Justia Montana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Upon the dissolution of their marriage, Husband and Wife entered into a dissolution settlement agreement that provided that Wife was entitled to half of Husband’s federal retirement benefits entered during the parties’ marriage. Wife later sought an order to show cause alleging that Husband violated the agreement by not naming her as the beneficiary of his Survivorship Benefit Plan. The district court granted Wife’s motion, concluding that the agreement awarded Wife a portion of Husband’s Survivorship Annuity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the agreement reflected the parties’ intent that Husband was to retain ownership of the Survivorship Annuity after the dissolution. View "In re Marriage of Bushnell" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of assault with a weapon and one count of criminal mischief. An affidavit by the victim indicated that he suffered $6,418 in medical and dental expenses related to the assault, but the victim’s insurer paid for some portion of that total. The district court required Defendant to pay $6,418 in restitution to the victim. Defendant appealed, arguing that his restitution to the victim should be reduced by the amount paid by the insurer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly applied the law in determining that Defendant was not entitled to an offset in his restitution based on the victim’s insurance compensation, as the victim and his insurer were entitled to any damages that could be pursued against Defendant in a civil action, regardless of any subrogation issues between them. View "State v. Fenner" on Justia Law

In 1988, Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor assault and felony sexual intercourse without consent and was also designated a persistent felony offender (PFO). In 2013, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was wrongly sentenced for both the underlying felony and his PFO status. The Supreme Court granted the petition and remanded for correction of the illegal sentence. On remand, the district court resentenced Appellant during a status conference docketed under a newly-created civil cause number when neither Defendant nor his attorney were present. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was sentenced with a complete lack of statutory or constitutional process. Remanded for a sentencing hearing.View "State v. McEvoy" on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiff’s floral shop was destroyed by a fire. State Farm Casualty Insurance Company, with whom Plaintiff had an insurance policy for her business, paid Plaintiff the maximum amount available under her policy, which was approximately $21,105. Plaintiff filed suit against State Farm and insurance agent Shawn Ori, alleging that Ori, acting as State Farm’s agent, had a professional duty to ascertain or advise her of the adequate amount of coverage for her business and that his failure to do so constituted professional negligence. State Farm and Ori jointly moved for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff failed to name an expert witness to establish the standard of care applicable to an insurance agent. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that expert testimony was required to establish the standard of care to which Ori was required to conform. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s failure to obtain an expert witness resulted in an insufficiency of proof regarding duty and thus prevented Plaintiff from establishing a prima facie claim of negligence. View "Dulaney v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the water rights to a well (“disputed well”). In 1982, Carl Kambich filed a statement of claim for existing water rights. In 1990, Kambich filed a notice of transfer of water right to Randall and Ila Mae Brooks. The current Water Court case involved the claim originally filed by Kambich and amended by the Brooks. Ernest Nelson objected to the claim, arguing that he was the owner of the disputed well. After a hearing, the Water Master found that the claim belonged to the Brooks and that, although Nelson had presented some valid questions regarding the history of the well, he had failed to overcome the prima facie proof in the statement of claim. The Water Court dismissed Nelson’s objections to the water rights claim by the Brooks. The Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court’s order, holding that the Brooks’ well claim was valid. View "Nelson v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Abraham and Betty Jean Morrow filed a request for a modification of their home loan, serviced by Bank of America, through the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. Bank of America denied the modification and scheduled a trustee’s sale of the property. The Morrows subsequently filed a complaint against Bank of America based on the bank’s alleged breach of an oral contract for modification of their loan. The district court granted summary judgment to Bank of America, concluding (1) the Morrows’ claims for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) were barred by the Statute of Frauds; and (2) the Morrows could not succeed on their claims of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Bank of America owed no duty to the Morrows. The Supreme Court reversed as to the negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of MCPA claims, holding that Bank of America owed a duty to the Morrows, genuine issues of material fact existed as to some claims, and the Statute of Frauds did not preclude the remainder of the Morrows’ claims. View "Morrow v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiff rented an apartment from Defendant, a residential hotel. After Plaintiff’s tenancy terminated, she filed suit against Defendant for failing to return her $500 security deposit within thirty days. During the discovery process, Defendant failed to provide informal or formal discovery, resulting in entry of an order compelling discovery and granting Plaintiff her attorney fees as a sanction against Defendant. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for sanctions due to Defendant's continued failure to provide discovery. After a hearing at which Defendant did not appear, the court granted the motion for sanctions and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, which the justice court denied. Defendant filed a notice of appeal, which Plaintiff moved to dismiss, contending that the notice of appeal was not timely filed and that, although the judgment had already been satisfied, Defendant’s failure to file an undertaking required dismissal. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the notice of appeal was timely filed and that no undertaking was required due to the satisfaction of judgment. Remanded. View "Guethlein v. Family Inn" on Justia Law

The district court adjudicated M.J.C. a youth in need of care and granted temporary legal custody of M.J.C. to the Department of Public Health and Human Services based on physical neglect by Mother, and absence of a father. A court-ordered paternity test later determined D.W. to be the father of M.J.C. After Mother and D.W. failed to comply with the requirements of their treatment plans, the State filed a petition to terminate their parental rights. The district court terminated the parental rights of Mother and D.W. after a hearing. D.W. appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s determination was supported by clear and convincing evidence.View "In re M.J.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs entered into a contract for professional services with CTA, Inc., a firm offering architectural, engineering, and construction management services. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against CTA and others, alleging that Defendants negligently designed and constructed Plaintiffs’ home and that CTA breached its contract with Plaintiffs. CTA filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court treated as a motion for summary judgment, on grounds that the contract was subject to mandatory arbitration. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment, alleging that the arbitration clause in the contract was unenforceable. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the arbitration clause was enforceable because it was within Plaintiffs’ reasonable expectations and was not oppressive, unconscionable, or against public policy.View "Day v. CTA, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1983, Marilyn and Stanley Hedrick executed a joint will. When Stanley died in 1995, his estate passed to Marilyn. The next year, Marilyn transferred much of her property to the Marilyn M. Hedrick 1996 Living Trust. Sheena Lamach, one of Stanley’s children from another marriage, was not included as a beneficiary of Marilyn’s trust. Marilyn died in 2012, and the estate entered informal probate. Under the terms of the joint will, the residue of Marilyn’s estate, which consisted of the proceeds from the sale of Marilyn’s home and personal property, was to be divided equally among the couple’s six children. Leroy Lamach, the husband and attorney-in-fact of Sheena, filed a petition objecting to the proposed distribution, arguing that the transfer of assets to the trust violated the terms of the joint will and asking that the trust assets be distributed equally among the six children. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lamach, concluding that the joint will prohibited Marilyn from transferring property to the trust after Stanley’s death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the will allowed Marilyn to transfer property into a trust during her lifetime.View "In re Estate of Hedrick" on Justia Law