Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brandon Burns was charged with felony DUI or, in the alternative, felony DUI per se. Ultimately, Burns pled guilty to DUI per se, reserving his right to appeal. The district court designated Burns as a persistent felony offender and sentenced him to fifteen years' incarceration. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err in (1) denying Burns' motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial; (2) denying Burns' motion to suppress evidence; (3) denying Burns' motion to dismiss the felony DUI charge on the grounds that his third prior DUI conviction was invalid; and (4) sentencing Burns as a persistent felony offender.

Donovan Donald (Don) was incapacitated in an accident and received several treatment in Kalispell Regional Medical Center (KRMC). Later, a dispute arose between Don's estate and KRMC over KRMC's acceptance or rejection of Medicaid's payments for Don's care. KRMC filed liens against the Estate. The Estate, in turn, sued KRMC and MASH, a company that had provided Medicaid application forms to the Estate, under several theories of liability. The district court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment to KRMC and MASH; (2) correctly interpreted and applied the Montana Medicaid Act; (3) correctly awarded KRMC prejudgment interest but incorrectly included interest KRMC received from its interest-bearing account; and (4) did not abuse its discretion by awarding KRMC attorney fees and costs. Remanded with instructions to offset the prejudgment interest award by the amount of interest KRMC received from the interest-bearing account.

Appellants Mike Touris and Chuck Sneed filed a petition for judicial review after the County Board of Commissioners denied Appellants' request for a zoning change. Appellants subsequently moved to dismiss the action (Touris I) with prejudice, and the district court granted the motion. Appellants then filed the current action (Touris II), setting forth a factual scenario identical to Touris I and asserting eleven counts. The County moved to dismiss Touris II, and the district court entered an order dismissing some but not all of the counts. The County then amended its answer in Touris II to include res judicata as an affirmative defense. The County moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts in Touris II, asserting the action was barred by res judicata. The district court entered an order dismissing Touris II. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that res judicata barred Appellants' claims, and (2) the County did not waive its right to assert res judicata.

After child R.M.T. had been in the custody of the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services for two years, the Department petitioned for termination of Father's and Mother's rights. After finding that Father's attempts to comply with his treatment plan failed to reach the level necessary to complete the plan, the court determined that the termination of Father's parental rights was in R.M.T.'s best interest. The court then terminated both Father's and Mother's parental rights. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated Father's rights; and (2) the lower court violated Father's due process rights when at the termination hearing the court declined Father's request to cross-examine the guardian ad litem, who submitted a factual report to the court, but because the report provided no new information to the court, the exclusion of the guardian ad litem's testimony did not cause substantial injustice to Father.

Harold Caldwell was injured when he fell at an airport where he worked as manager. The airport's insurer, MACo, paid Caldwell's medical and wage-loss benefits. MACo, however, denied Caldwell rehabilitation benefits based on Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-710. Caldwell challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the basis that its categorical termination of benefits based on a claimant's eligibility for social security violated equal protection principles. The Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) agreed, concluding that the statute creates two similarly situated classes and treats them disparately without being reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. MACo appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute creates two similarly situated classes and treats them differently, and (2) the categorical elimination of rehabilitation benefits in the statute based solely on age-defined eligibility for social security does not rationally relate to any governmental interest. Therefore, the statute violates the Equal Protection clause insofar as it deems disabled workers ineligible to receive rehabilitation benefits based on their eligibility for social security benefits.

Gregory Ternes purchased a residential property from Keith and Sue Eberhard. The Eberhards were insured by State Farm when the house received water damage. Sue reported the damage, and State Form listed the claim on a website report. The Ternes purchased the home without being aware of the website report. The Ternes later attempted to sell the property to the Giardinos, who backed out of the deal. Afterwards, Ternes learned of the website report. Ternes filed a complaint with the state commissioner of insurance, alleging that State Farm put false information on the website, causing the sale of the residence to the Giardinos to fall through. The commissioner advised Ternes that State Farm had not submitted a false report as per State Farm's understanding at the time of the loss. Ternes then filed an action in the district court against State Farm and the Eberhards. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for State Farm and the Eberhards because there were no genuine issues of material fact and both defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Defendant Wesley Couture was charged with a DUI. During trial, defense counsel attempted to introduce redacted versions of a video from the arresting officer's patrol car even though counsel had not listed the video as an exhibit pursuant to an omnibus order, nor had he provided a copy to the state. The court refused to admit the redacted video. Couture was convicted of the charges and designated a persistent felony offender (PFO). Couture filed a motion for a new trial, arguing, inter alia, that his trial was unfair because the court refused to allow him to admit the redacted video. The court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Couture's offered video evidence at trial; (2) the district court did not err in sentencing Couture as a PFO; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Couture's motion for a new trial.

Russell and Melissa Levens and Al Ballard, neighboring property owners, entered into an agreement defining the location of the boundaries of their properties. The agreement provided that Ballard would not excavate on his property within thirty feet of the Levens' property. After Ballard occupied the area between the two properties and refused to sign a certificate of survey pursuant to the agreement, Levens brought an action against Ballard to enforce the agreement and for an injunction. The district court enjoined Ballard from excavating on the disputed property and later granted Levens' motion for summary judgment. Levens later filed a motion for contempt against Ballard for failure to abide by the judgment. The district court denied the motion and entered an order awarding attorney fees to Ballard. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the orders, holding that the judgment must be construed to prevent Ballard from excavating in such a way that the pit intrudes into the thirty-foot buffer strip at the edge of Levens' property.

In the fall of 2008 William Hartford, a high school science teacher, was fired after his Montana teaching certificate expired by his inadvertence in failing to renew it. Hartford sought to file a grievance, alleging that he had been terminated without just cause in violation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into between Kalispell School District (District) and the Kalispell Education Association (KEA). The district superintendent, and later the board of trustees, denied Hartford's request, claiming the matter did not constitute a valid grievance under the CBA on grounds that Hartford was not a member of the bargaining unit at any point during his employment in the fall of 2008 and that he was not a "teacher" as defined under Montana law during his employment in the fall of 2008. Hartford and the KEA filed a petition in the district court to compel arbitration as provided in the CBA. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Hartford and the KEA and ordered the matter submitted to arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the questions raised by the matter were properly submitted to arbitration.

After a petition seeking to transfer territory from Dutton/Brady K-12 School District to Conrad High School and Elementary Districts was refused by the county superintendent of schools, the petition was referred to a three-member panel of county superintendents. The panel denied the petition, and the district court affirmed. Conrad Schools appealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding the panel of superintendents abused its discretion in denying the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record demonstrated that the panel carefully evaluated the effects of the proposed transfer and made its decision based upon the best and collective interests of all students involved.