Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Decedent's will named her daughter Dawn as personal representative of her estate. After the clerk of court accepted Dawn's application for informal probate, Dawn issued a notice to heirs and devisees specifying that the estate was being administered without supervision of the court. Decedent's son, William, subsequently filed a motion for substitute of judge in the proceeding pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804. The district court denied the motion as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the substitution statute did not apply to the informal probate matter because the matter was not under the supervision of the district court and therefore not a "civil action" for purposes of section 3-1-804; and (2) although the proceeding was later converted into a court-supervised administration under which section 3-1-804 would apply, William's motion for substitution was filed prematurely, and was therefore not timely and void. View "In re Estate of Greene" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between Johnny Hughes and his parents, Jack and Shirley Hughes, regarding borrowed money, the partition of jointly owned real property and accompanying water rights, and a contested pasture lease. The district court ruled in favor of Johnny on all of the issues except for the water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the jury's determination that Johnny paid interest on a promissory note executed in favor of Jack and Shirley in 1989 restarted the statute of limitations on the note, and therefore, the matter was remanded to consider the amount of principal and interest Johnny owed on the note; (2) the partition agreement between the parties dissolved whatever right Jack and Shirley may have possessed in a life estate on a house on the land Johnny received pursuant to the agreement or to insurance proceeds Johnny received after the house was destroyed by fire; (3) Jack was entitled to an easement for stock water across Johnny's property; and (4) the arbitrator who arbitrated the pasture lease did not exceed his authority or miscalculate damages. View "Hughes v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Defendant, a sexual offender, was charged with failing to provide notice of his change of residence. Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court imposed a four-year sentence and imposed several probation conditions recommended in Defendant's presentence investigation report. The district court also required Defendant to pay the costs of his court-ordered evaluations and treatment. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding (1) Defendant's failure to object to the district court's requirement that he pay the costs of his court-ordered evaluations and treatment in the district court precluded Defendant from raising the issue on appeal; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing certain conditions, which relate specifically to sexual offenders, as part of Defendant's probation. View "State v. Bullplume" on Justia Law

After the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS) was granted temporary legal custody of Child, DPHHS petitioned for termination of Mother and Father's parental rights. After a hearing, the district court terminated both Mother's and Father's parental rights to Child. The Supreme Court affirmed the termination order, holding (1) DPHHS made reasonable efforts to reunite Mother with Child; (2) the district court did not err in concluding that Mother's drug addiction rendered her unfit to parent Child and that her condition was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; (3) the district court had jurisdiction to terminate Father's parental rights; (4) Father's attorney rendered effective assistance; (5) the district court did not err in terminating Father's parental rights based upon his incarceration for mitigated deliberate homicide; and (6) the district court correctly concluded that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest. View "In re A.D.B." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor. Defendant was informed that his failure to appear at the final pre-trial hearing would constitute a waiver of his right to a jury trial. Defendant failed to appear at the final hearing, although his counsel made an appearance. The court set a date for a bench trial. Defendant filed a motion to vacate the bench trial and reset the matter for a jury trial, arguing that his absence was due to his development disabilities and medical conditions, which affected his memory. The municipal court summarily denied Defendant's motion and proceeded to a nonjury trial, after which the court found Defendant guilty of disorderly conduct. The district court affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, in light of certain affidavits and Defendant's medical records, combined with defense counsel's appearance and affirmative representation at the final pre-trial hearing that Defendant was not waiving his right of trial by jury, the municipal court abused its discretion in deeming Defendant's failure to appear at the final pre-trial hearing as a waiver of Defendant's right to a jury trial. View "City of Missoula v. Girard" on Justia Law

Bruce Nelson subdivided property in the 1970s. Appellant claimed he purchased tract eighteen from Nelson ten days after Nelson filed the plat. Appellant claimed that at the time of the conveyance, Nelson guaranteed that it would not sell adjoining tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee filed a notarized declaration four years later. In 2005, however, Nelson sold tracts sixteen and seventeen. Appellee purchased tracts sixteen and seventeen in 2008. Appellee filed a quiet title action to clear her title of any cloud that may have arisen as a result of Appellant's declaration. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellee, concluding that Appellant's declaration did not create a restriction on development and that there was no restriction on the property prohibiting the sale of the disputed tracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Appellee. View "Pennington v. Flaherty" on Justia Law

The Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife & Parks and Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks Commissions (collectively referred to as DFWP) decided to transfer a group of bison to two reservations as part of a quarantine program. Plaintiffs, collectively referred to here as the Citizens for Balanced Use, filed this lawsuit challenging the DFWP action and seeking to enjoin the bison transport. While the bison transport was still in process, the district court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining certain bison movement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court relied upon erroneous grounds for issuing a preliminary injunction under Mont. Code Ann. 27-19-201(3). View "Citizens for Balanced Use v. Maurier" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop of his vehicle, arguing that the officer lacked particularized suspicion for the stop. The justice court denied Defendant's motion. Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty, reserving his right to appeal the court's suppression ruling. On appeal, the district court denied Defendant's motion to suppress, finding that the officer had particularized suspicion to justify an investigative stop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, as there were sufficient facts for the officer to form a particularized suspicion that Defendant was committing an offense and, thus, to initiate an investigative stop. View "State v. Wagner" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, assault with a weapon, and assault on a peace officer. The Supreme Court upheld Defendant's convictions. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed Defendant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that that the district court did not err by denying Defendant's postconviction relief claim alleging that (1) Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective representation during plea negotiations, as Defendant could not show prejudice by asserting an incorrect or overruled legal principle as the basis for his claim of ineffective assistance; (2) Defendant was denied access to counsel during an overnight recess; and (3) Defendant's appellate counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to raise certain issues on appeal. View "Rose v. State" on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, the district court ordered Father to pay child support. After Father failed to make child support payments, the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED) of the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) placed a support lien on all of his property. After Father and Mother's divorce, Mother married Plaintiff. Plaintiff and Mother subsequently divorced pursuant to a final decree of dissolution in which Mother assigned to Plaintiff her interest in the child support lien. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced a proceeding against Father seeking to foreclose on the CSED support lien. The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, ordering that Plaintiff could foreclose on the child support lien. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff was precluded from obtaining an enforceable interest in the support lien, as, under Montana law, the Department alone held the rights to and was authorized to foreclose on the child support lien. Remanded. View "LeCount v. Davis" on Justia Law