Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gavin Johnston was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol after the result of a breath test taken by a breath analysis instrument called the Intoxilyzer 8000 showed Johnston had elevated blood alcohol levels. The district court granted Johnston's motion to suppress the results of the breath test pursuant to State v. Gieser because the Intoxilyzer 8000 had not been field tested within a week of Johnston's arrest. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's ruling, holding (1) the reference in Gieser to weekly field testing of breath analysis instruments was dicta and should not have been relied upon as authority as to how often breath analysis instruments must be field certified; and (2) the Intoxilyzer 8000 was properly certified as required by Mont. Admin. R. 23.4.213, which states that breath analysis instruments shall be field certified for accuracy at least once every thirty-one days.

A jury found Robert DaSilva guilty of failure to provide notice of address change as a sex offender, a felony, and resisting arrest, a misdemeanor. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not violate DaSilva's due process rights by instructing the jury as a matter of law that DaSilva's previous Washington conviction of second degree assault with sexual motivation was a "sexual offense" under Montana law; and (2) the district court did not act arbitrarily or err in granting a continuance of trial that was requested by the State to permit an amendment to the information.

In 2003, Joshua Micone applied for Medicaid benefits for himself and his family. In his applications, Joshua did not report his wife Jennifer's interest in a family limited partnership. The Department of Public Health and Human Services approved Joshua's application, and the Micone family received Medicaid benefits from 2003 to 2006. Subsequently, the Department notified Joshua that his household was ineligible for benefits paid over the past three years because of Jennifer's interest in the partnership and demanded repayment. Joshua contested the demand of benefits paid. The State Board of Public Assistance upheld a hearing officer's findings that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was a countable and available resource. The district court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that that the hearing officer did not violate Mont. Code Ann. 2-4-623 when he did not issue a decision within ninety days after the case was deemed submitted; and (2) the district court correctly determined that substantial credible evidence supported the Department's finding that Jennifer's interest in the partnership was an available resource.

After Madeleine Willson died of metastatic breast cancer and acute aspiration pneumonia, Robert Willson filed a complaint against Benefis Hospitals, Peace Hospice, and Dr. T. Brice Addison for medical malpractice. Robert alleged that the administration of medication expedited Madeleine's death and that Madeleine did not give informed consent to administration of the medications. Benefis filed two motions for summary judgment, the first of which argued that Robert had failed to establish causation through qualified expert testimony. Robert filed a motion for summary judgment seeking default judgment as a sanction for Benefis' alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation in favor of Benefis and Dr. Addison. The court denied Robert's motion, finding Robert failed to prove spoliation. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Benefis and Dr. Addison, and (2) although the district court denied Robert's motion for summary judgment for the wrong reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where sanctions were not appropriate.

The State charged Michael Spreadbury with felony intimidation by way of an information. Spreadbury initially pled not guilty and moved to dismiss the information for failure to establish probable cause to charge him with intimidation. After the district court denied the motion, Spreadbury changed his plea to no contest without reserving any issues for appeal. The district court entered judgment against Spreadbury and imposed a one-year deferred sentence. Spreadbury appealed, arguing that the State had no probable cause to believe he committed the offense of felony intimidation. At issue was whether Spreadbury waived the right to raise a probable cause challenge when he entered his no contest plea without reserving the issue for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment entered by the district court, holding that, by entering a no contest plea without reserving for appeal the question whether there was probable cause to support the information filed against him, Spreadbury waived the right to raise the issue on appeal from the final judgment entered.

C.R. Weaver ordered a coffee urn from defendant Advanced Restaurant Supply for use by Glacier Kitchens, a corporation in which Weaver owns the majority of the shares. Advanced Restaurant sent a coffee urn it ordered from defendant Wilbur Curtis Manufacturing. Glacier Kitchens used the urn to provide drink for forest firefighters under its food service contract with the United States Forest Service (USFS). The coffee urn ultimately malfunctioned, and, later, Glacier Kitchens' contract with the USFS was terminated by USFS. Weaver sued defendants for breach of contract, alleging that a contract attached when he ordered the coffee urn. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that Weaver, as a shareholder in Glacier Kitchens, lacked standing to bring a claim that belonged to the corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendants; and (2) the district court properly awarded costs to defendants.

While pitching in a baseball game, Brandon Patch was struck in the head by a batted ball that was hit using a Hillerich & Bradsby Company (H&B) aluminum bat. Brandon died from his injuries. Brandon's parents sued H&B in strict products liability for survivorship and wrongful death damages, asserting manufacturing and design defect and failure to warn claims. The district court granted H&B's motion for summary judgment on Patches' manufacturing defect claim but denied summary judgment on their design defect and failure to warn claim. The court granted Patches' motion in limine, excluding H&B's assumption of the risk defense. The jury concluded that the bat was in a defective condition due to failure to warn of the enhanced risks associated with its use and awarded Patches an $850,000 verdict on their failure to warn claim. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court properly (1) denied H&B summary judgment, (2) denied H&B's motion for judgment as a matter of law, (3) granted Patches' motion in limine regarding H&B's assumption of the risk defense, and (4) instructed the jury on failure to warn.

After James Patrick filed a petition for postconviction relief, the district court judge who presided over Patrick's previous trial and sentencing recused herself and ordered that Patrick's postconviction proceedings be reassigned. Patrick filed a motion to invalidate the State's judicial substitution, which the district court denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err when it denied Patrick's motion to invalidate the State's judicial substitution because the substitution in this instance was permitted, Patrick received notice of the substitution, and Patrick was not denied due process when the district court issued its order denying Patrick's motion without waiting for Patrick's reply brief; and (2) Patrick should have been given the opportunity to file his own motion for judicial substitution. The Court concluded that equity demanded that Patrick be given twenty days to move for a judicial substitution.

The Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks seized unlawfully killed deer head mounts, deer antlers, and a golden eagle skull and feathers from Lin Torgerson's residence and family business. Torgerson was charged with and subsequently convicted of possession of unlawfully killed wildlife and unlawful possession of bird parts. After trial, Torgerson filed a motion for the return of property seized during the investigation. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that there was substantial evidence supporting the district court's determination that Torgerson had no right of possession to any of the exhibits he sought.

After a Montana DOT (MDT) investigation, employee Richard Kershaw was demoted with a lower rate of pay. After resigning, Kershaw filed a complaint in district court, asserting wrongful discharge without good cause under the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act (WDEA), wrongful discharge under the WDEA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court granted summary judgment to MDT all three claims, ruling that Kershaw was precluded from bringing a constructive discharge under the WDEA because the claim was subject to the Board of Personnel Appeals (BOPA) grievance procedure and that the IIED claim was precluded by Kershaw's failure to pursue a BOPA grievance procedure. Kershaw moved to amend his complaint to include additional tort claims, and the district court denied his motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by concluding that the preclusion of Kershaw's claim from the WDEA did not violate his constitutional rights to equal protection and to a jury trial; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kershaw's motions for leave to amend the complaint.