Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jayson O’Neill requested to examine certain documents from the Office of the Governor of Montana, specifically 2021 Agency Bill Monitoring Forms (ABMs) and related emails. The Governor’s office denied the request, citing attorney-client privilege. O’Neill argued that the documents should be produced with redactions and a detailed privilege log. The Governor’s office maintained that the documents were entirely privileged but offered to provide a privilege log and documents for in camera review if directed by a court.O’Neill filed a complaint seeking an order to produce the requested documents under Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution. The Governor asserted executive and deliberative process privileges. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The First Judicial District Court partially granted O’Neill’s motion, holding that Montana law did not recognize executive or deliberative process privileges and required in camera review to determine the applicability of attorney-client privilege and privacy exceptions. The Governor’s subsequent motion for relief from judgment was deemed denied.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Montana law does recognize a form of gubernatorial privilege rooted in the state’s constitutional history, allowing the Governor to receive candid advice necessary for executing constitutional duties. However, this privilege is not absolute and must be assessed through in camera review to determine if the information is essential and if its disclosure would chill future candor. The court reversed the lower court’s ruling that no form of executive privilege is recognized in Montana but affirmed the need for in camera review to evaluate the claims of privilege. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "O'Neill v. Gianforte" on Justia Law

Tintina Montana, Inc. sought to operate an underground copper mine in Meagher County, Montana, which required the removal of substantial quantities of groundwater. Tintina planned to use part of this water for mining operations and return the rest to the aquifer. Montana Trout Unlimited and other environmental groups (collectively "MTU") challenged the issuance of a water use permit by the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) for the mine's operations, arguing that the removal and discharge of water should be considered a beneficial use requiring a permit under the Montana Water Use Act (MWUA).The Fourteenth Judicial District Court denied MTU's petition for judicial review and affirmed DNRC's decision. The court held that DNRC correctly categorized the removal and discharge of water as neither a beneficial use nor waste, thus falling outside the permitting process of the MWUA. The court also found that DNRC's interpretation of the MWUA did not contravene the Montana Constitution.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that DNRC's longstanding interpretation of the MWUA, which categorizes mine dewatering as neither a beneficial use nor waste, was reasonable and consistent with legislative intent. The court also concluded that the MWUA's exclusion of mine dewatering from the permitting process did not render the Act unconstitutional, as the primary purpose of the MWUA is to regulate water rights, not the water resource itself. The court noted that other statutory frameworks, such as the Montana Water Quality Act and the Metal Mine Reclamation Act, provide for the regulation of water quality and environmental impacts. View "Trout Unlimited v. DNRC" on Justia Law

Flathead Properties, L.L.C. (Appellant) owned a tract of land along Flathead Lake that became an island during certain months due to rising water levels. In 2011, Appellant received a permit from the Flathead County Planning and Zoning Office to build a bridge connecting the island to the peninsula. The Community Association for North Shore Conservation (C.A.N.S.C.) challenged the permit, arguing it violated the Montana Lakeshore Protection Act. The District Court voided the permit and ordered the bridge's removal, a decision upheld by the Montana Supreme Court.Following the Supreme Court's decision, Appellant filed a claim for inverse condemnation against Flathead County, arguing that the court-ordered removal of the bridge constituted a taking of its vested property interest, requiring compensation. The County filed a motion to dismiss under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that since the permit was void ab initio, Appellant never had a vested property interest. The District Court granted the motion, agreeing with the County's reasoning.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and reversed the District Court's decision. The Court held that Appellant's complaint contained sufficient facts to support a claim for inverse condemnation or, alternatively, a regulatory takings claim. The Court noted that Appellant had a constitutionally protected property interest in the bridge once it was built and that the County's actions in issuing and then voiding the permit could be seen as a taking requiring just compensation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Flathead Properties L.L.C. v. Flathead Cty" on Justia Law

Danielle Wood was charged with deliberate homicide for the shooting death of Matthew LaFriniere. The State alleged that Wood purposely or knowingly caused LaFriniere's death by shooting him with a firearm. The case involved a tumultuous relationship between Wood and LaFriniere, including a custody battle over their child. On the evening of May 2, 2018, Wood received a text message purportedly from LaFriniere, stating he was delayed and instructing her to keep their child. Later that evening, LaFriniere was found dead with multiple gunshot wounds.The Montana Twentieth Judicial District Court, Sanders County, convicted Wood of deliberate homicide. Wood appealed, raising several issues, including the sufficiency of evidence for the State's alternative theory of accountability for deliberate homicide and the clarity of the jury verdict form. The District Court had allowed the State to amend the Information to include an alternative theory of accountability, which Wood contested. The jury was instructed on both direct deliberate homicide and accountability for deliberate homicide, but the verdict form did not distinguish between the two theories.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The Court found that the District Court erroneously submitted the State's alternative theory of accountability to the jury without sufficient supporting evidence. The Court also found that the verdict form provided to the jury was ambiguous and did not allow the jury to unambiguously declare Wood's guilt or innocence regarding each of the charged offenses or theories of criminal liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed Wood's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "State v. Wood" on Justia Law

Appellees Gordon Tait and Michelle Janz plan to build a residence at the base of their property adjacent to Whitefish Lake. The proposed access to their home is a narrow dirt road that crosses both Appellees’ and Appellants’ lots, part of an express easement allowing all lot owners to use the road. Appellants challenged this use, arguing the easement was intended only for summer access to the lake, not for regular travel to a residence, and that their properties would be unduly burdened by the construction.The Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, ruled in favor of Appellees, determining the easement’s language was specific and did not prohibit year-round use of the road. The court granted summary judgment to Appellees, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court examined the easement’s language and found it unambiguous regarding year-round use. The easement explicitly permitted motor vehicle traffic across a ten-foot right of way without seasonal limitations. The court noted that while the easement limited shared maintenance costs to summer use, it did not restrict the road’s use to summer months only. The court also found no basis to prohibit the use of the road for constructing a residence, as the easement did not limit the type of access provided.The court affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that the easement allowed year-round use and did not restrict the road’s use to accessing only non-residential structures. Concerns about potential overburdening of the easement due to construction were deemed speculative and not ripe for adjudication. View "Archer v. Tait" on Justia Law

The State of Montana charged Matthew Jason Welch with six counts of Deceptive Practices and four counts of Theft by Deception. Welch faced varying prison terms depending on the value of the property involved. On January 20, 2022, Welch entered a non-binding plea agreement, pleading guilty to all counts. The agreement recommended a sentence of 10 years with five suspended for each count, with some sentences running concurrently and others consecutively. However, the District Court rejected this recommendation and sentenced Welch to 10 years for each count, all running consecutively, resulting in a net sentence of 50 years with 50 suspended. Welch appealed the four illegal sentences, leading to a remand for resentencing within statutory limits.The District Court resentenced Welch to three years for each of the four counts, all running consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of 30 years with 30 suspended and 12 years DOC. Welch then moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing it was involuntary due to the illegal sentence, but the District Court denied the motion.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. The court held that Welch was not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because the State accepted a reduced sentence within legal limits, and Welch received the benefit of his bargain. The court also noted that Welch was aware the court was not bound by the plea agreement. The court affirmed the denial of Welch's motion to withdraw his guilty plea but remanded to correct the restitution amounts in the amended judgment to reflect the court's oral pronouncement. View "State v. Welch" on Justia Law

The defendant, Justin Guy Zeno Shawn Wolf Mason, was convicted of felony Partner and Family Member Assault (PFMA), misdemeanor Unlawful Restraint, and misdemeanor Resisting Arrest. He received a suspended five-year sentence for the PFMA charge, with probationary conditions, and concurrent six-month suspended sentences for the misdemeanors. Mason was required to comply with all laws and maintain contact with probation and parole.The Tenth Judicial District Court, Fergus County, revoked Mason's suspended sentence after he failed to report to probation and parole and was charged with misdemeanor assault following an altercation with a security guard. Mason argued that the court erred in finding him in violation of his probation terms, denying his motion to introduce video evidence, and revoking his suspended sentence.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the State had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Mason violated the conditions of his suspended sentence by being charged with misdemeanor assault. The court noted that a single violation is sufficient to support revocation. The court also held that the exclusion of the body camera footage was not prejudicial to Mason, as his testimony established conduct meriting revocation. Additionally, the court declined to exercise plain error review regarding the banishment provision, as it was part of a separate pre-trial diversion agreement and not directly related to the conditions Mason was accused of violating.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the revocation of Mason's suspended sentence, concluding that the State met its evidentiary burden, the exclusion of the video was not prejudicial, and the District Court did not commit plain error. View "State v. Mason" on Justia Law

A disabled woman, T.M.B., was sexually assaulted by an employee of West Mont, a nonprofit organization contracted by the State of Montana to provide community-based services for developmentally disabled individuals. T.M.B. sued both the State and West Mont, alleging they owed her a nondelegable duty of care. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, concluding neither owed a nondelegable duty of care for the employee’s criminal acts. T.M.B. appealed.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, found that the State had satisfied its statutory obligations by contracting with West Mont to provide services and did not owe a nondelegable duty to T.M.B. because she was not under state custody or control. The court also found that West Mont did not owe a nondelegable duty, as there was no statute or rule explicitly stating such a duty existed for state contractors operating community homes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision regarding the State, agreeing that the State did not have a close, continuing relationship with T.M.B. that would impose a nondelegable duty. However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision regarding West Mont, finding that the relationship between West Mont and T.M.B. was sufficiently close and continuing to impose a nondelegable duty under Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214. The court held that West Mont had a duty to protect T.M.B. from harm due to her dependence on their care and supervision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "T.M.B v. West Mont" on Justia Law

Donald Fleming filed a lawsuit against Caribou Creek Log Homes, Inc. and North Idaho Insulation, LLC, alleging that spray foam insulation installed by North Idaho Insulation caused significant structural damage to his residence in Montana. Fleming's claims included negligence, violations of residential construction defect statutes, the Montana Consumer Protection Act, and breach of warranties. North Idaho Insulation then filed a third-party complaint against Southwest Distributing Co. (Southwest), alleging that Southwest manufactured and sold the defective spray foam insulation and seeking indemnification and contribution.The Montana Nineteenth Judicial District Court denied Southwest's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that it had specific personal jurisdiction over Southwest under Montana Rule of Civil Procedure 4(b)(1). Southwest then petitioned the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control, arguing that the District Court erred in its jurisdictional ruling.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and determined that the District Court erred in concluding it had specific personal jurisdiction over Southwest. The Supreme Court found that Southwest did not transact business in Montana related to the claims and that the claims did not arise from Southwest's activities in Montana. Additionally, the Court held that the stream-of-commerce theory did not apply, as Southwest did not purposefully direct its activities toward Montana. Consequently, the Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of supervisory control, reversed the District Court's order, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Southwest v. 19th Judicial Dist." on Justia Law

Craig Baugh acquired a 20-acre tract of land in 1983 and another adjoining 20-acre tract in 1993, both located in a remote, forested area in Flathead County, Montana. In 2006, Baugh consolidated and subdivided the 40-acre aggregate into two new 20-acre tracts (Tract 1 and Tract 2) by certificate of survey (COS), which included a 20-foot wide access and utility easement on an existing road. Baugh sold Tract 2 to Florian Skyland in 2019, who later sold it to H2S2, LLC. H2S2 planned to develop a 32-unit short-term "glamping" business on Tract 2, which Baugh opposed, leading to a lawsuit.The District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, initially denied Baugh's request for a preliminary injunction but later granted summary judgment in his favor. The court concluded that H2S2's planned commercial use of the easement would exceed the intended scope of the easement, which was meant for single-family residential use. The court permanently enjoined H2S2's planned use and awarded Baugh prevailing party attorney fees, deeming H2S2's counterclaims for damages as frivolous.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's summary judgment that H2S2's proposed commercial use exceeded the authorized scope of the express easement. The court held that the easement's intended use was limited to single-family residential purposes, and H2S2's planned commercial use would significantly exceed this scope. However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's award of attorney fees to Baugh, concluding that the central issue was a bona fide dispute on the merits of the permissible use and scope of the easement, and thus, H2S2's counterclaims were not frivolous. The case was remanded for entry of a corresponding final judgment. View "Baugh v. H2S2, LLC" on Justia Law