Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to failure to register as a sexual or violent offender. The district court sentenced Defendant to Montana State Prison, not to the Department of Corrections as agreed - for three years, all suspended, and imposed eight probation conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court erred by rejecting the plea agreement without allowing Defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea; (2) the district did not err by imposing seven of the conditions on Defendant’s sentence; and (3) Defendant failed to preserve his argument that the use of the term “pornography” rendered the remaining condition unconstitutionally vague. View "State v. Nauman" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of felony sexual intercourse without consent and felony sexual assault. Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution to compensate the victims for fifty-two hours of counseling. Appellant later filed a petition for remission of restitution. The district court denied Appellant’s order after a hearing at which the victims testified. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court was well within the bounds of reason in determining that Appellant should not be released from his restitution obligation. View "State v. Passmore" on Justia Law

The predecessor in interest to 71 Ranch filed statements of claim for four right rights located on Confederate Creek (Creek Rights), describing a new point of diversion and place of use for the Creek Rights. Donald Marks, whose water rights were junior to the Creek Rights, filed an objection to the Creek Rights’ place of use and point of diversion. The Montana Water Court dismissed Marks’ objection, concluding that Marks failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut 71 Ranch’s claimed point of diversion and place of use for its water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court correctly concluded that Marks failed to present sufficient evidence to contradict 71 Ranch’s claimed point of diversion and place of use for its water rights. View "Marks v. 71 Ranch" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who was injured while performing her work duties, filed a workers’ compensation claim. Liberty Northwest (Liberty), the insurer for the claim, terminated Petitioner’s temporary partial disability (TPD) benefits after Petitioner revoked releases and authorizations she had previously signed allowing Liberty and its agents to have ex parte communications with her medical care providers. Petitioner filed an action asserting that the statutes relied upon by Liberty to terminate her medical benefits, Mont. Code Ann. 39-71-604 and Mont. Code Ann. 50-16-527, were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Court (WCC) determined that section 39-71-604(3), as applied in Petitioner’s case, violated Petitioner’s constitutional right of privacy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the WCC did not err in concluding that section 39-71-604(3) violated Petitioner’s right of privacy set forth in the Montana Constitution. View "Malcomson v. Liberty Northwest" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to felony criminal endangerment and misdemeanor aggravated driving under the influence. At a sentencing hearing, the State, as agreed, recommended a six-year commitment to the Department of Corrections, with three years suspended. The district court declining to adopt the sentence recommendation and sentenced Defendant to ten years suspended. Defendant subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that the district court failed to comply with Mont. Code Ann. 46-12-211(4) because the court had not informed him that it was rejecting the agreement and had not offered him the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied Defendant’s motion. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence and reversed and remanded for another sentencing hearing, holding that the district court failed to comply with section 46-12-211(4) when it departed from the plea agreement without providing Defendant with the full advisory required by the statute. View "State v. Zunick" on Justia Law

After Norman Benjamin, the father of Delmar and Cecil, passed away, Cecil, who was named personal representative in Norman’s will, filed a petition for determination of testacy, for determination of devisees and for settlement and distribution of a testate estate. After a hearing, the probate court entered a decree approving the petition, which designated Norman’s wife, Joyce, as the sole devisee under the will. Delmar filed an action against Cecil and Joyce, alleging that Cecil violated his fiduciary duty by distributing Norman’s tangible personal property by distributing it among Norman’s other children, but not to Delmar. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Delmar’s claim. Subsequently, Delmar filed a petition to reopen probate, alleging that Cecil misrepresented the extent of Norman’s tangible personal property and engaged in self-dealing with regard to this property and that there was newly discovered tangible personal property that needed to be distributed. The district court sua sponte denied Delmar’s petition under principles of res judicata. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that res judicata did not bar Delmar’s fraud and newly discovered tangible personal property claims in this case. View "In re Estate of Benjamin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of deliberate homicide. The Supreme Court remanded the case to correct illegal portions of the sentence. On remand, the district court filed a first amended judgment and sentence sentencing Defendant to a term of commitment and recommending conditions of parole and ordering conditions of probation, one of which was payment of restitution. Because the district court never specified the amount of restitution to be paid, the State filed a motion for a ruling on restitution. The district court then entered a second amended judgment and sentence ordering Defendant to pay $16,361 in restitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) had the authority to specify in its second amended judgment and sentence the total amount of restitution; (2) did not err by recommending parole restrictions; and (3) did not improperly base the length of Defendant’s sentence on the amount of time it would take her to pay restitution. View "State v. Winter" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in a van that was parked at a park. A police officer parked behind the van, approached the van, and asked the driver for her driver’s license and Defendant for identification. After learning that the driver did not have a license and that Defendant had an outstanding warrant, the officer placed Defendant under arrest. Defendant subsequently produced a baggie filled a methamphetamine. Defendant filed a motion to suppress her statements and the evidence, arguing that the officer lacked particularized suspicion to perform an investigatory stop when he asked her and the driver for identification. The district court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that there had not been a seizure for which particularized suspicion was required. Thereafter, Defendant pled guilty to one count of criminal possession of dangerous drugs, a felony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was not particularized suspicion to stop or seize the driver that could support or properly lead to the subsequent investigation of Defendant. Remanded. View "State v. Strom" on Justia Law

The State filed a petition for involuntary commitment of A.M. The district court appointed the Office of the State Public Defender to represent A.M. No friend was appointed. At an initial hearing at which A.M. appeared with counsel via video conferencing, A.M. stipulated that he had a mental disorder from a traumatic brain injury. The district court approved the stipulation. The court then found there was sufficient evidence in the record, together with the parties’ stipulation, that A.M. had a mental disorder requiring commitment. The court entered an order mandating that A.M. be committed to the Montana State Hospital. A.M. appealed, arguing that the district court erred when it issued the commitment order without obtaining from him an intentional and knowing waiver of his procedural rights as required by Mont. Code Ann. 53-21-119(1). The Supreme Court reversed the order of A.M.’s commitment, holding that no evidence was presented and no record was made in this case establishing a knowing and intentional waiver of A.M.’s procedural rights. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled no contest to the felony offense of mitigated deliberate homicide. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his no contest plea, which the district court denied. Appellant appealed from the denial of his motion but later waived his appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel against his trial and appellate counsel. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Appellant’s petition for postconviction relief, holding (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to provide to Appellant a copy of a report by a forensic pathologist, but Appellant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s error; and (2) Appellant failed to establish that appellate counsel was deficient by advising Appellant to withdraw his direct appeal in order to file a petition for postconviction relief. View "Haagenson v. State" on Justia Law