Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Wagners owned property along a river, which was subject to restrictive covenants. Brian Woodward purchased adjacent property that was subject to the same covenants. Woodward later added onto the deck of the home he purchased and built a split-rail fence along his east and west property lines. The Wagners sued, claiming Woodward's additions violated the restrictive covenants. The district court determined (1) the fences did not violate the covenants, but (2) the deck addition violated the covenants. The court ordered Woodward to remove the deck addition. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the district court's order requiring Woodward to remove the deck addition from his home, holding (1) any violation of the covenant by the deck addition was de minimus, and (2) given Woodward's detrimental reliance of the Wagners' failure to timely enforce the covenants as they pertained to his home and the absolute absence of damages to the Wagners, it would be inequitable to compel removal of the deck addition. View "Wagner v. Woodward" on Justia Law

Appellants and Bank entered a loan agreement in which Bank agreed to lend Appellants $5 million. After Bank refused to disburse further funds under the loan, Appellants sued Bank. Bank was represented by the Crowley Fleck law firm (Crowley). During the ensuing litigation, an attorney that was working with the law firm representing Appellants (Lawyer) joined Crowley as an attorney. Appellants subsequently filed motions to disqualify Crowley from representing Bank in the case and to permanently enjoin Crowley from proceeding in the litigation. The trial court denied Appellants' motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellants' motions where (1) Lawyer, who was engaged in concrete discussions of future employment with the adversary's law firm, did not promptly inform Appellant, terminate all further discussions concerning the employment, or withdraw from representing Appellant; (2) the conflict was concurrent and thus imputed to Crowley; and (3) the measures Crowley took were inadequate to preserve Appellants' confidences. View "Krutzfeldt Ranch, LLC v. Pinnacle Bank" on Justia Law

Phil and Valerie married in 2003 and commenced dissolution proceedings in 2005. After five years of litigation, the district court held bifurcated bench trials to address three separate aspects of the dissolution: the parenting plan, child support obligations, and division of the marital estate. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining and distributing the marital estate; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the couple's children would reside primarily with Valerie under the final parenting plan; and (3) the district court did not err in calculating Phil's child support payments. View "In re Marriage of Tummarello" on Justia Law

Kevin and June Funk were married in 1990. In 1996, Kevin inherited several acres of lakefront and non-lakefront property, several vehicles, and an undisclosed amount of cash. June filed for dissolution in 2009. In distributing the marital assets upon dissolution, the district court included Kevin's inherited real property in the marital assets and awarded a portion to June. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's award of one of the vehicles to June and its valuation of Kevin's lakefront property; and (2) remanded for the district court to assess the factors set forth in Mont. Code Ann. 202(1) in determining the legal basis for an award to June of a portion of the value of the lakefront property. View "In re Marriage of Funk" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Rhonda Hall was sentenced on her conviction of charges of obstructing a peace officer, disorderly conduct, and assault with a bodily fluid. At the conclusion of the City's case, the district court judge expressed her concern that the City had not presented sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof. Defense counsel subsequently filed a motion that the case be dismissed for insufficient evidence, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding that inasmuch as the court dismissed the City's case against Hall for insufficient evidence, Hall stood acquitted and could not be retried, and the City had no appeal from the district court's decision. View "City of Cut Bank v. Hall" on Justia Law

The City of Dillon filed a civil action against George Warner seeking to recover the costs of installation of a water meter. Judge Gregory Mohr ruled on several motions filed by the city and conducted a scheduling conference. Warner subsequently filed an affidavit of disqualification against Mohr. The judge that presided over the disqualification proceeding (1) found Warner's affidavit of disqualification was insufficient as a matter of law and was therefore void; and (2) ordered that Mohr would maintain jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Warner's appeal, finding that the city court order concerning Warner's attempt to disqualify Mohr was an interim order and was therefore not appealable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed Warner's appeal, as it was from an interim order and not a final judgment; and (2) the district court's orders dismissing the appeal were interim orders and thus not appealable to the Court. View "City of Dillon v. Warner" on Justia Law

James Whealon was employed by the Anaconda School District pursuant to a series of employment contracts. Upon retirement, Whealon filed a formal grievance, asserting that, under the terms of his contract, he was entitled to payment of his health insurance premiums by the District until he reached the age of sixty-five. The District denied his claim. The County Superintendent granted summary judgment to the District, holding that the language of the contract was unambiguous and that Whealon was not entitled to the claimed benefits beyond the date of his retirement. The State Superintendent of Public Instruction reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the language of the contract was ambiguous. The district court reversed and reinstated the County Superintendent's ruling. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the district court did not err in holding that a county superintendent has authority to grant summary judgment; and (2) the district court did not err in reinstating summary judgment in favor of the district where the language of the agreement was unambiguous and the District was entitled to judgment. View "Anaconda Public Schools v. Whealon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Blaine Fadness was convicted of three counts of attempted deliberate homicide. One of the conditions of Defendant's suspended sentence was that he not own, possess, or be in control of any firearms of deadly weapons. The county attorney subsequently filed a petition for order of disposing of evidence, seeking an order giving him authority to sell Defendant's firearms, dangerous weapons, ammunition, and other equipment that the government had seized for use in the investigation and trial. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in permitting the State to sell items that were not firearms, ammunition, or deadly weapons, as Defendant was entitled to have those items returned; (2) did not err in denying Defendant possession of the firearms, ammunition, and deadly weapons; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to sell Defendant's firearms, ammunition, with the proceeds to go to Defendant's father as an agent for Defendant, rather than releasing the items to Defendant's parents, who had no plan for selling them and little or no knowledge about how to do so. Remanded. View "State v. Fadness" on Justia Law

T.M.L. was seventeen when he pled guilty to felony burglary and misdemeanor criminal trespass to vehicles. The youth court entered a dispositional order providing that T.M.L. be placed on probation until he reached age eighteen, after which supervision was to be transferred to the district court and adult probation and parole department. After T.M.L. turned eighteen, the youth court transferred T.M.L.'s matter to district court and transferred T.M.L.'s supervision to adult supervision under the department of corrections. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the youth court's denial of T.M.L.'s motion to dismiss where the youth court had jurisdiction over T.M.L.; and (2) remanded the matter for the limited purpose of striking the condition that T.M.L. register as a sexual offender as a condition of T.M.L.'s sentence, as the youth court did not have the power to require T.M.L. to register as a sexual offender. View "In re T.M.L." on Justia Law

Husband appealed from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution entered by the district court, which dissolved the marriage of Husband and Wife, determined Husband's child support obligation, and adopted a parenting plan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) imputed $90,000 in annual disposable income to Husband for purposes of calculating his child support obligation, and (2) did not follow the recommendation of the parenting evaluator that Husband be allowed "make up" visitation days for those days he missed visitation while working out of town. View "In re Marriage of Everett" on Justia Law