Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was accused of multiple instances of sexual activity with C.M., a fourteen-year-old student at Billings Senior High School, where Defendant was employed as a teacher. C.M. subsequently took her own life. The State eventually charged Defendant with three counts of sexual intercourse without consent. Defendant pled guilty to one count of the charged offense, and the State recommended a prison sentence of twenty years with ten suspended. The district court, however, sentenced Defendant to fifteen years’ incarceration with all but thirty-one days suspended, indicating that C.M. had “control” of the situation with Defendant and that she was mature beyond her years. After significant public outcry, the district court apologized and published an order acknowledging the illegality of Defendant’s sentence. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment, holding (1) the sentence in this case was imposed under an inapplicable statute, and the illegality of the sentence could not be corrected by striking some portion of the offending language; and (2) reassignment to a new judge was necessary to preserve the appearance of fairness and justice in this matter. Remanded for resentencing.View "State v. Rambold" on Justia Law

Kelisa Allen and Justin Tucker were divorced in Arizona, after which Kelisa relocated to Montana with the parties’ two children. Kelisa later remarried, taking the surname, “Allen.” Kelisa subsequently sought to change the surnames of the children to Allen. The petition was granted. In the meantime, Kelisa filed a motion to suspend Justin’s contact with the children. The motion was granted, and Justin’s parenting time was suspended pending reevaluation of the custody agreement. Justin subsequently filed a complaint seeking to set aside the name changes. After the new action was assigned to a judge, Justin filed a motion for substitution, and the complaint was reassigned. The new judge sua sponte consolidated Justin’s new complaint with the name-change petition and parenting plan issues and consolidated the cases in front of the original judge. After a rehearing, the judge granted the name change. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) it determined that the Allen surname was in the best interest of the children, and (2) consolidating the case.View "Tucker v. Allen" on Justia Law

Chad Anderson and Karen Ann Anderson were married in 2003 and had four children. The parties separated in 2009. Chad later filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in which he requested primary residential custody of the children. Following a trial in 2013, the district court found that it was in the children’s best interests to remain in Karen Ann’s custody and ordered Chad to pay child support in an amount based on an average of Chad’s income for the previous three years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) considering the testimony of the children’s treating counselor to determine the children’s wishes regarding custody; and (2) determining the amount for Chad’s child support payment.View "In re Marriage of Anderson" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs. The State subsequently filed a petition to revoke Defendant’s deferred sentence based on her possession of oxycodone in violation of the conditions of her probation. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by her probation officer after a search of Defendant’s purse. The district court denied the motion and later revoked Defendant’s deferred sentences. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly concluded that the probation officer conducted a legitimate probation search based on reasonable suspicion and in thereby denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.View "State v. Fischer" on Justia Law

In 2009, Janet Gates gave birth to a daughter, BNY. Douglas Young was named on the child’s birth certificate as the child’s father and held himself out as the child’s father. In 2012, Gates sought primary residential custody of BNY. In this Silver Bow County proceeding, the parties stipulated to participate in DNA paternity testing, which indicated a “99.99% probability” that Young was BNY’s natural father. Gates subsequently brought an action in Madison County requesting that Michael Donahue undergo a paternity test to determine if Donahue was BNY’s father. Gates then moved for an order requiring Donahue to undergo a blood DNA test and Young to undergo a sterility test. The Madison County district court granted Donahue’s motion to dismiss and denied Gates’ motion for paternity and sterility tests. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting Donahue’s motion to dismiss, as Gates failed to rebut the presumption of paternity in favor of Young, and judicial estoppel provided an independent and appropriate basis for the district court’s order dismissing Gates’ action.View "J.L.G. v. M.F.D." on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between property owners in a subdivision developed by Christopher and Jeffrey Houden. In 2007, twenty-three lot owners (“Defendants”) voted to record an amendment (“second amendment”) to the original covenants for the subdivision that prohibited division of the Houdens’ lot. The Houdens filed a complaint against Defendants seeking injunctive relief to declare the second amendment invalid. During the ensuing litigation, the lot owners passed another amendment (“third amendment”) purporting to revoke the second amendment. In 2010, the Houdens and all Defendants except Wayne Todd entered into a settlement agreement which set forth restated covenants expressly prohibiting amendment to prevent subdivision of the Houdens’ lot. The district court subsequently entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Houdens and against Todd, declaring the second and third amendments null and void and ordering that the Houdens were entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to a provision in the original covenants. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment in the Houdens’ favor, as the restated covenants mooted the underlying merits of the case; and (2) affirmed the district court’s determination that the Houdens’ were entitled to attorney’s fees.View "Houden v. Todd" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned rural property, including a tract referred to as Section 27, that Defendants, who owned adjacent property, used to cross with their cattle and to conduct other ranching operations. Plaintiff filed an action seeking to exclude Defendants from crossing Section 27 and claiming damages for trespass. Defendants counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the road across Section 27 was a public road or, alternatively, for a declaration that they had a prescriptive easement to use the road. After a trial, the district court concluded that Defendants established a prescriptive right to cross Section 27 for their ranching and other uses of their adjacent land. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in determining that Defendants established a prescriptive easement across Plaintiffs’ property and properly determined the scope of the easement based upon the evidence in the record. View "Lyndes v. Green" on Justia Law

In 2009, Kristine Davenport sought to disqualify Justice of the Peace John Odlin for cause from presiding in two misdemeanor cases against Davenport. The district court denied Davenport’s motion to disqualify Odlin. Davenport subsequently filed a flurry of motions, briefs, and requests, which the district court denied. On August 23, 2011, the district court entered an amended order imposing Mont. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions and ordered Davenport to pay $2,500 within thirty days. Davenport appealed the district court’s refusal to disqualify Odlin pursuant to her affidavits of disqualification. The Supreme Court held that Davenport’s affidavits did not comply with the good faith requirement in Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-805(1)(b) and that her arguments failed. Subsequently, on April 1, 2013, the district court again amended its order to impose jail time on Davenport should she fail to pay the $2,500 Rule 11 sanctions within thirty days. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s April 1, 2013 order must be set aside and its August 23, 2011 amended order reinstated because the district court incorrectly amended its order a year and a half after the matter should have terminated. View "Davenport v. Odlin" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Montana Board of Oil and Gas Conservation (MBOGC) adopted special statewide temporary spacing units for certain wells. Petitioners = filed a petition for judicial review of MBOGC’s order, stating that it was filed pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 82-11-144 and Mont. Code Ann. 2-4-702. The district court dismissed Petitioners’ proceeding, stating that the “sole remedy for a person aggrieved by an order of the MBOGC was a challenge under Montana Code Ann. 82-11-144.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the action, as Petitioners’ allegations, coupled with their express reliance upon section 82-11-144 as a legal basis for their petition, should have been sufficient to save their petition from dismissal on the ground that they had not pursued their “sole remedy” of proceeding under that statute. View "Ostby v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation" on Justia Law

In 2010, Lewis and Clark County filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, asking the district court to declare that the entirety of Eagle Ridge Road was a sixty-foot public or county road or a sixty-foot public access easement from its intersection with Birdseye Road. After discussing the Supreme Court’s prior holding concerning Eagle Ridge Road in Schroeder v. Lewis & Clark County (Schroeder I), the district court determined that a portion of Eagle Ridge Road was not a public road and that no public prescriptive right existed over that portion of the road. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court may not revisit its ruling in Schroeder I; and (2) the district court did not misapply the law or misapprehend the evidence of prescriptive use when it determined that public prescriptive right exists over a portion of Eagle Ridge Road.View "Lewis Clark County v. Schroeder" on Justia Law