15-403, MCA, by allowing the customer service representative to testify about the defendant's alleged fraudulent statements. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants' motion in limine. The court finally held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering additional transcripts under Montana Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(3)(b).

Appellant appealed from the sentence imposed by the district court where appellant was charged with aggravated assault of his two-month-old daughter and found guilty after a jury trial. At issue was whether the district court sentenced appellant illegally by inappropriately enhancing his sentence because he refused to admit guilt. The court held that the district court imposed the sentence because of the gravity of the offense, the lifelong consequences that appellant's actions would have on his daughter, not because he refused to admit guilt. Therefore, the court affirmed the sentence where appellant's continued minimization of what actually occurred caused the child's medical treatment to be delayed and where appellant's sentence resulted from the combination of numerous factors.

Appellant appealed from an order of the district court dismissing its complaint for condemnation and entering judgment in favor of appellee. At issue was whether the district court erred in issuing an order concluding that appellant did not possess the power of eminent domain, either express or implied, and it had no authority to take the private property of a nonconsenting landowner. The court concluded that HB 198 provided appellant authority to pursue eminent domain proceedings and that HB 198 explicitly codified eminent domain authority into the Major Facility Siting Act ("Act"), Title 75, chapter 20. The court held that HB 198 retroactively applied to appellant's certificate issued pursuant to the Act and the explicit language of HB 198 was in conflict with the district court's order. Accordingly, the court reversed the order dismissing appellant's complaint and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant appealed from the district court's order declining to hold appellee in contempt and directing her to clear title to his vehicle or face entry of a judgment against her. At issue was whether the district court erred when it failed to hold appellee accountable for violating the economic restraining order and when it allowed her to repossess the vehicle. Also at issue was whether appellant's due process rights were violated because he did not receive notice of two hearings. The court held that the district court had broad discretion to determine whether or not to hold appellee in contempt for non-compliance with the decree. The court also held that, although the court acted within its discretion in refusing to issue a contempt order, the court did not have authority to modify the redistribution of property under its prior decree without notice to both parties and an opportunity to be heard, and erred in doing so. The court held, however, that appellant was not prejudiced by the district court's ruling, which was in his favor, and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

J.A. was charged with burglary by common scheme and theft by common scheme when he was 17-years-old and placed on probation until February 2009 by the Youth Court. In December 2008, the State filed a petition to revoke probation and transfer supervision of J.A. to district court. The Youth Court issued a summons and, when J.A. did not appear, the court issued a warrant for his arrest. J.A. was not picked up on the warrant until May 2010, when he was 21-years-old. J.A. appealed the order entered by the Youth Court denying his motion for release from custody due to lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the Youth Court Act, section 46-18-203(2), MCA, did not provide for continuing jurisdiction in youth court over revocation proceedings after youth turned 21, even where a petition to transfer had previously been filed and therefore, the court held that it could not extend the Youth Court's jurisdiction beyond what the Legislature had clearly provided. Accordingly, the court held that the Youth Court erred in denying J.A.'s motion and reversed the Youth Court's order, remanding for further proceedings.

Plaintiff appealed from the order of the district court granting defendant's motion to dismiss where the suit arose out of a previous landlord/tenant action filed in district court. At issue was whether section 3-10-302, MCA, conferred jurisdiction on justices' and district courts for actions arising under the Montana Residential Landlord and Tenant Act of 1977. The court held that the clear terms of the Montana statute provided that justices' courts shared concurrent jurisdiction with district courts. The court also held that plaintiff's arguments were not made in good faith and sanctions were warranted. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint and remanded for a determination and assessment of costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred on appeal.

Defendant appealed from the judgment and conviction of deliberate homicide, felony murder. At issue was whether the district court erred by denying defendant's motion to suppress and by denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of the State's case-in-chief. Also at issue was whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. The court held that the district court's findings of fact, considering the totality of the circumstances, were not clearly erroneous, and its conclusions of law were correct where defendant's waiver was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently given. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the elements of the crime had been committed beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore, the district court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. The court further held that defendant failed to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and the court declined to address certain related issues on appeal and to apply plain error review. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff alleged that the two vehicles that it purchased from defendant, a used Ford and a new 2008 Dodge, had mechanical problems and body damage. The parties disputed responsibilities for repairs. At issue was whether the court could rely upon testimony on appeal for a vacated default judgment hearing and whether the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant. The court held that the district court afforded the parties sufficient opportunity to refute affidavits through depositions, interrogatories, and through witness testimony at a hearing. Defendant elected not to depose plaintiff's owner and opted not to cross-examine plaintiff's witnesses at a rescheduled hearing. Defendant waived its right to the hearing and presented its own evidence in the form of affidavits. Therefore, defendant's argument that the court must disregard certain testimony or any of plaintiff's affidavits presented to the district court was unconvincing. The court also held that the Montana court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant through long-arm provisions did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order and remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant appealed a district court order denying his motion for summary judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, as personal representative of the Estate of Larry Rasmussen ("Estate"), and awarding the Estate attorney fees. At issue was whether the district court erred in concluding that the Estate's nonjudicial foreclosure was not a compulsory counterclaim to an earlier action between the parties and whether the district court erred in concluding that appellant could not revive fraud-related claims as an affirmative defense. The court held that the district court did not err in ruling that the Estate was not required to assert nonjudicial foreclosure where the Estate commenced a foreclosure by advertisement and sale, which was a nonjudicial remedy it was statutorily entitled to invoke and the rules governing judicial claims and defenses did not apply to nonjudicial proceedings. The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that appellant's fraud claims were barred where he was the plaintiff in the case and could not assert affirmative defenses nor could he compel the Estate to commence a judicial action so that he could raise an affirmative defense. The court further held that the Estate was entitled to recover attorney fees in the instant case in connection with its defense of appellant's claims in the district court and on appeal.