Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Clifford Sabo and Sabo Brothers Construction (the Sabos) entered into a written lease agreement with Vernon and Laura Caldwell for the excavation of scoria, a substance used in road construction, on the Caldwells' land. The Sabos agreed to pay the Caldwells a royalty rate for all scoria sold from the Caldwells' land, but the lease was silent as to when royalty payments were to be made. For several months, the Sabos made royalty payments to the Caldwells but for another period of several months, the Sabos did not make any royalty payments at all. The Caldwells subsequently filed a complaint against the Sabos, alleging breach of the lease for failure to pay royalties in a timely manner. The Caldwells also filed an application for a preliminary injunction. The district court enjoined the Sabos from hauling or selling any scoria from the Caldwells' land, concluding that the Caldwells had made a prima facie case that the Sabos had not paid them for all the scoria sold. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting the Caldwells a preliminary injunction in a breach of contract action when pecuniary compensation was contemplated and would afford adequate relief. Remanded. View "Caldwell v. Sabo" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a certain channel adjacent to the Yellowstone River. The disputed channel had been used for years to obtain river water to satisfy water rights held by Heart K Ranch. The City of Livingston owned land adjacent to the channel and argued that Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel harmed the City's property. The Park Conservation District (PCD) permitted Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel as provided in the Natural Steambed and Land Preservation Act. The City petitioned the PCD for a declaratory ruling that the channel was not subject to the permitting process in the Act because it was actually an irrigation ditch not subject to the Act. The PCD determined that the channel was part of the natural watercourse of the Yellowstone River, which was indisputably subject to the Act. The district court upheld the PCD. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City failed to show that the PCD's decision was arbitrary or capricious, characterized by an abuse of discretion, or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. View "Livingston v. Park Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

Timothy Watts sold real property to the Marions, who financed the purchase with one loan from PrimeLending and a second loan from Watts. Watts signed a subordination agreement agreeing to subordinate his loan to the PrimeLending loan. The Marions subsequently signed a deed of trust to PrimeLending and a trust indenture in favor of Watts. The Marions defaulted on the loan originating with PrimeLending, which assigned its interest in the loan to HSBC Bank. After a trustee's sale, HSBC purchased the property. The Marions also defaulted on the loan from Watts. Claiming to be unaware of the previous HSBC trustee's sale, Watts held his own trustee sale and was purchaser of record. After discovering HSBC claimed ownership of the property, Watts filed a complaint against HSBC and other parties claiming an interest in the property, seeking to quiet title to the property. The district court granted Watts' motion for summary judgment against HSBC, finding that the Marion debt to PrimeLending was no longer in the first priority lien position because the debt had been assigned to HSBC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that HSBC's deed of trust in the property was clearly entitled to priority over Watts' subordinated trust indenture. View "Watts v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A." on Justia Law

As part of their dissolution of marriage, Viola and Gary entered into a mediated property settlement agreement. The district court approved the property settlement, deeming the property and debts "equitably distributed." The court then entered a decree of dissolution. Viola subsequently filed Mont. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60(b) motions seeking relief from the judgment, claiming that the property settlement agreement was unconscionable and failed to include a disclosure of assets as required by Mont. Code Ann. 40-4-254. The district court denied Viola's motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions in which Viola alleged that the property settlement agreement was unconscionable and that the district court failed to require a full disclosure of assets. View "In re Marriage of Anderson" on Justia Law

Carl and Karen were married in 1993. In 1995, Karen made Carl a co-owner of certain property. In 2007, the county clerk recorded a quit claim deed transferring Carl's interest in the property back to Karen. When the parties divorced in 2009, the district court concluded that Karen was the owner of the property and that the $100,000 increase in the property's value from 1993 to 2009 was due to market force and had nothing to do with any contributions made by Carl. In 2012, Carl filed a complaint alleging that Karen fraudulently forged Carl's signature on the deed to the property and that Alta, another defendant, notarized the forged signature. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations for fraud claims had run. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) correctly determined that Carl's fraud claim was barred by the statute of limitations; but (2) erred by awarding fees and costs to Defendants. View "Kananen v. South" on Justia Law

Decedent, the mother of Cathie and Marcy, died testate. Decedent's will expressly made no provision for her daughters. Decedent named Kristine Fankell as the personal representative of her estate. After Fankell's application for informal probate was accepted, Marcy filed a petition for supervised administration of the estate and a petition for formal probate of the will. Cathie subsequently filed an objection to the application and appointment of Fankell as personal representative as well as a motion for substitute of judge. The district court (1) denied Cathie's motion for substitution of judge as untimely, and (2) granted Fankell's motion to strike Cathie's pleadings because she failed timely to intervene and her interests were adequately represented by Marcy. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Cathie's motion for substitution of judge, holding that the court correctly determined Cathie's motion was untimely. View "In re Estate of Quirin" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Bennett, the adult son of Abel and Judy Bennett, died as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Jeremiah died intestate and was survived by two minor children. The district court appointed Sabrina Bennett, Jeremiah's former wife, as the personal representative of Jeremiah's estate. Sabrina subsequently petitioned the district court for a declaration that Abel and Judy (the Bennetts) had no standing to claim wrongful death damages as a result of Jeremiah's death. The district court concluded that Jeremiah's children were the sole heirs of the estate and therefore had priority over any wrongful death and survivorship claims. The Bennetts petitioned the Supreme Court for supervisory control. The Court accepted the petition and vacated the portion of the district court's order holding that the Bennetts could not recover wrongful death claims as a matter of law, holding that the Bennetts were entitled to recover wrongful death damage as Jeremiah's parents and survivors. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Bennett" on Justia Law

The Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Board approved a revised neighborhood plan (Plan) created by the Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Committee (LNPC). The Flathead County Commissioners passed a resolution to adopt the Plan. Numerous property owners in Flathead County sought to have the Plan declared void, contending that the LNPC violated Montana's open meeting laws by holding unannounced meetings in private homes or via a private Yahoo Group website and that LNPC unlawfully destroyed public records by deleting files that had been posted to the Yahoo Group website. The district court entered judgment in favor of LNPC and Flathead County, concluding (1) LNPC initially failed to fully comply with the open meeting laws, but voiding the final Plan was not an appropriate remedy for the offense; and (2) the term "meetings" as defined by the relevant statute could not be held on Yahoo Group. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err (1) when it declined to void the Plan and determined that no relief was available on Plaintiffs' claims regarding the destruction of public records and violations of Montana's open meeting laws; and (2) in determining that an electronic meeting did not occur in this case. View "Allen v. Lakeside Neighborhood Planning Comm." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of sexual intercourse without consent, partner or family member assault, unlawful restraint, and violation of a no contact order. The district court sentenced Defendant to forty years imprisonment with twenty years suspended. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by allowing the State to question Defendant about his prior criminal history once he testified about the alleged victim's prior acts of violence against him, as the introduction of Defendant's criminal history, including convictions overturned by an appellate court for legal error, violated Defendant's right to a fair trial. View "State v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexual assault, among other crimes. Defendant was subsequently arrested in New Mexico pursuant to an arrest warrant. Defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual assault as part of a plea agreement. After a sentencing hearing, the district court ordered Defendant to pay $1069 in restitution to reimburse the State for the cost of extraditing Defendant from New Mexico and imposed a twenty-year term of imprisonment. The district court subsequently re-sentenced Defendant to a term of fifteen years but also imposed the original restitution order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the State was not a "victim" for the purposes of the restitution statutes, the district court lacked the authority to award restitution to the State. Remanded. View "State v. Brothers" on Justia Law