Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pam, Allan, and Charles and Mary Lou Dees (the Dees) started a business, Great Falls Portables, Inc. (GFP), with Allan acting as sole manager of the business. Pam subsequently took over management. The Dees later filed a complaint against Pam, GFP, and others. A month later, Pam and Allan, who were married but separated, entered into a settlement agreement that provided that Pam would be responsible to the Dees for any obligation owed them in connection with their interest in GFP. In litigation with the Dees, Pam filed a third-party complaint against Allan, alleging (1) the Dees' complaint arose out of Allan's fraudulent activity (Count I), (2) Allan had fraudulently induced Pam to enter the agreement assigning responsibility for the Dees' interest (Count II), and (3) Allan must indemnify her from liability to the Dees (Count III). The district court granted summary judgment to Allan on all three counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly determined that (1) Pam failed to plead fraud with sufficient particularity; (2) Pam failed to show reliance on Allan's representations; and (3) Count III of Pam's complaint was dependent on and related back to Counts I and II. View "Fossen v. Fossen" on Justia Law

After leaving her job as a bus driver, Plaintiff applied for unemployment benefits with the Montana Department of Labor and Industry. The Department determined that Plaintiff was not qualified to receive unemployment benefits. The Boar of Labor Appeals affirmed. Plaintiff subsequently filed a petition for review in the district court. The district court denied Plaintiff's petition for failure to comply with Rule 2 of the Montana Uniform District Court Rules because Plaintiff had not filed a supporting brief or stated issues of law for review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred when it denied Plaintiff's petition for failure to include a supplemental brief because the provisions of Rule 2 do not apply to a petition for judicial review. View "Jacky v. Avitus Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for Union Pacific Railroad Company as a locomotive engineer until his retirement in 2008. After an MRI showed evidence that Plaintiff suffered from a degenerative disc disease, Plaintiff filed a report of personal injury with Union Pacific. Three years later, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Union Pacific under the Federal Employers' Liability act (FELA) for the back and leg injuries he allegedly sustained during his employment. Union Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred under FELA's three-year statute of limitations because Plaintiff sought medical help as early as 2000. The district court granted Union Pacific's motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred, and Union Pacific was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Bridgman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co" on Justia Law

Terry Willis purchased a tract of property with funds that were apparently the proceeds from illegal drug sales. After Willis failed to make a payment, David Ferterrer contributed approximately half of the late payment. Willis was later sentenced to life imprisonment for drug-related crimes, which left him unable to pay for the property as the contract for deed contemplated. The parties agreed that Ferterrer would be responsible for completing the payments to purchase the property. Ferterrer also removed funds from Willis's checking account to prevent federal authorities from seizing those funds. Armed with a notarized agreement allegedly from Willis to sell the property to Ferterrer (the Deed), Ferterrer obtained a loan to purchase the property. Willis subsequently filed an action challenging Ferterrer's ownership of the property, also alleging that Ferterrer had converted the funds from Willis's bank account. The district court affirmed the validity of the Deed and concluded that Fertterer had not converted any funds belonging to Willis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's findings of fact; and (2) the district court properly determined that Willis failed to prove that Fertterer had converted funds from Willis's bank account. View "Willis v. Fertterer" on Justia Law

Decedent was the sister of Linda Hyde and the mother of Kelli Martin. Martin petitioned the district court to adjudicate that her mother died intestate and to appoint her as Decedent's personal representative. Hyde opposed the petition, asserting that Decedent had previously executed a will naming Hyde as executrix. The district court concluded that Decedent had revoked the will, and therefore ruled that Harless died intestate and that Martin was entitled to be appointed as personal representative. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Decedent's will was a valid will that Decedent did not revoke. Remanded with instructions that Decedent's will be probated. View "In re Estate of Harless" on Justia Law

Thomas Madsen, a sheriff's deputy, was charged with mistreating prisoners pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-204 for his behavior toward K.J., a female juvenile who was brought to the county law and justice center at the request of her parents for assistance in getting her transported to residential treatment. Madsen moved to dismiss the charge, contending that K.J. was not a prisoner under section 45-5-204. The district court agreed and dismissed the charge against Madsen because K.J. was a juvenile, had not been convicted of an offense, and was not being held in a State facility. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that, under the circumstances, K.J. was a prisoner under section 45-5-204(1), and the charging information filed in this case was adequate to state an offense. View "State v. Madsen" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of three counts of omitting material facts relating to his offer and sale of a security. Defendant appealed, arguing that the multiple charges statute, Mont. Code Ann. 46-11-410, precluded his convictions on two of the three counts with which he was charged. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment as to two of Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the State's assertion that "each count had a different element" was incorrect, as each count had the same statutory element, and the offenses arose from the same transaction; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in denying Defendant's motion under section 46-11-410. Remanded. View "State v. Parks" on Justia Law

After Father's four children were removed from his care, the district court terminated Father's parental rights to the children, concluding that Father failed to complete several tasks in his treatment plan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Father failed to preserve for review the issue of his treatment plan's appropriateness when he did not timely object to the plan; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by terminating Father's parental rights without also terminating Mother's parental rights; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that terminating Father's parental rights was in the children's best interest. View "In re T.S." on Justia Law

Mont. Code Ann. 15-6-218 grants tax exemption to intangible personal property and defines intangible personal property. The statute lists "goodwill" as the one non-exhaustive example of intangible property that lacks physical existence. The Department of Revenue implements the statute with Mont. Admin. R. 42.22.110. In 2010, the Department amended its definitions of intangible personal property and goodwill. The district court found that the new definitions of intangibles and goodwill imposed additional and contradictory requirements on state law and that the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported the Department's new rules. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly concluded (1) the Department's regulation defining goodwill was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(b); (2) the Department's regulation defining intangible personal property was invalid because it conflicted with section 15-6-218(2)(a); and (3) the valuation manuals adopted by the Department were invalid to the extent they supported its new rules. View "Gold Creek Cellular of Mont. Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Revenue " on Justia Law

Keith Davies was run over by a tractor-trailer driven by Paul Tychsen, who worked for Dick Irvin, Inc. Davies, who worked for Great Falls Sand and Gravel (GFSG), was directing traffic when the truck struck him. The incident occurred during a project to construct a Flying J Travel Plaza. GFSG subcontracted for the road work and submitted a traffic control plan to the State, which approved of the plan. Davies filed a negligence action against Irvin. Irvin filed a third-party complaint seeking contribution from the State, alleging that the State negligently approved the traffic control plan. Irvin subsequently settled Davies' claims. In regard to Irvin's third-party claims against the State, the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the State did not owe any duty to Irvin or Davies. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State had no statutory or common law duty to Irvin or Davies. View "Dick Irvin, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law