Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the plaintiff, Billy Ann Merila, sought the expulsion of her business partner, Daniel Brian Burke, from their partnership, MBC. MBC is a business entity that owns a single piece of real property and rents it out for income. Merila alleged that Burke engaged in conduct that made it not reasonably practicable for her to carry on the business in partnership with him. Burke, a certified public accountant, was convicted on six charges of aiding and assisting tax fraud, unrelated to MBC, and sentenced to prison. He also unilaterally changed the partnership's depository without Merila's consent, limited her authority over MBC funds, refused to communicate with her directly, and appointed a third-party agent to act on his behalf. He also attempted to amend the partnership's tax returns and capital accounts without Merila's consent or knowledge.The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Merila, finding that Burke's conduct made it not reasonably practicable for her to carry on the business in partnership with him. The court also ordered the parties to negotiate a purchase price for Burke's interest in MBC. Burke appealed the decision.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court noted that the relevant standard for expelling a partner is whether the partner's conduct has made it not reasonably practicable for the other to carry on the business in partnership, not whether the partnership suffered damages or harm. The Court found that Burke's refusal to interact with Merila, his unilateral decisions affecting the partnership, and his conviction of tax fraud constituted conduct that made it not reasonably practicable for Merila to carry on the business with him as a partner. It affirmed the lower court's decision to expel Burke from the partnership and order him to negotiate a purchase price for his interest in MBC. View "Merila v. Burke" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, defendant Nels Jerry Peterson appealed his conviction on the offense of sexual assault against his eleven-year-old step-granddaughter (Q.H.). The main contention was the District Court’s decision to permit evidence of Peterson’s prior sexual conduct with other young girls under M. R. Evid. 404(b) and 403. The court concluded that some of the evidence may have been admissible for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), but the potential for unfair prejudice substantially outweighed its probative value as presented. The details of Peterson’s prior sexual misconduct were not more abhorrent than the current charge. However, the frequency and manner of the State’s references to them throughout the trial risked inducing the jury’s hostility toward Peterson, resulting in unfair prejudice. Further, the State did not meet its burden to show no reasonable possibility that its use of the tainted evidence might have contributed to Peterson’s conviction. Therefore, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Peterson" on Justia Law

This case is an appeal from a District Court order enforcing a Water Court decree related to water rights in Big Warm Creek, in Phillips County. Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC (LBWR) argued against the enforcement order and Wilfred Doll cross-appealed a ruling denying attorney fees. The parties have a complex history related to land sales and shared water rights with the same priority date. The water rights in question were co-equal in priority, meaning neither party could "call" on the other to decrease their water usage during times of low flow.The District Court allocated the parties' rights on a percent basis, which LBWR argued was erroneous. LBWR also contended that Doll should not be allowed to leave water instream at the Ester Headgate (a point of diversion). Doll, on the other hand, contended that he was entitled to attorney fees.The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. The Court found that the District Court correctly allocated the parties' rights on a percent basis and that it was correct in determining that Doll may leave water instream at the Ester Headgate. The Court also affirmed the District Court's refusal to award Doll attorney fees, reasoning that there was no prevailing party in the underlying dispute. View "Little Big Warm v. Doll" on Justia Law

In Montana, Hannah Rose Kuntz was charged with Violation of a Protective Order and pleaded not guilty. The City of Great Falls requested multiple continuances due to witness unavailability, with the final one being due to a key witness being quarantined due to exposure to COVID-19. The trial was set for a date beyond the statutory six-month deadline for a speedy trial, prompting Kuntz to file a motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial. The Municipal Court denied the motion, citing good cause due to public health concerns and uncertainty about the ability to convene the requisite number of jurors due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Kuntz changed her plea to guilty and later appealed the Municipal Court's order to the District Court. The District Court affirmed the Municipal Court's determination of good cause for delay.Upon Kuntz's appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court found that the Municipal Court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and that its legal conclusions were correct. It was determined that the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding trial scheduling and the COVID-19 pandemic provided good cause for the delay in Kuntz's trial. The Supreme Court also highlighted that the Municipal Court was in the best position to assess local trends and manage its docket in accordance with health risks. The court concluded that there was no prejudice to Kuntz and that the public health risks outweighed any potential prejudice, providing good cause to delay the trial two days beyond the deadline. View "Great Falls v. Kuntz" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the decision of the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, committing the appellant, C.M., a youth, to the custody of the Department of Corrections for placement in a state youth correctional facility until the age of 18. The appellant was charged with sex offenses against three of his high school classmates and he appealed the decision on the grounds that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to make objections to the admission of various hearsay statements.The court concluded that the appellant's counsel's failure to object to the admission of hearsay statements did not result in substantial prejudice. The court noted that the state presented sufficient admissible evidence to the jury that proved the same facts as the prior consistent statements and bus records. Furthermore, the court found that the appellant's counsel vigorously challenged the complaining witnesses' testimony by highlighting inconsistencies and gaps in their testimony, as well as aspects of the investigation. As a result, the court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient performance by his counsel and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Matter of C.M" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana had to decide if the Thirteenth Judicial District Court erred by disallowing a stipulated agreement for entry of a consent judgment between American Express National Bank (Amex) and Jocelyn Born (Born), and subsequently dismissing the action with prejudice.Born had accumulated a debt of $20,754.69 on her American Express credit card that she failed to repay, despite Amex’s demands for repayment. The parties had entered into a stipulation and consent agreement where Born agreed to the entry of judgment for the amount of her debt, plus costs. After some payments by Born, the amount owed had reduced to $19,368.19. The District Court initially entered a consent judgment for the reduced amount but later the same day vacated the judgment and dismissed the litigation with prejudice.Amex appealed this decision arguing that the District Court misunderstood the nature of the stipulation and consent agreement and treated it as a "cognovit judgment" - a judgment entered in advance of legal action in case of default, rather than a "judgment on consent" - an agreed judgment entered after action is commenced.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana agreed with Amex's argument, finding that the stipulation was a valid consent judgment and constituted a contract between the parties. The court held that the District Court erred in vacating the judgment and abused its discretion by denying Amex's motion for relief. The court reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the matter for entry of a consent judgment as contemplated by the parties' stipulation. View "American Express v. Born" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by William Russell and Mountain View Investments, LLC, (MVI) against a judgment from the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, in favor of 360 Reclaim, LLC. The dispute revolves around a twenty-acre parcel of land in Montana which was purchased by Russell in 2010 and later foreclosed due to defaulted loan payments. 360 Reclaim purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale and then started charging Russell for storage and cleanup of items left on the property. Russell attempted to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, but his payment was rejected as insufficient by 360 Reclaim, which calculated a higher redemption amount that included cleanup costs. The District Court determined that 360 Reclaim was entitled to include cleanup costs as maintenance expenses, rendering Russell's redemption invalid.However, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Montana held that "maintenance expenses," as used in the redemption statute, do not include cleanup costs for the removal of a redemptioner’s personal property. The court found that 360 Reclaim took a calculated risk in purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale, knowing its condition and the presence of Russell's personal property. The court reversed the judgment of the District Court and remanded the case for further findings and conclusions consistent with this decision. The lower court was directed to determine what credits, if any, Russell and MVI are entitled to against the redemption price and whether Russell’s offer of redemption was in substantial compliance with the redemption statutes. View "360 Reclaim v. Russell" on Justia Law

In the case, Jose Martinez Jr. was convicted by a jury in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, for two counts of incest, criminal distribution of dangerous drugs, solicitation to commit tampering with witnesses or informants, and three counts of criminal contempt. This case arose from allegations by Martinez's stepdaughter, S.M., that he had been sexually abusing her since she was 10 years old. The trial court allowed the admission of statements made by S.M. to a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) and a physician, despite Martinez's objection that their admission violated his right of confrontation as S.M. was not present to testify at the trial.The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed Martinez's conviction. It held that S.M.'s statements to the physician were nontestimonial and made for purposes of medical treatment, and thus, were admissible under Montana Rule of Evidence 803(4). However, the court found that S.M.'s statements to the SANE were testimonial and their admission violated Martinez's right to confrontation. Nevertheless, the court ruled that this error was harmless given other evidence produced at trial and because the SANE's testimony was cumulative.The court's decision reflected the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements in the context of the right to confrontation, and the admissibility of statements for purposes of medical treatment under the rules of evidence. The court also demonstrated the application of the harmless error doctrine in the context of a Confrontation Clause violation. View "State v. Martinez" on Justia Law

In this case, Lindsay Burns Barbier contested the validity of the 2016 will of her father, Horatio Burns, alleging that her brother Cameron and his wife Alison exerted undue influence over Horatio. The Supreme Court of the State of Montana upheld the validity of the will and the awarding of attorney fees to Horatio’s Estate, but reversed the awarding of attorney fees to Alison and the calculation of interest on the attorney fees. The court found that the lower court did not err in allowing Alison to file a response to Lindsay's petition contesting the will, despite Lindsay's objection that it was untimely and that Alison's interests were fully represented by the Estate. The court also found that Lindsay was not entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct. In terms of attorney fees, the court determined that Alison was not entitled to an award of fees under state law as she was defending her own interest in the will and her participation was not required to defend the validity of the will. Finally, the court found that the lower court incorrectly calculated the applicable interest rate on the attorney fees awarded to the Estate. View "In re Burns" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal by Bryce Caleb Hamernick, against his conviction for Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (SIWOC) in the Fourth Judicial District Court. The Supreme Court of Montana considered whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury that to find Hamernick guilty, it needed to determine that he was simply aware of the high probability that the victim did not consent to the sexual intercourse.The court's decision mainly revolved around the interpretation of the term "knowingly" used in the Montana Code Annotated (MCA) to define the mental state required for the crime of SIWOC. The District Court had used two different definitions of "knowingly" for the two elements of the crime. For the act of sexual intercourse, the court used the "conduct-based" definition, that Hamernick must have been aware of his conduct. For the element of "without consent," the court instructed that Hamernick must have been aware of a high probability that the sexual intercourse was without consent, which the appellant argued lowered the state's burden of proof.The Supreme Court of Montana found that the District Court erred in its instruction. It held that the crime of SIWOC is a conduct-based offense, necessitating an "awareness of conduct" mental state. The court stated that the crime does not consist of sexual intercourse with a high probability the other person does not consent; rather, it is sexual intercourse with the awareness that it is without that person’s consent. The Supreme Court of Montana thus reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "State v. Hamernick" on Justia Law