Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2011, the State filed identical Petitions for Emergency Protective Services, Adjudication of Youths in Need of Care, and for Temporary Legal Custody in two causes involving K.H. and K.M., the daughters of Appellee K.H. (Mother). The children were two and five years old, respectively, at the time of the petition. The petition was ultimately dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. Counsel for the children appealed the dismissal. The issues before the Supreme Court were whether the children had standing to appeal the dismissal of the State's petition for their adjudication as youths in need of care, and whether the district court erred in dismissing the State's petition. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matter of K.H. & K.M." on Justia Law

Defendant Laurie Kay Corbino appealed a district court's judgment and order of commitment. Defendant entered into a plea agreement wherein she pled guilty to felony burglary. Defendant admitted to entering the Lendmans’ residence and taking cosmetic items that belonged to them. In the presentence investigation report, Mrs. Lendman submitted an affidavit of pecuniary loss wherein she listed as missing two large bags of personal items and a large gold ring with opal, emeralds and diamonds. Because the other items were recovered, the only restitution Mrs. Lendman requested was $1,500 for the ring. Defendant admitted to taking the personal items, but denied taking the ring. The District Court also determined that "with no current resources, [the Defendant did not have the] ability to pay for the type of programs that she needs if she were on probation, including the [Cognitive Principles and Restructuring] program." Defense counsel objected to Defendant's sentence on the grounds that she was being incarcerated based on her inability to pay. The court denied Defendant's objection because, even though she had a counselor for her drug and alcohol addictions, Defendant's compulsive thievery was different than addiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the District Court properly applied the law to the facts of this case, and affirmed the district court's decision. View "Montana v. Corbino" on Justia Law

In 2007, Defendant Ralph Fox was charged with two counts of felony sexual assault against minor females, CS (Count I) and HS (Count II). A federal grand jury handed down an indictment in the United States District Court charging Defendant with three felony offenses: sexual exploitation of children, receipt of child pornography and possession of child pornography. He was convicted on all charges and sentenced to federal prison for 110 years. Subsequently, Defendant moved to dismiss the State action against him on the ground of double jeopardy. The District Court dismissed one count of sexual assault and Defendant was convicted on the remaining count. Nevertheless, the court sentenced Defendant to two fifty-year sentences (one for each count of sexual assault) and five years for failing to register as a sex offender. The fifty-year sentences were to run concurrently with each other and with the federal sentence. The five-year sentence was to run consecutively to the fifty-year sentences for assault but concurrently with the federal sentence. Defendant appealed, arguing the District Court erred when it sentenced him to a term of fifty years for the dismissed assault charge. He also claimed the court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the remaining assault charge. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The case was remanded to the District Court for correction of the illegally-imposed sentence pertaining to Count II. The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss Count I. View "Montana v. Fox" on Justia Law

This was a dispute over rights to use water from the Teton River in Montana. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt use water from the downstream portion of the Teton near Fort Benton, Montana. They claimed generally that they are damaged by diversion practices on the upstream portion of the Teton near Choteau, Montana, and that their "calls" on upstream appropriators to release water for their downstream use have been ignored. They first filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the District Court in February, 2011, and ultimately filed second and third amended petitions seeking to halt certain water diversions from the Teton. The issue underlying this case arose in part from the decision in "Perry v. Beattie." "Perry" decreed the priority date and flow rate of about 40 water right claims in the upper Teton River west of Choteau. The District Court appointed a Water Commissioner pursuant to 85-5-101, MCA, to administer the water rights decreed in "Perry." The majority of water users on the Teton (and their successors in interest, including downstream users Giese, Kelly and Reichelt) were not parties to the Perry case. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt claimed water rights from the Teton with priority dates that are senior to or contemporary with the upstream rights decreed in Perry. Water right claimants on the Teton were participating in the Water Court’s on-going adjudication of water rights under Title 85, Chapter 2 of the Montana Code. While that process was nearing its final stages, it was not yet complete and the Water Court did not issue a final decree. Giese, Kelly and Reichelt challenged the Water Commissioner’s practice of diverting the flow of the Teton down the Bateman Ditch. They contended that their water rights pre-date the rights of many upstream Perry decree rights and pre-date the Water Commissioner’s diversion of the Teton through the Bateman Ditch. They contended that since the Bateman Ditch was not used to divert the entire river at the time of the Perry decree, the Water Commissioner lacked the authority to make the diversion. The Supreme Court restated the issue on appeal as whether the District Court erred in dismissing Appellants’ request for certification to the Chief Water Judge pursuant to 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA. Upon review, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to certify all appropriate issues to the Chief Water Judge as provided in 85-2-406(2)(b), MCA, and to grant such injunctive or other relief that, in the District Court’s discretion, it determined to be necessary and appropriate. View "Giese v. Blixrud" on Justia Law

Louis G. Hannum, Jr. (Louis Jr.) appealed a district court's order removing him for cause as the personal representative of the estate of Louis G. Hannum, Sr. (Louis Sr.). Louis Sr. passed away in 2010, and was survived by his children, Louis Jr., Mike and Mark; and his grandchildren, Monika, Veronica, Michelle, Naomi, Zachary, Esther and Jim. Louis Sr. was predeceased by his daughter, Cheryl Gallagher, who was Esther’s and Jim’s mother. Louis Jr. filed an application for informal probate of will and appointment of personal representative of Louis. Sr.’s estate on September 2, 2010. Notice was sent to Louis Jr., Mike, Mark, Esther and Jim, but not to the remaining grandchildren. Naomi did, however, know of Louis Jr.’s appointment because Naomi was Louis Jr.’s daughter and she was acting as his counsel. It is unclear whether Zachary, Louis Jr.’s son, was aware of these proceedings. Notably, Louis Jr. did not send notice to Louis Sr.’s grandchildren Monika, Veronica and Michelle. In its Order, the District Court concluded that Louis Jr. violated numerous fiduciary duties, and as a result, his removal for cause was appropriate. In its conclusions of law, the District Court determined that Louis Jr. had failed in his duty to administer the probate according to the 2005 Will, a duty imposed by 72-34-101, MCA, when he included the value of certain alleged promissory notes and distributed them between himself and Mark without authority under the 2005 Will. The court additionally found that Louis Jr. failed in his duty to avoid conflicts of interest, in his duty to use ordinary skill and prudence, in his duty to exercise discretionary powers reasonably, and in his duty to file or otherwise deliver to interested parties, within nine months of his appointment, an inventory of estate assets that included a full and true value of the decedent’s interest in every item listed in the inventory. In reaching its decision, the the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court relied on substantial credible evidence. Though the Court disfavors removing a personal representative, the District Court has broad discretion in its decision to remove a personal representative, and the Court concluded that the District Court did not abuse that discretion when it removed Louis Jr. for cause. View "Estate of Hannum" on Justia Law

Petitioners brought an original proceeding to the Supreme Court to challenge the validity of Initiative 166. They requested the Court rule that the Attorney General and Secretary of State did not comply with their responsibilities under law when they failed to bar I-166 from appearing on the general election ballot. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Attorney General and Secretary of State acted in compliance with their duties under law, and that the initiative met all statutory requirements. Accordingly, the Court denied the petition. View "Montanans Opposed to I-166 v. Bullock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Fellows appealed a district court's order that dismissed his complaint. Plaintiff owned a water right in Spring Creek. He claimed that the flow of the creek was for many years recharged by water seeping from the natural channel of the Teton River. He claimed that the practice of diverting water from the natural channel of the Teton implemented by the district court's water commissioner on the Teton adversely affected the water available to satisfy his water right in Spring Creek. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court held that Plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action as a dissatisfied water user unless he could prove a hydrological connection between Spring Creek and the Teton River. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Plaintiff's factual allegations and his request for a declaratory ruling were sufficient to invoke the district court's power to issue a ruling on the issue of connectivity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Fellows v. Water Commissioner et al" on Justia Law

Defendant Kingsley Ariegwe appealed a district court's denial of his petition for postconviction relief. Defendant virtually met a fifteen-year-old female in an internet chat room. After chatting, the two telephone one another, and eventually met in person. Allegedly a sexual encounter occurred at that in-person meeting. Shortly thereafter, the fifteen-year-old told a friend that she had sex with a 32-year-old man. Unknown to either girls, the phone conversation was inadvertently recorded on an answering machine at the friend's house. The tape of the conversation was preserved, and was at issue in this appeal. Defendant was charged with sexual intercourse without consent, attempted sexual intercourse without consent, and unlawful transactions with children. In his opening statement at trial, Defendant told the jury about the taped conversation and implied that the jury would get to listen to the recording. However, defense counsel never offered the tape into evidence. He later noted the omission in his closing statement. Defendant appealed his conviction. The district court determined that Defendant was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to introduce the tape recording into evidence. On appeal to the Supreme Court ,Defendant argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in denying Defendant's petition for postconviction relief. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's judgment and dismissed Defendant's application for relief. View "Ariegwe v. Montana" on Justia Law

Pro se litigant Sharon McCrea appealed a district court's judgment that awarded over eight thousand dollars to CBM Collections, a Missoula collection agency. McCrea owned a business which had an outstanding credit card bill with the Missoula Federal Credit Union (MFCU). She was notified that the debts were being assigned to CBM for collection. CBM subsequently filed its complaint to seek the full amount owned plus interest. McCrea answered, arguing that MFCU was unfairly and deliberately targeting her for collection and that the matter should be "remanded" to the credit union so that she could continue making incremental payments. McCrea did not deny owing the debts. She sought discovery of credit card statements and cell phone billing statements to establish she had been in regular contact with MFCU in an attempt to resolve the matter. The district court granted CBM's motion for judgment on the pleadings without ruling on McCrea's discovery request and entered the award. Finding no error in the district court's ruling, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "CBI Inc. v. McCrea" on Justia Law

Sherman Anderson and other concerned residents of the City of Deer Lodge (Anderson) appealed a district court order that denied their petition for a writ of mandamus. The issue in this case arose from the revocation of Zoo Mountain Natural Care, Inc.'s business license. Zoo Mountain contacted the City in 2010 regarding a business license. Zoo Mountain had purchased property in the City limits for the purpose of lawfully growing and selling medical marijuana. The City was not issuing business licenses at that time, however, due to a change from a calendar-year licensing system to a fiscal year licensing system. The City previously had determined that it would waive the business license requirement for new applicants during this transition period. The City accordingly allowed Zoo Mountain to operate lawfully without a business license until July 2010. The City Council convened shortly after Zoo Mountain’s move to Deer Lodge. Anderson expressed concern over Zoo Mountain’s location at this meeting. He specifically disliked the fact that Zoo Mountain was located in a residential neighborhood, and that Zoo Mountain was located near the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Anderson believed that the City’s decision to issue the business license violated Ordinances 130 and 136. Anderson further believed that the City violated the 2009 version of the Medical Marijuana Act when it issued the business license to a corporation, rather than to an individual. Anderson sought a writ of mandamus from the District Court to require the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The court declined to issue the writ. It concluded that the MMA provided no clear legal duty for the City to revoke the business license. It similarly concluded that the City Code, particularly Ordinances 130 and 136, contained no clear legal duty to revoke the business license. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: Anderson has failed to establish any clear legal duty that requires the City to revoke Zoo Mountain’s business license. The District Court acted accordingly in denying the writ. View "Deer Lodge v. Chilcott et al." on Justia Law