Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After the State petitioned for L.L.A.'s involuntary commitment to the Montana State Hospital (MSH), the district court held a hearing, at the conclusion of which it pronounced L.L.A. would be committed to MSH for a period not to exceed ninety days. L.L.A. appealed, claiming the district court erred in making insufficient findings of fact supporting her commitment. The Supreme Court reversed the order involuntarily committing L.L.A., holding that the district court erred in failing to provide a detailed statement of facts supporting its commitment order as required by Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-127(8)(a). Because the district court's findings contained no indication of the facts upon which it found that, because of her mental disorder, L.L.A. was substantially unable to protect her life and safety or that imminent threat of injury to herself or others would result if she was left untreated, the district court failed to follow the statutory requirements for involuntary commitment proceedings. View "In re L.L.A." on Justia Law

Charley Johnson entered a nolo contendere plea to intimidation for repeated sexually assaultive behavior against his stepdaughter. During sentencing, the district court (1) sentenced Johnson to a ten-year commitment to the department of corrections, (2) required Johnson to pay for counseling costs previously incurred by his stepdaughter as well as an undetermined amount for future counseling costs she would incur the period of Johnson's sentence, and (3) imposed a condition restricting Johnson from places where children can congregate. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed, holding that Johnson failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the district court erred in imposing restitution for past and future counseling expenses incurred by the victim, but (2) remanded for calculation for future restitution in compliance with Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-244. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a police officer arrested Jason Jenkins for driving a motorcycle under the influence of alcohol, Jenkins agreed to a breath test. Jenkins was subsequently convicted of driving under the influence (DUI). On appeal, Jenkins contended that the district court erred by admitting field certification documents as part of the foundation for the admission of the results of his breath test, alleging that they were hearsay because the officer who submitted the documents was not the author or custodian of the documents. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the results of the breath test because case law has established that when a district court is determining whether there is adequate foundation for admission of breath test results in a DUI prosecution, Mont. R. Evid. 104(4)(a) authorizes the court to do so without regard to whether the certification forms are hearsay. View "State v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved by the district court. The order included an allocation of Husband's state employee retirement plan, which Wife appealed. At issue on appeal was whether Wife was entitled to fifty percent of what the account would be worth if Husband were to liquidate it immediately or fifty percent of the marital portion of Husband's benefits at the time he would begin receiving them after retirement. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that Karen was entitled to a percentage at the time of payout under the "time rule" for deferred distribution of pension plans as set forth in Rolfe v. Rolfe, and (2) ordered that the account should be divided by awarding Wife a fraction of each pension payment that represents the amount earned during the marriage. Remanded for a new distribution of the marital estate. View "In re Marriage of Spawn & McGowan" on Justia Law

Bill Thomas was convicted and sentenced for deliberate homicide. Thomas subsequently field a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. Thomas filed a notice of appeal. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court would continue to consider a party's appeal from a district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus as an original petition. The Supreme Court held (1) a district court's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a criminal proceeding is not appealable to the Court; (2) because a writ of habeas corpus may be granted by either a district court or the Supreme Court, the district court's denial of such a writ is not res judicata because it does not divest the Court of jurisdiction to grant a subsequent petition; and (3) a party must file an original petition for writ of habeas corpus for the Court to consider it. The Court then (1) granted Thomas's motion to proceed on appeal without payment of a filing fee; and (2) ordered that Thomas's appeal from the district court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice. View "Thomas v. John Doe" on Justia Law

Brent Wilson appealed from his conviction for involvement in a fraudulent scheme to illegally take possession of real property. Prior to and throughout the jury trial, Wilson invoked his constitutional right to represent himself. On appeal, Wilson argued, inter alia, that he was not competent to waive his constitutional right to counsel and the district court should have compelled standby counsel to represent him. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial credible evidence that Wilson unequivocally waived his right to counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently; and (2) Wilson's sentence was legal because the length of the commitment was within the district court's statutory authority, the court took the sentencing criteria of Mont. Code Ann. 46-18-225(2) into account, and the court did not punish Wilson for refusing to confess to his crimes. View "State v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Ross Habets pled guilty to aggravated assault. The district court sentenced Habets to a one-year commitment to the Department of Corrections followed by placement at the state prison for nineteen years. Habets appealed, arguing that (1) the district court failed to account for Habets's mental illness and his attempts to seek health treatment before the incident in violation of Montana's sentencing policy and principles, and (2) the court failed to comply with the rehabilitative section of the sentencing policy statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court followed the law in this case by properly considering the necessary factors in sentencing Habets. View "State v. Habets" on Justia Law

Donald Puhto and his sister, Janet Barrett, commenced an action against Defendant Smith Funeral Chapels, alleging negligence and misrepresentation in the handling of their deceased uncle's remains. Counsel for Puhto and Barrett withdrew from the representation. Defendant's counsel then sent Puhto and Barrett a notice of removal of attorney for plaintiffs informing them of the need to appoint a new attorney or appear in person at a show cause hearing. After Puhto and Barrett failed to respond to the notice of removal and failed to appear at the hearing, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice. The court subsequently set aside the dismissal as to Barrett. The court then denied Puhto's motion to set aside the dismissal and request for an evidentiary hearing, finding that Puhto did not raise sufficient indications of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Puhto had not shown the district court abused its discretion in determining he had not proven excusable neglect.

Following a jury trial, Larry Daniels was convicted of deliberate homicide. In defense, Daniels asserted justifiable use of force. Daniels' arguments on appeal pertained to the 2009 legislative changes to the justifiable use of force statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) justifiable use of force is still an affirmative defense, and the defendant has the initial burden of providing evidence to raise the defense, and then the burden of proof shifts to the State; (2) the district court correctly disallowed cross-examination concerning specific instances of the victim's violent acts under Mont. R. Evid. 405(a); (3) proper foundation was necessary before the victim's character evidence could be admitted, and under the facts of this case, the district court correctly required Daniels to lay a proper foundation by testifying; and (4) the district court correctly refused Daniels' proposed jury instructions on justifiable use of force in defense of an occupied structure and burglary as a forcible felony.

Rodrick Cameron was charged with driving under the influence (DUI). Cameron filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the deputy sheriff that stopped Cameron's vehicle lacked particularized suspicion to stop him. The justice court denied Cameron's motion. Cameron entered a guilty plea to DUI while reserving his right to appeal the justice court's denial of his motion to suppress. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the district court did not err in affirming the justice court's denial of Cameron's motion to suppress because, based on the totality of the circumstances, the deputy sheriff had sufficient facts to form a particularized suspicion of wrongdoing to initiate an investigative stop.