Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jesse Kirk was convicted by a jury of burglary and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. The district court issued a pre-trial order denying Kirk's motion to sever the counts, concluding that the counts in the amended information were properly joined and that severance was not required to avoid an unfair trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the burglary and drug charges were linked by a common motive and because the burglary occasioned the second charge of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, the counts in the amended information were properly joined; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that severance was not required to avoid an unfair trial where Kirk did not prove that, while he may have faced some prejudice as a result of the joint trial, the prejudice was so great that it prevented a fair trial. View "State v. Kirk" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's twin sons were born with physical and mental disabilities and required full-time care and supervision. Upon his divorce from Mother, Father was ordered to pay child support. Father's obligation to provide child support ceased upon the twins' graduation from high school. Mother later requested continued child support from Father once the twins turned nineteen. The district court concluded that Mont. Code Ann. 40-6-214 did not allow an order imposing such support but that the statute provided the court with authority to order a parent to support an adult child who is poor and unable to maintain himself if the parent does not do so. Mother subsequently filed a second petition, and the district court found it had the authority to order Father to support the twins based on information he was not providing for them to the extent of his ability. The Supreme Court consolidated the two proceedings on appeal and affirmed, holding that the district court had the statutory authority to order Father to support the twins and that section 40-6-214 imposed a duty on Father to support the twins "to the extent of his ability." View "In re M.A.S." on Justia Law

The Fronks (Fronks) purchased two pieces of property from the Collinses (Collins), and the parties entered into an oral agreement whereby Collins would acquire horses and Collins would be entitled to keep the first foal from each mare as payment for their services. Fronks later transferred $215,000 to Collins for the acquisition of the horses. Fronks later deeded the properties back to Collins with the understanding that Collins would reconvey the land back to Fronks within five years. The parties subsequently signed an agreement setting forth each party's obligations. When Collins did not comply with the agreement, Fronks brought an action for breach of contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and misrepresentation seeking, inter alia, to enforce the agreement and recover damages, obtain ownership of the real property, and recover attorney fees. The district court determined that the agreement was a valid, enforceable contract and granted summary judgment to Fronks. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agreement was a valid contract and the agreement did not suffer from a lack of consent by virtue of duress or menace. View "Fronk v. Collins" on Justia Law

Husband and Wife had been married for almost seventeen years when Wife petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage. A temporary order of protection was issued against Husband to protect Wife and the couple's three children. The district court subsequently issued a final order of protection (FOP) requiring that Husband stay 300 feet away from Wife at all times and that he have only telephonic and supervised in-person contact with the children. The marriage was then dissolved. Husband later filed a motion to dissolve the FOP. The district court left the FOP in effect, reasoning that under Mont. Code Ann. 40-15-204(5), it did not have the legal authority to terminate the FOP without Wife's request for termination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court misinterpreted the law as set forth in section 40-15-204(5), as a district court has the authority to continue or terminate an order of protection notwithstanding the petitioner's desires. Remanded. View "Albrecht v. Albrecht" on Justia Law

Mother and Father's parental rights to their children were terminated by the district court. Before the district court's judgment, Mother had moved to transfer to the case to a tribal court as allowed under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). However, the case was never transferred. The district court maintained jurisdiction and denied Mother's request to continue the termination hearing and appoint counsel for the children. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not comply with the jurisdictional ICWA transfer requirements where the court misinterpreted the ICWA requirement to require an affirmative acceptance of the transfer by the tribe; and (2) because there was an apparent conflict between the children's wishes and what the guardian ad litem concluded to be in the children's best interests, counsel for children should be appointed on remand. Remanded. View "In re J.W.C." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife's marriage was dissolved in Mississippi. The decree awarded Husband custody of Son and Wife custody of Daughter. Subsequently, Husband and Son moved to Montana, and Wife and Daughter moved to Arizona. Husband petitioned the district court in Montana to modify the child support award for Son. The district court denied the petition and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum because Husband and Son had moved back to Mississippi and Wife and Daughter were residing in Arizona. The court then relinquished jurisdiction of Son to the Arizona. Husband and Son later moved back to Montana, and Husband petitioned the district court to reduce accrued child support to a money judgment. The district court noted jurisdiction had been relinquished to the Arizona court and declined to exercise further jurisdiction on the basis that it was an inconvenient forum. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly applied the Montana Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) in determining it did not have jurisdiction over the matter because the UCCJEA applies to child custody matters, not child support matters. Remanded. View "Ervin v. Ervin" on Justia Law

Marjorie Ward established a trust that devised $100,000 to her stepdaughter, Joan, and provided that the trust residue be distributed in equal shares to Ward's sons, Jack and James. Ward also instructed that before Jack would receive any distributions from the trust, his share would be decreased, and Joan's increased, by any amount he owed Joan. After Ward died, the district court concluded Jack's share would be reduced by $298,356, the amount he owed Joan on the date of Ward's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court complied with the requirements of Mont. R. Civ. P. 52(a) by orally stating its findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (2) the district court did not err in ordering that Jack's share of the trust be reduced by the amount he owed his stepsister, pursuant to Ward's instructions contained in the trust, even though that debt was previously discharged in bankruptcy proceedings. View "Ward v. Ward" on Justia Law

Defendant crashed into a car driven by a seventeen-year-old. The victim suffered several injuries, including a shattered ankle. Defendant subsequently entered a guilty plea to felony criminal endangerment and was sentenced to ten years' incarceration with all but 180 days suspended. The district court also ordered Defendant to pay restitution for the victim's summer wages, the victim's father's lost wages, and unpaid medical expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly imposed restitution for lost wages, and (2) the district court did not exceed the bounds of reason or act arbitrarily under the circumstances in imposing the maximum length sentence allowed under statute. View "State v. Dodson" on Justia Law

The district court terminated Mother's rights to her two minor children after determining that Mother had willfully surrendered custody of her children for a period of six months and that Mother had abandoned her children in accordance with Mont. Code Ann. 41-3-609(1). Mother appealed, contending that she could not surrender custody because she never possessed custody. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Mother abandoned her children under the circumstances where (1) Mother had physical custody of her children until 2006, and (2) Mother made no manifestation of an intent to resume custody of the children. View "In re E.M.S." on Justia Law

Riley Styren's vehicle was struck by Sherry Roos's vehicle. Styren and the owner of her vehicle (collectively, Styren) filed a complaint against Roos, Roos's mother, Julia, and Curtis Stordahl, who together owned the car Roos was driving. The complaint alleged claims of negligence against Roos and negligent entrustment and liability under the family purpose doctrine against Julia and Stordahl. The district court granted summary judgment for Julia and Stordahl. A jury then found Roos was not negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly (1) granted summary judgment to Julia on the negligent entrustment claim as there was no evidence that Julia knew that Roos was an incompetent driver or that Roos would drive in a manner that created an unreasonable risk to others; (2) granted summary judgment to Julia on the family purpose doctrine claim where Styren did not meet her burden to raise genuine issues of material fact in opposition to Julia's motion; and (3) denied Styren's motion for a new trial where Styren did not meet her burden on appeal to demonstrate that the district court erred and the jury's verdict was legal and supported by substantial evidence. View "Styren Farms v. Roos" on Justia Law