Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Davie Lin Lloyd (Davie) appealed a Parenting Plan Order entered by the district court. Davie and Brett Camaron Lloyd (Brett) were married in 1997, and are the parents of one minor child, M.K.L. In 2004, the district court issued a decree of dissolution and parenting plan, which awarded Davie residential custody and included an attorney’s fees provision. After the dissolution, Davie moved with M.K.L. from Texas to Oklahoma to Kentucky, and finally, to Florida. In the summer of 2009, the parties’ communication disintegrated when they disagreed over Brett’s summer visitation and as a result, M.K.L. never visited Brett that summer. Due to this communication breakdown, Brett initiated legal proceedings in Montana to enforce the parenting plan. The district court held a hearing on the parenting issues in 2011 and issued its order. The Order gave Brett residential custody of M.K.L., and included a provision requiring that for each vacation M.K.L. would be transferred to the parent with visitation rights on the evening of the last day of school before the break and would remain with that parent until the evening before school would resume. Brett filed a request that the District Court enforce the attorney’s fees provision in the 2004 Parenting Plan and award Brett his attorney’s fees. The District Court approved that request on August 16, 2011, and on August 24, 2011, Davie filed an M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief from the judgment awarding attorney’s fees. Counsel for Brett submitted an affidavit containing a statement of attorney’s fees on August 29, 2011, to which Davie did not object. On September 21, 2011, the District Court denied Davie’s motion and approved the amount of the fees. Finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to award attorney's fees, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Marriage of Lloyd" on Justia Law

Petitioner Emily Blodgett petitioned the Supreme Court for a Writ of Supervisory Control alleging that the Missoula County Justice Court violated sections 3-10-231 through -234, MCA; Article VII Sections 1 and 5 of the Montana Constitution, and several of the Court's prior decisions when it allowed a retired district court judge to preside over her jury trial. Petitioner contended that the presiding justice of the peace improperly called the judge to preside over the case even though the justice was present in her court but otherwise involved with another case. Finding that though the retired judge was qualified by his training and experience to act as a substitute justice of the peace, he was not one at the time he presided over Petitioner's trial because the statutory procedures to vested him with the power to perform judicial functions as a substitute justice of the peace had not been followed. Consequently, any purported judicial acts performed by the judge in this case were void ab initio. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's request for a Writ of Supervisory Control and held that Petitioner's jury trial was void ab initio. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Blodgett v. Missoula JP Court" on Justia Law

The district court entered a decree in 2011 dissolving the marriage of Petitioner Aylynn King (Aly) and Joseph King (Joe) and establishing a parenting plan with respect to their two-and-a-half-year-old child, B.K. Aly challenged: (1) the District Court’s denial of her request to change the child’s surname to Matté, the surname that was restored to Aly after the dissolution, and (2) the parenting plan, which provides that B.K. will reside with Joe two days a week during most of the year, and five to seven days a week for about six weeks each summer. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no basis upon which to reverse the district court's decisions in this case, and affirmed the court's decisions. View "Marriage of King" on Justia Law

This matter involved two cases, one involving two youths who appeared in youth court for detention hearings and one involving an adult who pled guilty to driving under the influence in justice court. After appearing in district court, the youths filed motions to substitute district court judge, and the court denied the motions as untimely. After the adult pled guilty in justice court, she appealed only the justice court's denial of her pretrial suppression motion, which the district court denied as untimely. The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of supervisory control for the youths and denied it for the adult, holding (1) the district court improperly determined that the youths had filed untimely motions for substitution of district judge; and (2) the district court correctly denied the adult's motion for substitution of district court judge, as no right exists under Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804 to substitute a district judge in an appeal of a specific pre-trial legal ruling from justice court. View "Bledsoe v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant James Davis appealed from his conviction of one count of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability, claiming that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he provided assistance in the drug deal that preceded his charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not have found that Davis purposely promoted or facilitated the sale of drugs, and therefore, the district court erred when it denied Davis' motion to dismiss the charge of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs by accountability on the basis of insufficient evidence. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the Montana Board of Oil & Gas Conservation's (MBOGC) issuance of twenty-three gas well permits to Fidelity Exploration and Production Company in the area known as the Cedar Creek Anticline (CCA). The Montana Wildlife Federation and National Wildlife Federation (collectively, Federations) challenged the issuance of the permits. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, MBOGC, Fidelity, and Montana Petroleum Association, holding that the Federations failed to rebut the presumption of validity in the MBOGC's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) conducting its review under Mont. Code Ann. 82-11-144 and in considering evidence outside the administrative record; (2) determining that the environmental assessments prepared by MBOGC for gas development in the CCA were adequate under the Montana Environmental Policy Act; and (3) ruling that MBOGC did not have to prepare a programmatic environmental impact statement for oil and gas development in the CCA. View "Mont. Wildlife Fed'n v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Miller was convicted of the deliberate homicide after a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Miller subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and that his appellate counsel's failure to raise his trial counsel's ineffectiveness on direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed Miller's petition for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Miller had exhausted his remedy of appeal and that his ineffectiveness claims were record-based assertions which he did or reasonably could have raised on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Miller's claims against his trial counsel were without merit, and thus, he could not state a claim of ineffectiveness against his appellate counsel for failing to raise ineffectiveness claims against his trial counsel in his direct appeal. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Anthony Leyva with sexual intercourse without consent. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the charge and filed an amended information charging Leyva with burglary by remaining unlawfully in the victim's home with the purpose to commit a sexual assault therein. Defendant was subsequently convicted of burglary following his plea of guilty. The district court sentenced him to twenty years in prison, fifteen years of which the court suspended on numerous conditions. Leyva appealed the conditions of his suspended sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court erred in imposing a condition designating Leyva as a Level II sexual offender, as, pursuant to controlling precedent, a district court cannot attach a sexual offender designation to a burglary conviction. Remanded for correction of the sentence. View "State v. Leyva" on Justia Law

The district court determined that Plaintiffs Nigel and Jami Davis held an easement over the properties of Defendants, four property owners, and that the Davises could use the easement for the purpose of accessing their nearby property. The district court permanently enjoined Defendants from placing any gate across the easement unless they provided the Davises with a means to pass through the gate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a 1974 declaration of easements and a 1974 certificate of survey referenced in the declaration were sufficient to create an access easement benefitting the Davises' off-survey property; and (2) an express easement may be appurtenant to noncontinguous property if both tenements are clearly defined and it was the parties' intent that it be appurtenant. View "Davis v. Hall" on Justia Law

Defendant entered into a contract for deed for the sale and purchase of Plaintiffs' building. After Defendant discontinued making payments and failed to pay property taxes as required by the contract, Plaintiffs obtained Defendant' quit claim deed from escrow, recorded it, retook possession of the building, and resold the contract. Plaintiffs then filed suit against Defendant for breach of contract. Defendant moved to summary judgment, arguing that because Plaintiffs chose to terminate the contract, take possession, and retain contract payments as liquidated damages rather than sue for the accelerated balance and additional damages under the contract, their breach of contract action was precluded under the election of remedies doctrine. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs elected to invoke the remedy of terminating the contract and retaking possession of the property, and that election, under the contract provisions at issue, precluded the additional relief sought here. View "Kaufman Bros. v. Home Value Stores, Inc." on Justia Law