Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed an action against a district court judge, seeking damages for the judge's acts or omissions while presiding over a telephone pretrial conference in a civil action then pending before him. At all relevant times the judge was acting in his official capacity as a district court judge with regard to that case and the pretrial conference. The district court granted the judge's motion to dismiss on the grounds of judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the acts of which Plaintiff complained occurred while the judge was conducting the pretrial conference and were clearly within the authority and responsibility of a district court judge, the judge was immune from suit, and the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff's complaint. View "Hartsoe v. McNeil" on Justia Law

Employer terminated Employee's employment after receiving complaints regarding poor service and use of inappropriate language by Employee. The Department of Labor & Industry concluded Employee was not qualified for unemployment insurance benefits because she had been discharged for misconduct. A hearing officer awarded unemployment benefits to Employee, concluding that Employee had not been deliberately rude and thus had not engaged in misconduct. The Board of Labor Appeals affirmed. Employer petitioned for judicial review. The Department and Board filed a notice of non-participation indicating they would not participate in the proceeding but reserved the right to intervene if issues arose pertaining to them. The district court reversed, holding that Employee's conduct as established by the hearing officer's findings of fact constituted misconduct as a matter of law under the carelessness standard of Admin. R. M 24.11.460(1)(d). The Department appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Department did not preserve its evidentiary arguments for appeal; and (2) the district court did not err by determining that the evidence found by the Department constituted misconduct as a matter of law under the carelessness standard. View "Gary & Leo's Fresh Foods v. Dep't of Labor & Indus." on Justia Law

Johnson Farms, Inc. and Floyd Johnson filed a complaint against Ethel Halland alleging (1) in her capacity as secretary of Johnson Farms, Inc., Ethel breached her fiduciary duties by diverting corporate funds to herself and others; and (2) Ethel conferred gifts to herself and other family members in contravention of a written trust agreement. The district court granted Ethel's motion for summary judgment, finding that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable estoppel did not toll the statute of limitations. The district court also awarded Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Johnson's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) the district court did not err in awarding Ethel attorneys' fees and costs. View "Johnson Farms, Inc. v. Halland" on Justia Law

James Turner and Julie Viers opened a line of credit with Wells Fargo Bank and granted Wells Fargo a deed of trust on property they owned as security for the line of credit. Later, John Turner, Christina Turner, and Sandy Couch (the John Turners) purchased the property. Julie and James paid off the entire outstanding balance under the credit line agreement using the proceeds from the sale of the property to the John Turners, but Julie subsequently borrowed $169,090 under the credit line agreement secured by the property. Thereafter, Wells Fargo refused to release the deed of trust. The John Turners then filed a complaint to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the John Turners could not enforce the terms of the credit line agreement because they were not intended beneficiaries of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the John Turners were not entitled to judgment requiring Wells Fargo to release the deed of trust the bank held on the property; and (2) the John Turners failed to establish prima facie claims of promissory or equitable estoppel. View "Turner v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

LR-123 was enacted by the Montana Legislature in 2011. It proposed a vote in the November 2012 general election on whether to provide a tax credit and potential tax refund, or outright State payment, to individuals in years in which there is a certain level of projected surplus revenue. Plaintiffs filed a complaint contending LR-123 was unconstitutional because it unlawfully delegated legislative powers. The constitutional issue in this case turned upon whether LR-123 impermissibly delegated legislative power to an employee (the legislative fiscal analyst) of one of the Legislature's committees. The district court found that LR-123 unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the legislative fiscal analyst. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that LR-123 was unconstitutional on its face and therefore may not appear on the ballot in November 2012. View "MEA-MFT v. McCulloch" on Justia Law

Sarah Wheeldon petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to Corey Wheeldon on April 20, 2009. Following a bench trial, the district court issued findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree of dissolution that dissolved the parties' marriage and divided the remaining marital estate. Corey appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding (1) based on all the evidence, the district court acted within its discretion by granting Sarah primary residential custody of the children; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its division of the parties' marital assets and liabilities. View "In re Parenting of Wheeldon" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony partner or family member assault. The district court designated Defendant a persistent felony offender and committed him to the department of corrections (DOC) for the statutory minimum period of five years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that the complaining witness had a history of a felony forgery charge over a decade before Defendant's trial based on the remoteness in time of the forgery charge and the substantial evidence in the record to support the assault against the witness; and (2) the district court lawfully based its sentence upon Defendant's likelihood of reoffending and the court's desire to rehabilitate him. View "State v. Thompson" on Justia Law

After Employee made allegations about a fellow employee that Employer concluded were patently false, Employee was discharged. Employee applied to the Department of Labor and Industry Unemployment Insurance Division (UID) for unemployment benefits, and the UID determined Employee had not been discharged for misconduct. Employer appealed. The Department of Labor and Industry Hearings Bureau reversed. The Board of Labor Appeals (BOLA) reversed, concluding that Employee's conduct was a good faith error in judgment and that Employer had presented insufficient evidence that Employee acted in willful or wanton or deliberate disregard for the interests of Employer. The District Court found substantial evidence to support BOLA's determination that Employer had not shown misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because BOLA's factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, it's legal conclusion that misconduct had not been shown was correct. View "Somont Oil Co. v. King" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking a judicial resolution of an LLC in which both Plaintiffs and Defendants held ownership interests. The district court ordered judicial dissolution and appointment of a receiver after finding that the managing member of the LLC, one of the defendants, had never operated the LLC in conformity with the operating agreement and had acted in a manner that was unduly prejudicial to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there were substantial undisputed facts to support the district court's order for dissolution under Mont. Code Ann. 35-8-902(1), and the district court properly applied the statute; and (2) the district court properly denied Defendants' motion to amend their answer to add counterclaims because Defendants were required to arbitrate such claims under the operating agreement. View "Gordon v. Kuzara" on Justia Law

The State appealed an order that preliminarily enjoined parts of the Montana Marijuana Act. Montana Cannabis Industry Association, Mark Matthews, Shirley Hamp, Shelly Yeager, Jane Doe, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, Michael Geci-Black, John Stowers, Point Hatfield, and Charlie Hamp (collectively, Plaintiffs) cross-appealed. The 2004 Medical Marijuana Act left in place those provisions in the Montana criminal code that make it illegal to cultivate, possess, distribute or use marijuana, while simultaneously protecting authorized users of medical marijuana from being prosecuted. The Legislature enacted Senate Bill 423, which repealed the 2004 Medical Marijuana Act and replaced it with the Montana Marijuana Act (MMA), which dramatically changed the landscape for the cultivation, distribution, and use of marijuana for medical purposes. In 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking to both temporarily and permanently enjoin the implementation of the MMA in its entirety. Based on a motion filed with the complaint, the District Court immediately entered a temporary restraining order blocking implementation of the MMA which prohibited the advertising of "marijuana or marijuana-related products" and which was scheduled to take effect that day. By stipulation, the temporary restraining order remained in effect pending the preliminary injunction hearing. The court ultimately issued its Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The issues raised on appeal to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the District Court erred when it applied a strict scrutiny, fundamental rights analysis to preliminarily enjoin the MMA; (2) whether the District Court erred in not enjoining section 50-46-308(2), MCA; (3) whether the District Court erred in not enjoining section 50-46-308(7), MCA; and, (4) whether the court erred in declining to enjoin the MMA in its entirety. The Supreme Court concluded after review: (1) the MMA did not implicate the fundamental right to employment, and reversed the District Court’s holding on this issue; and in pursuing health, an individual does not have a fundamental affirmative right of access to a particular drug. The Court reversed the District Court's holding with respect to this issue. Because the Court remanded the case on the scrutiny issue, it declined to address Issues Two, Three and Four. View "Montana Cannabis v. Montana" on Justia Law