Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Puskas v. Pine Hills Youth Corr. Facility
Appellant worked at Pine Hills Youth Correctional Facility as a correctional officer for approximately three years. Appellant worked in the sex offender unit during the majority of her employment with Pine Hills. After quitting her job, Appellant filed an action against Pine Hills for sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for Pine Hills on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial credible evidence supported the district court's determination that Pine Hills held open an offer for Appellant to transfer units for one year until Appellant quit; (2) the district court correctly determined that Pine Hills reasonably and promptly offered a solution to end one inmate's harassment of Appellant; and (3) the district court correctly dismissed Appellant's retaliation claim against Pine Hills. View "Puskas v. Pine Hills Youth Corr. Facility" on Justia Law
In re Estate of Bennett
Jeremiah Bennett died intestate. Jeremiah's two children resided with their mother, Jeremiah's ex-spouse, Sabrina. Jeremiah's father, Abel, was appointed the personal representative (PR) of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina objected to Abel's appointment and nominated herself as the PR in her capacity as guardian and conservator of the children. After a hearing, the district court removed Abel as PR of the estate and appointed Sabrina as PR. Abel appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Abel failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion or failed to follow the law in determining that it was in the best interests of the estate to remove Abel and to appoint Sabrina as PR for Jeremiah's estate. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Schwan
Whitney Schwan died in an automobile accident after Travis Turner, the driver, lost control of the vehicle. Whitney's parents sued Travis's estate and his parents (the Turners). The Turners had a homeowners policy with State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm). State Farm filed an action seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the Turners under the homeowners policy. Meanwhile, a mediation concluded with a settlement that included assignment of all of the Turners' rights and claims under the homeowners' policy to the Schwans, and the Schwans replaced the Turners in the declaratory action. The district court granted summary judgment to the Schwans on its counterclaim that State Farm had breached its duty to defend the Turners by not retaining separate counsel for the Turners in the underlying action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by concluding that State Farm had breached its duty to defend under the policy, as State Farm did ensure a full defense was provided to the Turners even though its decisions regarding counsel did not include hiring additional counsel. View "State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Schwan" on Justia Law
Rolan v. New West Health Servs.
Plaintiff, who carried health insurance through New West Health Services (New West), was injured in an automobile accident resulting in medical expenses totaling approximately $120,000. The tortfeasor's insurer paid approximately $100,000 of Plaintiff's medical bills. Plaintiff later filed a complaint against New West alleging individual and class claims, asserting that New West failed to pay approximately $100,000 of her medical expenses because the third party liability carrier had paid the majority of the bills. The district court certified the class complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by adopting the class definition proposed by Plaintiff and denying New West's motion to modify the class definition. View "Rolan v. New West Health Servs." on Justia Law
Landa v. Assurance Co. of Am.
Leonard Landa was the sole managing member of a Montana limited liability corporation. Landa carried commercial general liability insurance through Assurance. After a former employee of Landa's filed a complaint alleging that Landa had committed various torts by inducing him to work for Landa under allegedly false pretenses, Landa tendered defense of the former employee's claim to Assurance. Assurance refused to defend Landa, stating that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy. Landa filed a complaint seeking declaratory relief establishing that Assurance had a duty to defend and indemnify Landa and alleging violations of Montana's Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), negligence, and other causes of action. The district court granted summary judgment for Assurance, finding that the complaint's allegations were not covered under Landa's policy and that Assurance was not liable under the UTPA because the denial of coverage was grounded on a legal conclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Assurance correctly declined to provide a defense where the former employee's complaint did not allege an "occurrence" and, as a result, did not trigger a duty to defend under the policy. View "Landa v. Assurance Co. of Am." on Justia Law
Diaz v. State
Plaintiffs were insured through the State group insurance plan administered by Defendants. Both Plaintiffs were injured in automobile accidents caused by tortfeasors whose insurers accepted liability. The third-party insurers paid Plaintiffs' medical providers, but in both cases, the State and Defendants allegedly exercised their rights of subrogation without confirming that Plaintiffs under the State plan had been made whole. Plaintiffs filed a class complaint seeking a declaratory ruling that Defendants' practices violated the State's made-whole laws. On remand, the district court defined the class to include only those insureds who had timely filed claims for covered benefits, thus excluding from the class all non-filing insureds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the incorporation of the filing limitation did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
View "Diaz v. State" on Justia Law
Covenant Invs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue
Mont. Code Ann. 15-7-211 requires the Department of Revenue (Department) to reappraise all residential property in the state every six years. The Department assessed the value of Plaintiff's property in 2008 and used the 2008 appraisal to establish Plaintiff's tax liability for the six-year tax cycle ending in 2014. Plaintiff argued that section 15-7-111, as applied, violated its right to equal protection. The State Tax Appeal Board rejected the claim. The district court, however, concluded that section 15-7-111 violated Plaintiff's right to equal protection because the six-year tax cycle caused some taxpayers to pay a disproportionate share of taxes due to their over-assessed property value and other taxpayers to pay less than their fair share of taxes due to their under-assessed property value. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that similarly situated taxpayers, for a short time, may pay divergent taxes, and such a divergence in taxes does not violate equal protection privileges. View "Covenant Invs., Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue" on Justia Law
Harrington v. Crystal Bar, Inc.
Plaintiff was a patron at the Crystal Bar when she was hit on the head by Jason Howard, a friend of the bouncer, causing him to fall and strike his head. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Crystal Bar, alleging, among other claims, negligence and liquor shop liability, or a "dram shop" claim. The district court entered summary judgment for the Crystal Bar on Plaintiff's negligence and dram shop claim, holding (1) there was no interaction between Plaintiff and Howard that should have alerted Crystal Bar employees that Howard posed any danger to plaintiff, and (2) it was uncontested that Howard was not intoxicated and had not been served at the Crystal Bar. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Crystal Bar on Plaintiff's dram shop claim, as there was no evidence Howard was served alcohol by the Crystal Bar prior to the altercation; but (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claims, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the Crystal Bar had knowledge of the conflict between Plaintiff and Howard and whether Crystal Bar satisfied its duty of reasonable care under the circumstances. Remanded. View "Harrington v. Crystal Bar, Inc." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Injury Law, Montana Supreme Court
Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Wife sustained injuries as a result of Husband's negligent driving. Wife and Husband (Plaintiffs) sought coverage from Insurer, which denied coverage due to a family member exclusion in the umbrella police Husband held with Insurer. The district court concluded that the exclusion was unconscionable and entered summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Insurer, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to establish that the family member exclusion unconscionably favored State Farm, and the district court erred in so concluding; (2) the exclusion did not contravene and express statute, undermine the made-whole doctrine, or violate public policy in any other way; and (3) the policy unambiguously excluded Wife's claim from coverage, and the family member exclusion did not violate Plaintiffs' reasonable expectations. View "Fisher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law
Dvorak v. State Fund
Employee contracted an occupational disease arising out of her employment with Employer. In 2006, Employee began seeking medical treatment. Employee received treatment periodically until 2011 when her doctor informed her that she had an occupational disease. Employee subsequently initiated a workers' compensation claim. Montana State Fund denied Employee's claim, asserting that the claim was not timely filed under the twelve-month statute of limitations. Employee appealed. The Workers' Compensation Court granted summary judgment for State Fund, concluding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that Employee knew or should have known that she was suffering from occupational disease as early as 2006. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a material question of fact existed as to when Employee should have known she was suffering from an occupational disease. Remanded for a trial to determine when Employee knew or should have known she was suffering from an occupational disease. View "Dvorak v. State Fund" on Justia Law