Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Following a jury trial, James Main Jr. was convicted of deliberate homicide and felony murder. Main appealed, arguing that (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made to two police officers while he was being driven to the police station and while at the police station; (2) the district court erred by denying Main's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the close of the state's case-in-chief; and (3) Main was denied effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) Main voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights; (2) the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find the elements of the crime had been committed beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) Main's ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be addressed in a postconviction proceeding.

While taking care of his infant daughter, R.G., Tony Garcia fell on top of R.G. then shook her when she did not respond. The next day R.G. was taken to the hospital where it was discovered that she was suffering from a traumatic subdural hemorrhage. The doctors found her injuries were consistent with violent shaking. Tony Garcia was charged with aggravated assault and found guilty after a jury trial. Garcia was sentenced to prison for 20 years, a period of time within the statutory parameters. Garcia appealed, arguing that his sentence was enhanced because he refused to admit guilt. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that far from punishing Garcia for maintaining his innocence, the district court imposed the sentence because a combination of numerous factors, not least of which was the gravity of the offense.

Gregory Schindler purchased insurance from USAA for a house he owned. The house was destroyed by fire a year and a half later. USAA denied coverage on the basis that Schindler had committed fraud during his application conversation. Specifically, USAA determined that Greg had misrepresented that the house was his primary residence and a single family dwelling when instead it was a rental divided into eight apartment units. Schindler and his wife filed suit against USAA asserting breach of insurance contract and implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing. USAA defended on the basis of fraud. The jury found for USAA and awarded USAA the monies it had advanced to the Schindlers. The Schindlers appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying the Schindlers' motion for summary judgment; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony from a USAA employee; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Schindlers' motion in limine to preclude USAA from introducing evidence of fraud; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the Schindlers to order and pay for additional transcripts.

In 2010, MATL, a Calgary-based company currently building a power transmission line, filed a complaint for condemnation against Larry Salois, the guardian and conservator of Shirley Salois. Salois moved for summary judgment. The district court then issued an order concluding that MATL did not possess the power of eminent domain and had no authority to take the private property of a nonconsenting landowner. MATL appealed. The Supreme Court reversed. At issue was HB 198, which was made into law on May 9, 2011. The bill expressly gives a person issued a certificate under the Major Facility Siting Act the power of eminent domain. The legislature explicitly provided for HB 198 to apply retroactively to certificates issued after September 30, 2008. In October 2008, MATL received a Major Facility Siting Act certificate. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that (1) HB 198 applies retroactively to MATL's certificate issued pursuant to the Major Facility Citing Act, and (2) the explicit language of HB 198 is in conflict with the district court's order.

During the dissolution of the marriage of Karen and Rodney Stevens in 2008, the district court entered a temporary economic restraining order prohibiting any transfer by the parties of their assets during the pendency of the proceedings. The district court awarded Rodney all right and title in a truck titled in Karen's name and ordered Karen to transfer title to Rodney. Karen later transferred the title to her mother. In 2010 the district court issued a written order declining to hold Karen in contempt for her violation of the economic restraining order. Instead, the court ordered Karen to remove any liens on the truck and to secure a new certificate of title and ruled if Karen refused to do so, a judgment would be entered against her in the amount of $21,000. Later, Karen retook possession of the vehicle. Rodney appealed. The Supreme Court determined that the court acted within its discretion in refusing to issue a contempt order but did not have authority to modify the distribution of property under its prior decree without notice to both parties and an opportunity to be heard. However, because Rodney was not prejudiced by the district court's ruling, the judgment was affirmed.

Grizzly Security Armored Express, which provides security and armored services in Montana, filed suit against The Armored Group (TAG), which sells armored vehicles statewide and internationally, to recover damages from a sale of an allegedly defective vehicle. TAG failed to file a timely answer, and Grizzly moved for entry of default. The district court entered a default judgment against TAG, and the Supreme Court reversed. On remand, the district court granted TAG's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Grizzly appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the district court had personal jurisdiction over TAG because (1) TAG transacted sufficient business in Montana to support the extension of long-arm jurisdiction over TAG under Mont. R. Civ. P. 4B(1)(a), and (2) the Montana court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over TAG through long-arm provisions does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Reversed and remanded.

In a previous landlord/tenant action in 2007, attorney Kevin Brown filed suit against Ronald Fick in district court on behalf of two tenants who alleged that Fick had unlawfully evicted them from a unit he manages. The district court found for Fick. Fick filed the present action in 2010, arguing that Brown had fraudulently brought the prior action in district court rather than in justice's court. The district court granted Brown's motion to dismiss, and Fick appealed. At issue was whether Mont. Code Ann. 3-10-302 confers concurrent jurisdiction on justices' and district courts for actions arising under the Landlord and Tenant Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) the clear terms of Montana law provide that justices' courts share concurrent jurisdiction with district courts; and (2) Fick's arguments were not made in good faith, Fick's appeal is frivolous and vexatious and filed for purposes of harassment, and sanctions are warranted. Remanded.

In 2000, Dick Anderson Construction (DAC) entered into a contract with Monroe Construction to do construction work on Paws Up Ranch, which was owned by Monroe Property. When each phase of the construction was completed, Monroe Construction sold that phase to Monroe Property. When DAC was not paid for the last $800,000 of its billings, it filed a construction lien to secure its claim. In 2001, DAC sued Monroe Property to foreclose the lien. On remand to the district court, Monroe Property argued since it was not a party to the construction contract with DAC, it was not a contracting owner against whom the lien could be foreclosed under the construction lien statutes. The district court granted Monroe Property's motion for summary judgment, and DAC appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding the facts of the case demonstrated that Monroe Construction was the actual agent of Monroe Property for the purpose of engaging DAC to complete construction work on the ranch. Therefore, under the statutes, Monroe Property, acting through its agent Monroe Construction, was a contracting owner with regard to the construction contract with DAC.

Petitioner appealed an order of the district court declining transfer of jurisdiction over the parties' child custody proceeding in Kentucky where the couple were married in Montana, petitioner resided in Kentucky, and respondent resided in Montana. The principal issue was whether the district court correctly determined that Montana had continuing jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody and Jurisdiction Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), KRS 403.820 and MCA 40-7-140. The court held that the district court correctly concluded that Montana was the child's home state under the UCCJEA and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the child had a significant connection to Montana or that Kentucky would not be a more convenient forum for conducting further child custody proceedings.

Defendant appealed from his convictions of felony incest, involving his fourteen-year-old son and six-year-old daughter, and his conviction of felony tampering with evidence. At issue was whether the district court erred when it allowed the six-year-old alleged incest victim to testify via a two-way electronic audio-video communication rather than in the presence of defendant and the jury. Also at issue was whether the district court abused its discretion when it prohibited defendant from conducting a forensic interview with, and calling as a trial witness, the four-year-old sibling of the two alleged incest victims. Further at issue was whether the district court erred in allowing the State to present evidence and summary testimony regarding pornographic images obtained from defendant's computer under 26-1-103, MCA, the transaction rule. The court held that defendant's constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was not violated when the 6-year-old testified via two-way electronic audio-video communication and that there was substantial evidence to support the district court's findings that the child would be traumatized by testifying in open court and in front of defendant. The court also held that it was entirely reasonable for the court to conclude that the four-year-old did not have relevant testimony to offer, was incompetent to testify, and would be psychologically harmed if required to testify. The court further held that defendant failed to preserve any possible error arising out of the admission of the summary evidence description of the photographic images for appeal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's rulings.