Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Casey Stuivnga and Britni Evans were injured in a single-vehicle accident. The vehicle was owned by Stuivenga. Both Stuivenga and Evans claimed the other person was driving and was liable to the other for their injuries. They both sought proceeds available under an automobile insurance policy issued to Stuivenga by Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Progressive determined that Evans' and Stuivenga's competing claims could not be settled in an amount equal to or less than the policy's per person liability limit of $25,000. Progressive commenced an interpleader action and deposited the $25,000 with the district court, asking the court to determine to whom the funds should be issued. Ultimately, a jury found that Evans was the driver at the time of the accident and released the $25,000 to Stuivenga. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this appeal was not moot, as the issue presented at the outset of the action of who was driving had not ceased to exist, and Stuivenga's payment of the funds to third parties did not render the Court unable to grant effective relief; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Evans' motion for a new trial. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Stuivenga" on Justia Law

The State removed two minor children from Mother's care and began abuse and neglect proceedings against Mother. The children were later adjudicated to be youths in need of care. After a dispositional hearing, the district court awarded Father sole custody of the children and dismissed the State's case. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the court did not err when it dismissed the State's abuse and neglect proceeding and placed the children with Father because the court followed statutory procedure in ordering placement of the children with Father, and Mother had a remedy by initiating an action for a parenting plan. View "In re S.S. " on Justia Law

Lake Cabin Development entered into two separate written agreements with the Robert Hurly and John Hurly families to purchase their respective properties. Pursuant to an agreement, Lake Cabin provided Robert Hurly with a $250,000 option payment. After public opposition to Lake Cabin's proposed development on the land forced Lake Cabin to extend the deadline on the closing date of its agreement with the Hurlys, Lake Cabin declared the contract to be null and void and demanded return of its option payment. Both Hurly families brought separate breach of contract actions. The district court concluded that Robert Hurly was required to refund the $250,000 option payment to Lake Cabin because there was never an enforceable contract between the parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in determining that the parties had not entered into a binding agreement, and (2) Lake Cabin was not entitled to a refund of the option payment. Remanded. View "Hurly v. Lake Cabin Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between Cascade Development, Inc. and the City of Bozeman. On December 7, 2007, Cascade filed a complaint alleging various claims against Bozeman. A summons and complaint were issued by the clerk's office on the same day, but service was not attempted by Cascade for nearly three years. On December 2, 2010, a professional process server took the summons and complaint to the city attorney's office, and a deputy city attorney took the papers. Bozeman filed a motion to quash service and dismiss the complaint, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court was correct in determining that Cascade had not validly served its summons and complaint on Bozeman pursuant to Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(t), as the deputy city attorney had neither implied authority nor apparent authority to accept service of process on behalf of Bozeman; and (2) the district court was correct in concluding that Bozeman was not estopped from asserting defective service of process. View "Cascade Dev., Inc. v. City of Bozeman" on Justia Law

Clayton DeVoe applied for a building permit for a large storage building to be located on a lot in an area zoned for single-family residences. The City of Missoula issued a building permit pursuant to applicable zoning regulations. After DeVoe began construction, the Board of Adjustment revoked DeVoe's building permit, finding that the storage building was in violation of the zoning regulations. DeVoe filed a civil action in the district court against, inter alia, the Board of Adjustment, the City, and two individuals. The district court granted the individuals' motions to dismiss and awarded attorney fees and costs to the individuals because DeVoe had forced them to defend a frivolous action. The court then upheld the Board's decision to revoke the building permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly upheld the decision of the Board revoking the building permit for DeVoe's storage building; and (2) the court did not err in awarding attorney fees and costs to the two individuals. View "DeVoe v. City of Missoula" on Justia Law

Tina Blackmore filed a complaint against Marvin Dunster alleging damages arising from an assault and unlawful restraint. The district court entered a judgment against Dunster. Dunster subsequently filed an unrelated personal injury action in the district court. While that case was pending, the clerk of the district court issued a writ of execution directing a levying officer to satisfy the balance due to Blackmore out of Dunster's personal property. The writ specifically instructed the officer to seize and sell Dunster's personal injury cause of action. Blackmore purchased Dunster's cause of action for fifty dollars. The district court set aside the sale of Dunster's cause of action on the ground that a personal injury action was not subject to levy before judgment was entered. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Montana law does not allow the levy or sale of a personal injury cause of action before judgment is entered. View "Blackmore v. Dunster" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Hardman was found guilty by a jury of deliberate homicide and tampering with evidence. The district court sentenced Hardman to 110 years in prison with no parole eligibility for thirty years. Hardman appealed his conviction and sought a new trial, contending that the district court made numerous erroneous evidentiary rulings amounting to cumulative error and requiring reversal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of the evidentiary rulings save one, which was the court's admission into evidence of an irrelevant photograph of Hardmann holding a gun at a shooting range, but there was no reasonable probability that the photograph contributed to Hardman's conviction, and cumulative error did not require reversal of Hardman's conviction. View "State v. Hardman" on Justia Law

Douglas Kirn was charged with two felony counts of assault on a police officer by causing reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury by use of a weapon. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, and Kirn was convicted. Kirn appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Kirn's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence because, under these circumstances, the State presented sufficient evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Kirn" on Justia Law

Kevin Kichnet was babysitting his young nieces when he met three-year-old Eternity after the Head Start bus dropped her off after school. Kichnet was allegedly holding her hand as they crossed the street when Eternity collapsed. Kitchnet called 9-1-1. After Eternity reached the hospital she was pronounced dead. Kichnet was subsequently arrested for deliberate homicide and jailed. More than six months later, charges against Kichnet were dropped when it was determined that the Head Start school bus had run over Eternity. Kichnet sued (1) Butte-Silver Bow County, claiming County law enforcement officers performed their investigation negligently, resulting in Kichnet's arrest and incarceration; and (2) the State, claiming that the State Medical Examiner performed his duties negligently when he reported Eternity's death as a homicide. The district court granted the County's and State's motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in its judgment, as (1) the State was immune under the cited statutes from Kichnet's negligence claim; and (2) the court did not err in determining that there was probable cause for the arrest and incarceration of Kichnet, and that the investigation by the County was not negligent. View "Kichnet v. Butte-Silver Bow County" on Justia Law

After receiving reports of an erratic driver, a deputy sheriff approached the driver of a truck matching the report's description and asked the driver, William Muller, to perform a field sobriety test and to take a preliminary breath test. Muller refused both tests, after which the deputy sheriff arrested Muller for DUI. Muller again refused to submit to a breath test at the detention center, which resulted in the automatic suspension of his license. The district court denied Muller's subsequent petition for reinstatement of drivers license. Muller appealed, arguing that he was not properly arrested for DUI. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly determined that the deputy officer legally arrested Muller, and therefore, the court did not err in denying Muller's petition for reinstatement of driver's license. View "Muller v. Dep't of Justice" on Justia Law