Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around a child, R.N., who was removed from his mother's care and placed in foster care with Ben and Charissa Wagner. The Wagners had previously adopted two of the mother's other children. The Department of Public Health and Human Services was granted temporary legal custody of R.N. and ordered the mother to complete a treatment plan. The Department later filed a petition to terminate the mother's parental rights due to her failure to complete the treatment plan and alleged abandonment of R.N. However, the mother began to engage with the Department and made positive changes, leading to the Department's shift from termination to reunification.The Wagners, unhappy with the Department's change of stance, filed a motion to intervene, asserting that it was appropriate under M. R. Civ. P. 24 and § 41-3-422(9)(b), MCA. The District Court granted the Wagners' intervention motion, despite objections from the mother, the Department, and the guardian ad litem. The Wagners then filed a motion seeking an order for R.N. to be immediately placed in their care and for the Department to pursue termination of the mother's parental rights. The District Court did not set a hearing or issue a determination on the Wagners' motion. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the District Court granted.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court found that the District Court had misinterpreted the law when it allowed the Wagners to intervene. The court also ruled that the Wagners did not have a fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of R.N. because the mother's rights had not been terminated. Furthermore, the court held that neither the District Court nor the Supreme Court had the authority to order or compel the Department to refile and prosecute its petition for termination. View "In re R.N." on Justia Law

The case involves Neldia Marie Puccinelli, who was accused of embezzling funds from her employer, ProMark, between 2006 and 2009. After her employment was terminated, ProMark filed a civil suit against her, which was settled with an agreement that Puccinelli would transfer certain personal property to ProMark and make 84 monthly payments of $350. In 2011, the State filed criminal charges against Puccinelli for theft by embezzlement. She entered a plea agreement, which consolidated the three counts into one and recommended a fully suspended sentence with restitution consistent with the civil settlement agreement.The District Court rejected the plea agreement, speculating that Puccinelli would stop paying restitution if given a probationary sentence. The court imposed a 10-year commitment to the Montana Women’s Prison, with 5 years suspended, and ordered Puccinelli to pay $67,235 in restitution. Puccinelli's disability payments were suspended during her incarceration, which led to financial instability for her household. Upon release, Puccinelli resumed making regular payments towards restitution.In 2022, five months before Puccinelli was set to discharge her probation, the State filed a Petition for Revocation of Suspended Sentence, alleging Puccinelli violated the restitution conditions of her sentence. The District Court determined Puccinelli had violated the terms and conditions of her suspended sentence as she had not “completely paid restitution.” The court revoked her suspended sentence and committed her to the Department of Corrections for five years, all suspended, with “the same conditions and restitution requirements as was in the original Judgment with no credit for street time.”The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reversed the District Court's decision, finding that the lower court had abused its discretion when it revoked Puccinelli’s suspended sentence based on her failure to pay full restitution. The Supreme Court concluded that the violation should have been characterized as a compliance violation, which should have been excused pursuant to § 46-18-203(6)(b), MCA. The case was remanded to the District Court to vacate the August 25, 2022 Judgment on Revocation of Suspended Sentence and dismiss the petition for revocation. View "State v. Puccinelli" on Justia Law

The case revolves around the defendant, Johnathan James, who was convicted of felony Driving Under the Influence (DUI) and Driving While Suspended. The charges stemmed from an incident where James was found asleep in his running vehicle at a gas station, surrounded by empty alcohol containers. The arresting officer, Deputy Sheriff Derek Breiland, testified that James exhibited signs of intoxication, such as bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and inability to maintain balance during a field sobriety test. James' blood alcohol concentration was later determined to be 0.322 percent.Prior to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the case was heard in the District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District, Lincoln County. During the trial, the defense counsel questioned the arresting officer's observations and suggested that James could have started drinking after he had safely parked his vehicle. The defense also objected to the officer's testimony that James was in "actual physical control" of his vehicle, arguing that it was a legal conclusion that invaded the province of the jury. The District Court overruled the objection, and the jury convicted James on both charges.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the arresting officer's testimony was admissible as lay opinion testimony under Montana Rule of Evidence 701. The court reasoned that the officer's testimony was based on his perception and was helpful to the jury in determining a fact in issue. The court also noted that the defense had opened the door for clarification about what factors constitute "actual physical control" under State v. Sommers, thus making the officer's testimony properly admitted lay opinion testimony. The court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow the officer to testify that James was in "actual physical control" of his vehicle. View "State v. James" on Justia Law

Robert Michael Arellano was charged with multiple counts of sexual intercourse without consent, sexual abuse of children, and tampering with a witness, all involving a minor under 12 years of age. The State and Arellano entered into a plea agreement, which the District Court later deemed illegal. Arellano was subsequently tried by a jury and convicted on all counts, receiving a total sentence of 210 years, with 100 years suspended.The District Court initially accepted a plea agreement between Arellano and the State. However, the court later determined the agreement to be illegal due to the proposed sentence not being authorized by law. The State had incorrectly advised the penalty for the charges, leading to the plea agreement proposing a sentence not in line with the statutory requirements for the offenses committed. When the court pointed out the discrepancy, the State withdrew from the plea agreement and the case proceeded to trial.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Arellano appealed the District Court's denial of his motion for specific performance of his plea agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, stating that the plea agreement was unlawful. The court found that the plea agreement proposed a penalty not authorized by law and also proposed that Arellano plead to a fictitious offense not recognized under Montana law. The court concluded that Arellano was not entitled to the enforcement of a plea agreement which proposed a penalty not authorized by law and proposed a plea to a fictitious offense. View "State v. Arellano" on Justia Law

The case involves Jeffrey Allen Westfall, who pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault and aggravated assault. The incident occurred at a motel in Lakeside, Montana, where Westfall assaulted a 69-year-old woman, F.C., who operated the motel with her husband. Westfall was later identified and apprehended. He was charged with attempted sexual intercourse without consent and aggravated assault. During the trial, Westfall exhibited disruptive behavior, repeatedly interrupting proceedings, arguing with his attorney, and expressing a desire to represent himself. His attorney requested a fitness evaluation to determine Westfall's ability to stand trial, but the court denied the request, viewing it as a delay tactic.The trial court proceedings were marked by Westfall's disruptive behavior, including interruptions, arguments with his attorney, and requests to represent himself. His attorney requested a fitness evaluation to assess Westfall's ability to stand trial, but the court denied the request, viewing it as a delay tactic. After the victim's testimony and the presentation of surveillance footage, Westfall and the prosecution reached a plea agreement. Westfall pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and attempted sexual assault in exchange for a recommended 50-year sentence with a 15-year parole restriction. The court sentenced Westfall to 20 years for aggravated assault and 50 years for attempted sexual assault, to run concurrently.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Westfall appealed, raising three issues: whether he waived his claim challenging the trial court's failure to order a fitness evaluation when he pleaded guilty, whether his convictions for aggravated assault and attempted sexual assault violated double jeopardy, and whether the trial court erred in ordering him to pay trial costs and a presentence investigation report fee without inquiring about his ability to pay. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision on the first two issues, finding that Westfall had waived his right to appeal the denial of a fitness evaluation by pleading guilty and that his convictions did not violate double jeopardy. However, the court reversed the decision on the third issue, ruling that the trial court had failed to assess Westfall's ability to pay before imposing financial obligations. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue. View "State v. Westfall" on Justia Law

The defendant, William Jerome Carnes, was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. He was charged with felony DUI for a fourth or subsequent offense, misdemeanor resisting arrest, and misdemeanor driving without a valid liability insurance policy in effect. Carnes failed to appear for his final pretrial conference, leading to an arrest warrant being issued. He was later arrested in Nevada for fleeing the scene of an accident and was sentenced to 24 to 72 months in the Nevada Department of Corrections.Carnes filed a pro se motion for a speedy trial or dismissal for lack of speedy trial and timely prosecution, citing the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Nevada Revised Statutes. The State argued that Carnes did not follow procedure as contemplated by statute to make a request for final disposition. The District Court agreed with the State and denied Carnes’s motion. Carnes then filed a motion to dismiss the case for the State’s failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, which was also denied by the District Court.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Carnes appealed the order denying his motion to dismiss and the subsequent judgment on his plea of guilty to an amended charge of criminal endangerment pursuant to a plea agreement with the State. The court concluded that Carnes failed to preserve his right to appeal the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. The court held that a defendant who voluntarily and knowingly pleads guilty to an offense waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of constitutional rights violations which occurred prior to the plea. The court found that Carnes’s plea agreement contained no language reserving the right to appeal after his guilty plea and he did not comply with the statutory requirements to reserve the right to appellate review of the adverse pretrial ruling. Therefore, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "State v. Carnes" on Justia Law

The case involves Creative Games Studio LLC and Ricardo Bach Cater, who sued Daniel Alves for alleged breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, constructive fraud, and deceit. The plaintiffs, who are co-founders of Creative Games Studio, a company that develops board games for online sale, accused Alves of collaborating with a competitor and using the company's funds and intellectual property for the competitor's benefit. Alves, a Brazilian citizen, was also a co-founder of the company. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit in Montana, where the company is based.The District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County, dismissed the case due to lack of personal jurisdiction over Alves. The court determined that exercising jurisdiction over Alves would not comply with constitutional requirements. Alves had moved to dismiss the complaint under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction or under the doctrine of forum non-conveniens.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Alves did not consent to jurisdiction and that subjecting him to the jurisdiction of Montana courts would not comply with due process. The court noted that Alves' only connection to Montana was the fact that one of the plaintiffs resided there and established the company in the state. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to show that Alves either availed himself of the privileges of Montana law or that their claims arose out of Alves's actions in Montana. View "Creative Games v Alves" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Missoula County and the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC) over the reimbursement rate for housing DOC inmates in county detention centers. The County and the DOC had entered into a contract in 2015, setting a reimbursement rate of $88.73 per day for each inmate. However, in 2015, the Montana Legislature capped the reimbursement rate at $69 per day. The County filed a lawsuit in 2020, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment.The District Court granted summary judgment to the DOC, concluding that the County's contract claims were time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations. It also found that the County's tort claim for breach of the covenant of good faith was not supported by a special relationship and that the County could not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment.The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision. It held that the one-year statute of limitations applied to the County's contract claims, rejecting the County's argument that an eight-year limitation period should apply. The court also agreed with the lower court that the County's tort claim for breach of the covenant of good faith was not supported by a special relationship. Finally, the court concluded that the County could not recover under a theory of unjust enrichment, as the County had not demonstrated that the DOC had reaped an inequitable gain. View "Missoula County v. Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Debra and Sidney Schutter (the Schutters) and the State of Montana Board of Land Commissioners (the Board) over the ownership of a water right, identified as Claim 13169. The Schutters use a groundwater well on their private property to irrigate four parcels of land, one of which is school trust land owned by the State of Montana. The Board objected to the Schutters' claim of exclusive ownership of the water right, asserting that the State holds an ownership interest in the portion of the water right used to irrigate the school trust land.The Montana Water Court granted summary judgment to the Board, adding the State as a co-owner of Claim 13169, but only for the portion of the claim appropriated to irrigate the school trust land. The Schutters appealed this decision, arguing that the Water Court erred in applying the precedent set in a previous case, Pettibone, and that no portion of Claim 13169 is appurtenant to the school trust land.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the Water Court's decision. The court held that the portion of Claim 13169 used to irrigate the school trust land is appurtenant to that land and, therefore, the State is a co-owner of that portion of the right. The court also rejected the Schutters' argument that the Water Court erred in applying the Pettibone precedent, stating that the Schutters' reliance on the point of diversion as singularly controlling was misplaced. The court concluded that the Schutters used the school trust land they leased to qualify for and establish the parameters of Claim 13169, and without the ability to claim a beneficial use on the school trust land, the Schutters' claim to a water right would have been different, perhaps smaller. View "Schutter v. Board of Land Commissioners" on Justia Law

Phoenix Capital Group Holdings, LLC, an oil and gas mineral rights investment firm, acquired mineral interests on two sections of real property in Richland County, Montana. The previous owner, Katherine Solis, had been approached multiple times by Kraken Oil and Gas LLC, an energy production company, to secure a lease of the mineral interests or to participate in drilling wells. Solis consistently refused to engage with Kraken. After Phoenix acquired the mineral interests, it expressed a desire to participate in the oil and gas production from the wells being drilled by Kraken. However, Kraken responded that the mineral interests had been deemed “non-consent” due to Solis’s lack of participation, and it was authorized to recover risk penalties.The Board of Oil and Gas Conservation of the State of Montana held a hearing and determined that Kraken had made unsuccessful, good faith attempts to acquire voluntary pooling in the spacing unit, and that Phoenix, as a successor in interest, was bound to Solis’s decision not to participate. The Board therefore determined that the mineral interests owned by Phoenix would be subject to forced pooling and that Kraken could recover risk penalties from Phoenix. Phoenix requested a rehearing from the Board, but that request was denied. Phoenix then filed a Complaint seeking injunctive relief from the Board decision in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. The District Court issued an Order granting Kraken and the Board’s motions for summary judgment, and dismissing Phoenix’s Complaint.In the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, Phoenix appealed the District Court's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Board correctly interpreted the statutory force-pooling requirements, and that its decision to force pool Phoenix’s mineral interests was reasonable. The court also held that Kraken’s letters to Solis constituted written demands that gave Solis the option to either participate or face assessment of risk penalties. The court concluded that risk penalties were imposed, not pursuant to the presumption in § 82-11-202(3), MCA (2021), but under § 82-11-202(2), MCA, which requires an owner pay risk penalties when “after written demand, [the owner] has failed or refused to pay the owner’s share of the costs of development or other operations . . . .” View "Phoenix Capital v. Board of Oil & Gas" on Justia Law