Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Tom Harpole, a former owner of real property in Powell County, sued First American Title Insurance Company and Powell County Title Company claiming they negligently misrepresented the status of the access road into his former property and thus foiled a potential sale of the property. The Third Judicial District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the title companies. Harpole appealed. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Harpole v. Powell Co. Title" on Justia Law

Michele Fogarty appealed the outcomes of four criminal misdemeanor cases at the Missoula Municipal Court. The cases were heard in bench trials, all on the same day, all with Fogarty acting pro se. Fogarty appealed her subsequent convictions on grounds that she had been denied her constitutional right to counsel. The District Court affirmed the convictions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed them too. View "City of Missoula v. Fogarty" on Justia Law

Defendant Jimmie Aker appealed his conviction by jury of sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant appealed the conviction on grounds that the prosecutor committed plain error during closing argument and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Montana v. Aker" on Justia Law

The State appealed a jury verdict that awarded damages to L. Fred Weaver, Joan Weaver and Vicki Weaver. The Weavers had sued the State over negligent fire containment procedures on their real property. The State argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss the Weavers' negligence claim; (2) whether the trial court did not allow the State to assert a "public duty doctrine" defense; (3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the jury to find the state negligent without expert testimony to establish the standard of care; and (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the State's motion to change venue. Finding no errors or abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Weaver v. DNRC" on Justia Law

Robert Lee Colton Dietsch appealed his conviction for sexual assault of a twelve-year-old girl. Dietsch was seventeen at the time of the alleged assault. The State charged Dietsch as an adult. Dietsch moved to transfer prosecution from the district court to the youth court. The district court denied the motion. Dietsch later entered into a plea agreement whereby he agreed to plead guilt to one count of sexual assault in exchange for the State's agreement to drop a sexual consent without consent charge. Ultimately Dietsch received a deferred sentence of six years and sixty days. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Dietsch argued the district court abused its discretion in refusing to transfer his case to the youth court. The Supreme Court concluded sufficient evidence supported the district court's decision. However, the Court concluded the district court erred in its imposition of certain conditions on Dietsch, including setting an indeterminate amount for restitution, and failing to retain jurisdiction over the case until Dietsch reached age 21. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montana v. Dietsch" on Justia Law

Appellant Laura Lee Neva sued Appellee Jim Bates, arguing he violated Montana's Human Rights Act by halting necessary repairs to a commercial building she rented from him because she rebuffed his sexual advances. In her complaint to the Human Rights Commission, Appellant alleged violation of the Public Accommodations Provision but made no mention of the Real-Estate Transaction Provision. The Commission nevertheless found that Appellee violated the Real-Estate Transaction Provision by sexually harassing Appellant while she was leasing the space from him. The District Court reversed that decision, holding that the Commission’s action violated Appellee's right to due process. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the District Court erred in its conclusion that Appellee was not afforded due process when Appellant brought claims under section 49-2-304 of the Act, but that the Commission did not find he violated section 49-2-305. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that the essential difference between a 49-2-304 claim and a 49-2-305 claim was the setting of the discrimination: a place of public accommodation as opposed to a real-estate transaction. "The setting here was fully litigated, as was the discrimination- Bates' sexual harassment of Neva." The Court concluded Appellee understood the issues as was afforded full opportunity to justify his conduct. Therefore, his due process rights were not violated. View "Bates v. Neva" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal arose from the district court's order certifying a class in Plaintiff's class action against Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company. Plaintiff's class action claim arose out of the Supreme Court's remand of his initial non-class third-party claim against Allstate in Jacobsen I. In Jacobsen I, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Allstate for, among other causes of action, violations of the Montana Unfair Trade Practices Act. Plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages. The Supreme Court ultimately remanded the case for a new trial. On remand, Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, proposing a class definition encompassing all unrepresented individuals who had either third- or first-party claims against Allstate and whose claims were adjusted by Allstate using its Claim Core Process Redesign program. The district court certified the class. The Supreme Court affirmed the class certification but modified the certified class on remand, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying the Mont. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) class action but that the certification of class-wide punitive damages was inappropriate in the context of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Remanded. View "Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Landowners protested pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 76-2-205(6) to block the Board of County Commissioners of Missoula County from establishing a special zoning district north of Lolo, Montana. Landowners effectively blocked the zoning proposal pursuant to section 76-2-205(6). L. Reed Williams filed a complaint against Commissioners, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Landowners intervened in the action. The district court denied Landowners' motion to dismiss and granted summary judgment to Williams and Commissioners, concluding that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and an unconstitutional violation of the right to equal protection and the right to suffrage. The Supreme Court upheld the Commissioners' adoption of the special zoning district and affirmed the district court, holding that the district court did not err in (1) denying Landowners' motion to dismiss Williams' complaint for failure to join them as necessary parties; (2) determining that section 76-2-205(6) was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power; and (3) ruling that section 76-2-205(6) was severable from the remainder of the statute. View "Williams v. Bd. of County Commr's" on Justia Law

Concerned that Defendant had collided with a fire hydrant, a police officer approached Defendant's vehicle and spoke to Defendant, at which time he noticed indicators that Defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. The officer ultimately arrested Defendant and cited him for driving under the influence (DUI). Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the stop. The municipal court denied the motion, concluding that the caretaker doctrine started the stop, and it ripened into a proper DUI investigation. Defendant subsequently pled guilty to DUI. The district court affirmed the denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the district court based its reasoning on the community caretaker doctrine, the motion to suppress was appropriately denied on the ground that there was particularized suspicion for the stop. View "State v. Marcial" on Justia Law

In 2010, Irene and John Moerman each signed an oil and gas lease with Prairie Rose Resources. In 2011, the Moermans filed a complaint for declaratory judgment claiming that their leases with Prairie had expired because, inter alia, Prairie had failed to establish oil production until after the expiration of the primary term of the lease. Prairie counterclaimed for a declaration that the lease remained in effect. The district court entered judgment in favor of Prairie and awarded Prairie its attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that the parties' oil and gas leases remained in effect; and (2) because the Moermans failed to establish that the leases had been forfeited, Prairie's attorney fees in defending the action were recoverable. View "Moerman v. Prairie Rose Res., Inc." on Justia Law